



Introduction

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IN NOVEMBER 2007, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) marked forty years of existence and its ten member states signed an ASEAN Charter that would provide the legal and institutional framework for the organization. The Charter, in its preamble, refers to their commitment to “intensifying community building through enhanced regional cooperation and integration, in particular by establishing an ASEAN Community comprising the ASEAN Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, as provided for in the Bali Declaration of ASEAN Concord II.”

Even while it has taken ASEAN forty years to institute a formal framework that would henceforth direct its efforts at building a Southeast Asian community, it has also been at the hub of parallel initiatives to involve other regional countries in multilateral cooperative arrangements, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Plus Three, and most recently the East Asia Summit which is expected to pave the way for a putative East Asian Community. Beyond East Asia, ASEAN is actively engaged in trans-regional dialogues including the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the Forum for East Asia and Latin American Countries (FEALAC), giving substance to its principle of open regionalism.

A number of new trends and developments appear to be pushing the East Asian community building project forward. At the global or trans-regional level, these include the perceived shortcomings, in the face of increasing interdependence and globalization, of more comprehensive regimes such as World Trade Organization and APEC, or even the United Nations, in addressing the challenges of building the post-Cold War

architecture for international politics and the international economy. By their default, states are opting for smaller and more manageable arenas where both collective rule-making and the promotion of national interests may be effectively pursued. Regionally, the more important factors driving an East Asian community at this historical juncture include the rapid pace of economic integration taking place, the rise of China and the strong need perceived by neighboring states to engage it, the weakened resistance by the United States to the idea of a regional grouping that does not formally include it, and crucially, ASEAN's willingness to play the role of a norm-entrepreneur¹ and organizer of the community building efforts, and other countries' willingness to accept such a role.

There are indeed indications that community building is being driven by different and at times seemingly contradictory forces, such as the need to hedge against uncertainty – emanating from what Peou in this volume calls the Hobbesian/Lockean viewpoint, and on the other hand, the Kantian desire to construct a new social reality characterized by inter-state cooperation and harmony. Most authors in this volume also emphasize that community building in East Asia is work in progress, and moreover still in its early stages, being neither irreversible nor hopeless. But the careful analyses devoted by our chapter writers – and many others now adding to the growing literature on regional communities – give us a sense that we are standing witness to an important new phenomenon, perhaps one that may even have the potential to transform international politics as we know it. And perhaps not.

How ASEAN defines its own community building process in terms of the three pillars – security community, economic community and socio-cultural community – raises interesting questions about the divisibility of such a process, or from the opposite view, the connectedness of their respective goals of peace, development, and concord or harmony. While it may be conceivable to attain one goal ahead of the others, it seems close to impossible to imagine how any one of them might be sustained without attainment of the other two. Indivisibility and interconnectedness aside, one must acknowledge that it is in the domain of security where the community building process in this and many other regions of the world encounters the most obstacles and pitfalls. Power rivalries, territorial and boundary disputes, arms races, terrorism, human trafficking, resource competition are but some of the extant issues that come to mind.

Amitav Acharya, in *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (Routledge, 2001) examines the extent to which ASEAN may already have become a “security community”, as “a group of states which have developed a long-term habit of peaceful interaction and ruled out the use of force in settling disputes with other members of the group”. Acharya uses as his starting point the definition developed by Karl Deutsch and others in the 1950s, which looks at a security community as the terminal point or end product of a process of integration that was originally intended to help cope with conflicts that arise from increased transactions and interactions among states. Acharya concludes, however, that the ASEAN approach to regional integration was different from what Deutsch understood of a security community, with cooperation being pursued even in the absence of high levels of interaction, and the vision of community preceding the reality of interdependence. This, he attributes to ASEAN's institution of norms of acceptable behavior, including non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force, avoidance of collective defense and the practice of the “ASEAN Way”. In turn, these norms contributed to the development of a regional identity.

The present collection of essays looks beyond the ASEAN security community that Amitav Acharya, Jurgen Haacke², and Rizal Sukma³ among others, problematize, to explore the possibility that a broader East Asian security community might also come into being in the future. In comparison with ASEAN's forty years of evolution and to the even older concept of “Southeast Asia” as a region, the concept of “East Asia” as a socially constructed - or imagined - collective entity encompassing both the states of Southeast Asia and those of Northeast Asia is not necessarily of recent vintage. Long before Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's doomed proposal for the formation of an East Asia Economic Grouping (EAEG) in 1990, Japan in the 1940s also had its dreams of leading a “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere”, whose association with imperialism, wartime expansion and domination had of course consigned it to the dustbin of history.

It was not until 1995 that the first collective, inter-governmental interactions exclusively involving ASEAN, China, Japan and Korea took place, spurred by the need for these countries to coordinate their positions preparatory to the first Asia-Europe Meeting held in 1996. Subsequently, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) crisis

underscored the importance of longer-term policy coordination among these countries, leading to the regularization of their meetings into what became billed as the ASEAN Plus Three. The first ASEAN Plus Three Summit was held in Manila in 1999, and since then there have been frequent meetings and agreements on a wide range of issues at different levels of policy making. An East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) was established upon the recommendation of South Korean President Kim Dae Jung in 1998, and subsequently an East Asia Study Group (EASG) was formed, both in order to consider specific areas for ASEAN Plus Three cooperation. In the process, a decision was made to convene an East Asia Summit as a step toward building an East Asian community. It was understood, however that the community building process would be a gradual process and that the East Asian community (initially referred to as “community” in lower case “c”, rather than as “Community”) would be a long-term goal.

These early efforts in visioning a shared future for East Asia were taking place against the backdrop of heightening tensions between the region’s two major powers China and Japan, fueled by continuing differences in their reading of wartime history but in essence a consequence of a changing balance of power and influence, as one power rose and another was perceived to be declining. Immediately following the decision to establish the East Asia Summit, controversy arose as to who should be the participants of the Summit, in anticipation of their becoming members of the aspired-for East Asian community. Malaysia, with support from China, preferred that participation be limited to the ASEAN Plus Three countries, while Japan wanted Australia and New Zealand present, as well as India. Singapore and Indonesia endorsed India’s entry, presumably as a counterweight to China, as Morada notes in his chapter.

By the end of 2007, three meetings of the East Asia Summit had convened, involving the sixteen countries (the ASEAN-10, China, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India) and narrowing down the agenda to cooperation on non-traditional security issues such as energy, environment and climate change. In the meantime, the community building process of ASEAN itself as well as the ASEAN Plus Three continue to be the primary mechanisms for East Asian regional integration.

This volume is a modest attempt to examine some of the issues, problems and prospects of laying the groundwork for an East Asian security community,

or a “non-war” community in the East Asian region (consisting principally of the ASEAN Plus Three, while keeping an open mind to possible expanded configurations). It traces its origins to an international conference organized in November 2006 by the Asian Center, University of the Philippines, not coincidentally during the run-up to the 12th ASEAN Summit and the 2nd East Asia Summit which were held in Cebu City in January 2007.

The conference, which was supported by the Japan Foundation, pursued a number of objectives. It sought: (1) to review the concept of “security communities” and its relevance for East Asia; (2) to compare security perspectives and strategic cultures across the East Asian region; (3) to explore viable areas and modalities of multilateral security cooperation in East Asia; and (4) to examine the role and impact of actors outside East Asia on East Asian community building efforts.

Since the “East Asian Community” or EAC remains a long-term goal, to speak of an East Asian security community at this time may seem to some observers little more than an exploratory exercise, especially as ASEAN itself, which lies at the core and driver’s seat of regional community building efforts, is only starting to define its own modalities, norms and principles as a security-oriented organization. However, of what is known about international relations and security in the East Asian region, and of the impetus behind and the trajectory of integration and community building efforts, certain key questions surface and must begin to be addressed. What does being a “security community” mean in both conceptual and practical terms? How inclusive should a security community be? Who should be leading or “driving” the community building processes? What role do common values and norms play in a security community? What degree of formality, structure or institutionalization will best serve the common security interests of the region? How will an East Asian Community relate to other existing multilateral arrangements such as ASEAN Regional Forum, APEC, and ASEAN itself? What might be the scope and modalities for security cooperation?

The essays in this volume, together with lively discussions at the November 2006 conference, provide some initial – and not surprisingly disparate – assessments.

At the minimum, a group of countries that enjoy reasonable assurance that they will not go to war with each other in settling disputes can be considered

a security community. Security communities must be understood as distinct from alliances, the latter being based on common short-term threats. In contrast, the members of a security community must have shared collective identity (a “we-feeling”) and a long-term interest in perpetual peace. By this definition, ASEAN may be said to be close to achieving a security community.

In his essay, Sorpong Poeu defines the concept of security communities, discusses the types of security communities, and looks into the role of democratic norms in security community building and maintenance. He argues that there are two crucial interdependent variables that must be present for security communities to succeed - shared fundamental democratic norms, and a democratic community leadership. He attributes this to three characteristics of democracies: they tend to be *pro-status quo* (in contrast to non-democratic states that tend toward revisionism), they tend to share liberal cultural values that promote the norms of nonviolence and mutual respect (rather than resort to war, power balancing and self-interest), and they tend to develop more stable institutions. Peou refers to this theoretical argument as “realist democratic institutionalism”. He then laments that there are very few liberal democracies in East Asia, and that while the ‘ASEAN Way’ may contain some liberal norms, it does not have its roots in a liberal democratic tradition. Thus, regional institutions in East Asia have remained underdeveloped.

Sung Chull Kim appears to disagree with Peou regarding the relationship between democratic norms and the propensity for regional cooperation, or at least the argument that non-democratic states are more prone to conflict. In his view, power distribution within a state (i.e. whether it is democratic or authoritarian) may be relevant to shaping values and perceptions but it does not determine a country’s propensity for either regional cooperation or confrontation. Citing ASEAN as his example, he points to the diverse political (not to mention, cultural, and religious) backgrounds that did not prevent them from “favoring security cooperation and engagement with the global economy”, or developing a “culture of consensus and openness” that led to the entry of Indochinese states into ASEAN and the formation of an inclusivist ARF.

The main purpose of Kim’s chapter, however, is to examine the security perceptions and relations of the three northeast Asian countries (China, Japan and Korea) and their effects on community building. He discusses how security issues in the three countries are influenced by historical contexts (i.e.

deeply rooted emotions or sentiment against the others), strategic contexts (i.e. national interest including the development of military capability and alliances), as well as imminent contexts (i.e. issues that demand a swift and urgent solution, in the absence of which domestic politics may impede dialogue and regional cooperation). He forwards the interesting proposition that “the strategic context is the most salient context regardless of regime form”, i.e. whether a regime is monolithic or polyarchic does not matter. He notes, however, a “preferential correlation” between power distribution and the context, where historical context and strategic context are closely intertwined with each other in a monolithic regime like North Korea, whereas imminent context operates more sensitively in democracies, such as Japan and South Korea, than in other regime forms. Kim concludes that it is possible to develop collective identity and a culture of cooperation in Northeast Asia through frequent interactions, but that repeated self-restraint from provocative behavior is necessary.

Nobumasa Akiyama gives a Japanese perspective on Asian regionalism and Japan’s role in community building, and asserts the continuing relevance of the 1970s’ Fukuda Doctrine even in the new strategic environment, comparing the Fukuda Doctrine with Foreign Minister Taro Aso’s ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’. He identifies the new agenda for Japan’s policy toward Asia as consisting of “profound challenges” such as how to deal with the rise of China, how to participate in the politics of Asian regionalization, and how to contribute to peace and stability particularly in the areas of non-traditional security issues and peace building. Pressures and expectations of Japan to pursue a “values-oriented diplomacy” based on the promotion of human rights and democracy in the region are difficult to fulfill, and place Japan in a hard spot between the United States on one hand and China and Southeast Asia on the other hand. Instead, among the areas where Japan can make a contribution to the region as well as promote some form of values-oriented diplomacy, are peace-building, disaster relief, and energy security. Akiyama believes that ‘open regionalism’ provides Japan a solution that will ensure she is in conformity with the goals of both the US-Japan defense alliance AND Asian regionalism.

The two contributors from China, Pan Yi-ning and Cai Penghong, present contrasting perspectives of the regional security environment and prospects

for community building using the “ASEAN way”, or an “Asian way”. Pan looks into the issue of whether the Asian approach of building cooperative institutions can be any more successful in addressing security dilemmas and resolving conflicts, compared to traditional realist approaches of self-help, alliances, or concert of powers. Examining the extent to which the confidence and security building measures introduced by the ARF have helped reduce arms build-ups, mitigate flashpoints in the Korean peninsula and sovereignty issues in the South China Sea, or decrease threat perceptions and mutual mistrust, she considers these as having limited success and nothing to get excited about. She professes doubt about there being such a thing as an “Asian way”, arguing that (1) East Asian security culture has largely become westernized (with strong belief in nationalism, Social Darwinism, and Westphalian notions of sovereignty and power politics), and (2) while there may have been traditional East Asian security cultures, such as hierarchy and cultural moralism for the Chinese, or *kampung*-style consensus building for ASEAN, reviving the former will create a paradox of encouraging Chinese hegemony, while the latter does not find real resonance outside of Southeast Asia. Therefore, bringing “Asian way” arguments into regional security cooperation efforts is not only conceptually confusing, but in substance the so-called “Asian way”- by its failure in managing traditional security concerns, even weakens the foundations of regional cooperative institutions.

Renato Cruz de Castro’s chapter expands on Pan Yi-ning’s discourse on Chinese strategic culture, this time applying elements of Sun Tzu to Chinese statecraft in Southeast Asia. He zeroes in on Southeast Asia as an arena of power competition between China and the United States. He notes that a key strategy that China uses to undermine U.S. strategic and political preponderance is “its attempt to co-opt Southeast Asian countries through its provision of side-payments to and fostering consultative relations with U.S. friends and allies in the region.” Rather than trying to develop countervailing capability against a more powerful state with abundant resources and superior forward-deployed naval and air forces, China – in de Castro’s view - desires to formalize a cooperative substructure within the regional system in order to neutralize the United States. Moreover, through its “soft power statecraft”, China stresses mutuality of interests, the idea of democracy in the international order, and the peaceful resolution of international conflicts while significantly downplaying any desire to dominate Southeast Asia.

Cai Penghong also examines Southeast Asia-China relations, with a focus on the role and prospects of non-traditional security cooperation. He traces how the discourses on non-traditional security gradually found their way into the thinking of intellectuals and some policy makers in China, departing from the conventional concerns of Chinese security specialists over external threats to state security and internal stability. By 2002, China was ready to sign with ASEAN the Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues. The agenda for such cooperation includes transnational crimes such as trafficking in illegal drugs, trafficking of persons, sea piracy, terrorism, arms-smuggling, money-laundering, international economic crimes and cyber crime. But Cai considers energy security cooperation as the most vital area for the two sides because of its impact on development, on the environment, and its implications for maritime security.

Cai argues that non-traditional security is very much related to traditional security and is not superior to the latter. On East Asian community building in general, he underscores the point that China believes ASEAN should play the leading role. He considers the role and participation of the United States a complicating factor, for which reason an East Asian Community must develop independently of the US, but he argues that the US should not be excluded from the cooperative security processes, nor should China-ASEAN cooperation be aimed against it.

Complementing Cai Penghong’s piece, Noel Morada looks at the prospects for East Asian regional cooperation on traditional security concerns. He provides an overview of the existing mechanisms for East Asian cooperation, including the ARF, the ASEAN Plus Three, the ASEAN-China and ASEAN-Japan dialogues, the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN security community building process itself. One major contribution of the ARF that he cites is in encouraging China and ASEAN to agree on the 2002 Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Subsequently, defense dialogues have also taken place where they discussed maritime security cooperation. As for an East Asian Community, he argues that it can play a vital role in confidence building as well as norm-shaping – especially involving stakeholders across different sectors in the respective countries. Interestingly, Morada calls for EAC to help transform existing alliances into “a strategic partnership that allows the re-creation of a regional order that recognizes

the legitimate interests of emerging powers such as China”. Deterrence against China, he argues, undermines the development of multilateralism in the region. Aside from encouraging trilateral strategic partnership between US, China and Japan, the EAC may also look into cooperation against terrorism and for the management of territorial disputes.

Mohan Malik and Swaran Singh dedicate their chapters to the role of external actors in East Asian community building. Malik, looking at three major external powers (the United States, the European Union and Russia), argues that it is not in their interests to have an East Asia Community dominated by one or more Asian countries or for an EAC to develop (even covertly) into an alliance or a collective security pact. In his view, the interests of external powers – and in particular, China’s relations with the United States, Japan, and India - will have a determining role on the future of EAC, along with such other factors as membership criteria, ASEAN’s will and capacity to remain in “the driver’s seat”, and how EAC will relate to APEC and ARF.

The United States, he posits, will likely support multilateral organizations for as long as they complement and reinforce the alliance network, help promote freedom and democracy along with free markets, and remain committed to “open regionalism”. Fortunately for the United States, many countries in East Asia consider it the “balancer of choice” as it is a distant hegemon. Malik suspects that Beijing wants the EAC to become like the China-led, anti-US Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which explains the catchy double entendre in his title, emphasizing the need for Asian multilateralism not to be ‘shanghaied’.

The final chapter by Swaran Singh provides an Indian perspective on security community building. He argues that Southeast Asia and South Asia have long been seen as part of the same strategic continuum, with the security of one being integral to the other. However, historical as well as ideological factors prevented earlier strategic cooperation and it was only India’s economic crisis, loss of Soviet support and ASEAN’s membership expansion in the 1990s to the CLMV countries that forced India to “look east”. Singh notes that it is concerns about China that have been critical to India’s vision of Southeast Asia and vice versa. India’s advantage, he says, is that it has managed to evolve strategic partnerships with both China and Japan, maintain friendly ties with both the United States and Russia, and it is

acceptable to ASEAN. However, he believes India’s engagement with East Asia will be economics-led, specifically focusing on trade, and that security interests will be pursued in the “soft security” framework. That said, he concludes that “India has critical stakes in ensuring the evolution of Security Community in East Asia and in exploring possibilities to replicate and expand that example to the wider Asian region...”

The nine chapters in this volume provide a wide range of thinking on an issue that governments and analysts around and beyond the region are increasingly paying attention to. Building an East Asian Community – and presumably embedded in this: a future East Asian security community – is not an easy project, as all our authors seem to agree. The divergent and at times even competing perceptions, interests, and capabilities of the countries in the region make it difficult to conceive of East Asia as a “non-war” community, especially when attention is drawn to the persistent power rivalries, and continuing military build-up across the Taiwan Strait, on the Korean Peninsula and of missile defense systems. While ASEAN has been quite successful in making multilateralism work, as far as preserving peace and promoting regional stability in Southeast Asia are concerned, the “Plus 3” countries have had little experience of regional cooperation and coordination.

Some regional analysts stress the need for ASEAN, being the hub of multilateralism, to strengthen internal unity over which directions it should take the community building processes. Some suggest focusing on successfully building the ASEAN community and its security community pillar before expanding the security community concept to ASEAN Plus Three/East Asia. After all, security community building itself is a new project for ASEAN, although it has had decades of confidence building and preparation among members. Northeast Asian countries, on the other hand, do not seem to be ready for any serious efforts at security community-building, and may not be ready for many years yet. The Six Party Talks may prove to be a good first lesson in multilateral cooperation, but beyond the common concern over nuclear weapons build-up under the Kim Jong Il regime, it has been argued that there may be little that unites China, Japan, and Korea among themselves, or with the rest of Southeast Asia. The key role played by the United States and China, and Russia’s participation in the Six Party Talks also raise doubts as to whether this

forum might not evolve into a new battlefield for power competition, rather than a constructivist security community-building process.

The concept of “East Asian Community”, and perhaps even more so the concept of “East Asian Security Community”, should be developed a step at a time, focusing on the shared goals and the objects of cooperation rather than on the structures, institutions or membership. Non-traditional security issues may be prioritized in the agenda of an East Asian security dialogue (and indeed the East Asia Summit is looking at energy, environment and climate change), but in order to keep the big powers interested and engaged, as well as to strengthen the efficacy of multilateralism, discussion of traditional security concerns that greatly affect perceptions among the region’s great powers (such as arms build-ups and the role of alliances), can not completely be avoided.

While agreement on common values and principles (specifically, democratic values) as the basis for building a regional identity might be considered desirable by some, it is unacceptable to others. It would seem that for the moment emphasis should be placed on mutual interests and shared goals as the foundation of security community building. In the absence of common democratic values among prospective members of a future East Asian security community, agreement on certain norms of behavior (notably self-restraint, peaceful coexistence, and equality and mutual respect) and on certain approaches (“soft security” emphasis, consensus-building) can help break down the walls of distrust and nurture the community-building efforts, with the hope that shared democratic values may gradually evolve.

Notes

1. A “norm entrepreneur” is one who establishes new norms or helps develop further the existing ones. Henning Boekle, Volker Rittberger, Wolfgang Wagner. Norms and Foreign Policy: Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory. (Center for International Relations/Peace and Conflict Studies, Institute for Political Science, University of Tübingen, 1999).

2. Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects* (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).

3. Rizal Sukma, “The Future of ASEAN: Towards a Security Community”, Paper Presented at the Seminar on “ASEAN Cooperation: Challenges and Prospects in the Current International Situation”, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations, New York, 3 June 2003.



Regional Security Communities: Theory, Practice & Future Prospects for East Asia

SORPONG PEOU

Building security communities in Pacific Asia is no longer the pipedream that realists tend to see it, but rather a real possibility that rests on concrete evidence. The hard question for us is to discover the means to build one without subscribing to untested polemics or ill-informed policy rhetoric still evident across this region, but also without ignoring rich insights from historical experience found in realism and other theoretical traditions, most notably Kantian internationalism and constructivism. This chapter develops a theoretical eclectic proposition that security community building and maintenance depends on at least two independent or interdependent variables: democratic norms and democratic community leadership. It advances a perspective called democratic realist institutionalism. Liberal democracy will not put an end to competition for power among democratic states, but they tend to grow into the new realism that war no longer serves as the appropriate means for their competition.

Introduction

BUILDING A SECURITY community in East Asia is no longer the pipedream that realists have tended to see it,¹ but rather a real possibility that rests on concrete evidence.² The security communities that currently exist include North America, the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and both the U.S.-Japanese and U.S.-Israeli security alliances.³ Regarding North America, Kalevi Holsti observed during the Cold War that, “there is little question that Canada and the United States

constitute a pluralistic security community. It is difficult to contemplate the two governments using violence against each other, planning military operations to the north or south, or targeting military capabilities toward each other".⁴ Ole Wæver describes Western Europe as a "non-war community".⁵ Thomas Risse-Kappen argues that NATO has become a Transatlantic Security Community.⁶ Michael Barnett makes the case for Israel and the United States as a security community.⁷

Even realist-inclined pessimists do not rule out the possibility of a security community in East Asia, but they question whether states in the region will be able to form one on a regional scale in the near future. Aaron Friedberg, for instance, famously contends that East Asia is "ripe for rivalry" and that "in the long run it is Asia that seems far more likely [than Europe] to be the cockpit of great power conflict."⁸ "If five hundred years of European history are of any guide," we are told, "the prospect of a multipolar system emerging in Asia cannot be an especially comforting one". Thus, "Europe's past could be Asia's future."⁹ According to his alarming prediction, "twenty-first century Asia may come to resemble nineteenth century Europe. Asia...will probably contain a group of big powers (including China, India, Russia and Japan, with the United States playing a role from across the Pacific) as well as several somewhat less powerful, but still potentially quite capable actors."¹⁰ However, this is perhaps more evidence of progress in European history than it is a prediction that East Asia will never experience such progress.

Although a multilateral security community is nowhere in sight on East Asia's horizon, it remains a long-term possibility. The hard question for us is to discover the means to build one without relying on or subscribing to the untested polemics or hurried policy rhetoric still evident across this region, but also without ignoring the rich insights from historical experience found in realism and other theoretical traditions, most notably Kantian internationalism and constructivism. States can collaborate when facing a common threat under anarchy, but this alone makes them more of a military alliance than a security community; shared fundamental democratic norms and institutions, however, can serve as a powerful non-material force that helps nurture a sense of community among them. Democratic community leadership appears to be the second crucial variable. Based on the historical experience shared by the security communities that exist today, this chapter

develops a theoretical proposition that security community building and maintenance depend on at least these two independent or interdependent variables: democratic norms and democratic community leadership. Members of a security community may never completely transcend the reality of relative power and balance-of-power politics among themselves, but they seem far more effective than autocratic states in making joint efforts to manage conflict or form and maintain a community.

This chapter advances a perspective called *democratic realist institutionalism* based on the proposition that liberal democracy will not put an end to competition for power among contending forces within domestic politics, nor do democratic states become apolitical by transcending power politics. Democracies can grow into the new realism that war no longer serves as the appropriate means for their competition.

Security Communities: A State-centric Framework

Exactly how states can transform their realist world into one based on security communities remains a matter of debate. Constructivists have so far offered the best clue. Alexander Wendt's typology of anarchy, for instance, helps us classify three groups of states: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian.¹¹ This paper argues that there exist three broad types of cooperation for security among states under anarchy: 1) the Hobbesian type of collective-defense alliances, 2) the Lockean type of collective-security regimes, and 3) the Kantian type of democratic-security communities.

According to the realist camp, the perils states face today remain deeply rooted in irredeemable conditions found in human ambitions, international anarchy, or both. The international system is anarchical and thus competitive, since states engage in endemic and unlimited warfare: the strong do what they have to do, while the weak must accept what they have to accept. Powerful states conquer and dominate weaker ones and naturally pursue a militant strategy of empire building. In this Darwinist world, 'unfit' states become extinct, while the 'fittest' survive. States supposedly exist in the 'state of nature,' in which the 'war of all against all' applies; they follow the logic of 'kill or be killed'. States are accustomed into thinking that war is 'natural,' that 'power' is what they aim to maximize, and that self-help is what international politics is all about. There is thus a high rate of state deaths.

Military power remains the most important means of national security. To survive, states must help themselves by arming to the teeth. This does not imply that states in such Hobbesian cultures are incapable of cooperation. When threatened by a common enemy, states will form military alliances. They tend to balance power or threats, but such balancing leaves no room for neutrality or non-alignment. Military alliances remain durable as long as states face the same enemy, but their collective defense ends as soon as the common threat disappears.

In Lockean cultures, however, states have a more relaxed view of their security, since they treat each other as rivals rather than enemies. As in the Hobbesian world, international anarchy still exists, but Lockean anarchy is one characterized by international 'rivalry' based on two basic norms: self-help and mutual help. States under Lockean anarchy should be seen as maturing: they become more secure than those still under Hobbesian anarchy. They also tend to become more status quo-oriented and only respond to others' threats defensively, although bad states still behave offensively. States thus grow out of the Hobbesian obsession with self-preservation. War is no longer considered 'natural', but as something more manageable. As such states recognize each other's right to sovereignty, which is viewed as "an intrinsic property of the state" and "an institution" that should not be taken away from each other.¹² Lockean states operate within an international rule-of-law system that remains incomplete and under the rule of self-restraint.

Military power remains important and balancing behavior still exists, because states remain self-interested individuals. As Inis Claude puts it: "the problem of power is here to stay; it is, realistically, not a problem to be eliminated but a problem to be managed."¹³ But power is managed through international institutions, which operate differently from military alliances associated with the realist concept of balancing. A proponent of collective security, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson expressed his contempt for collective defense, using the following words: "The day we left behind us was a day of alliances. It was a day of balances of power. It was a day of 'every nation takes care of itself or makes a partnership with some other nation or group of nations to hold the peace of the world steady or to dominate the weaker portions of the world'." After World War I, Wilson

asserted that collective security is "not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace."¹⁴ As states still regard one another as rivals, they may even engage in disputes (territorial or otherwise) and may use force to settle them. This is a new form of balancing under the condition known as the preponderance of international power.¹⁵ Contrary to the realist logic of power balancing, states balance against aggression - a type of behavior judged to be bad by international law, rather than normal or natural by the law of the jungle.

Lockean states remain less mature than Kantian states, though: the former are still "afflicted with a possessive individualism stemming from collective amnesia about their social roots."¹⁶ In Kantian cultures, states learn to identify one another as members of a 'pluralistic security community' - the way Karl Deutsch, his associates, and others in recent decades have identified them - rather than as individuals operating in the self-help international system or international anarchical society.¹⁷ International anarchy still exists, but states no longer treat one another as rivals. Their collective identity is defined in terms of friendship, which differs from alliances in Hobbesian terms and is not simply built on a Leviathan but on "shared knowledge of each other's peaceful intentions and behavior."¹⁸ Under Kantian anarchy, states also regard one another as 'friends' or 'team players', whose collective norms - namely, nonviolence and other-help or altruism - guide their mutual relations.

Conflicts among Kantian states can still arise; however, when they do, states resort not to war (which is considered illegitimate), but to peaceful methods of dispute settlement, including negotiation, arbitration, and adjudication. When threatened by a third party outside their community, states are expected to fight as a team, not simply as self-interested allies. The durability of their friendships is greater than that of threat-specific temporary alliances found in Hobbesian cultures. When these norms are viewed as legitimate, states no longer see each other's security interests in instrumental terms but in terms of their own and behave in ways considered altruistic. Because levels of trust among them are high, their friendships remain based on the *de facto* rule of law by which they agree to abide voluntarily.

The literature on security community studies further tells us that there are two basic types: amalgamated and pluralistic. States wishing to build an amalgamated security community develop a vision for common government

under which none remains sovereign. Members of such a community forfeit their sovereignty in an effort to unify themselves through the establishment of a formal supranational organization. According to Deutsch and his associates, an amalgamated security community results from the “formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation.”¹⁹ Proponents of this community type rely on the historical example of how the United States came into existence and the expectation that the European Union (EU) will become the United States of Europe.

Realistically, states in today’s world can only hope to build pluralistic security communities; for most scholars and state leaders, any vision for world or regional government seems out of reach. The basic feature of pluralistic security communities is that their members retain their political sovereignty. They retain their political independence but develop a sense of mutual trust based a sense of collective identity and mutual loyalty. There are at least two basic types of pluralistic security communities. Both Adler and Barnett call the first “loosely-coupled security communities”, whose members no longer expect any “bellicose activities” from one another and “consistently practice self-restraint.”²⁰ The second type is characterized as “tightly-coupled”, because member states “have a ‘mutual aid’ society in which they construct collective system arrangements.” They “possess a system of rule that lies somewhere between a sovereign state and a regional, centralized government.” Tightly-coupled pluralistic security communities are “transnational communities” with governance structures “linked to dependable expectations of peaceful change.”²¹

What are the specific steps states usually take when they engage in the process of building pluralistic security communities? Ole Wæver calls them “non-war” communities in that their members do not expect to wage war against each other.²² As members of a regional security community, for instance, Canada and the United States need not form a supranational regional organization demanding that they forfeit their political sovereignty and submit themselves to common rule. They may even form military alliances to defend themselves against a common enemy. Moreover, competition for power among community members does not cease. Members of NATO have never been completely set free from balance-of-threat politics, either. Canada

has traditionally sought to balance the United States within NATO. Even social constructivists have acknowledged this continuity. According to Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein, for instance, “A North Atlantic arrangement would allow Canada to use the European states as a balance against the United States” (“balancing U.S. preponderance in NATO in the case of Canada”)²³ Although France and the United States have been NATO members, their differences (since President Charles de Gaulle was in power in the late 1960s) at times seemed unbridgeable. French cooperation within NATO remained tenuous. In more recent years, French leaders have sought to balance American “hyper-power.” Kenneth Waltz found evidence of European discontent with American power and expects European states, such as France and Germany, to balance it. As he puts it:²⁴

Now as earlier, European leaders express discontent with Europe’s secondary position, chafe at America’s making most of the important decisions, and show a desire to direct their own destiny. French leaders often vent their frustration and pine for a world, as Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine recently put it, ‘of several poles, not just a single one’. President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin call for a strengthening of such multilateral institutions as the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations, although how this would diminish America’s influence is not explained. More to the point, Védrine complains that since President John Kennedy, Americans have talked of a European pillar for the alliance, a pillar that is never built.

We still witness counter-hegemonic politics among democratic states,²⁵ and should have no illusions that the game will ever cease to exist.²⁶ Adler asserts that, “the existence of security communities does not mean that interest-based behavior by states will end, that material factors will cease to shape interstate practices, and that the security dilemma will end.”²⁷ Constructivists would thus be unwise if they naively ignored balance-of-power politics among security community members.

There are concrete signposts that mark clear distinctions between security communities in the Kantian world and collective-defense alliances in the Hobbesian world or collective-security coalitions in the Lockean world. One conspicuous signpost indicating mutual trust between or among security community members is border demilitarization, when states begin to

demilitarize their joint borders. They end military preparations for war against each other and signal their non-aggressive intentions toward each other. They reduce material resources to defense, stop fortifying their border, and begin to expect peace in their mutual relations.²⁸

The next question for us then is whether there are credible alternatives to state-centric ones. Proponents may wish to remove the state in favor of other non-state actors, but cannot get far. Even critical theorists do not reject the role of states in providing for security, although they value non-state actors. Alex Bellamy and Matt McDonald, for instance, contend that their stance “does not mean that states cannot fulfill a positive role in pursuing human security”, that states have the responsibility to protect individual human beings, but that states do not always play a positive role.²⁹ Neither can we count on the United Nations for regional security based on the concept of collective security, which has so far failed miserably. I still defend an argument I made in 1997: “Although it will never be in the position to create a strife-free Utopia, the UN is the only global body with the best potential to keep its members [and other actors] thinking collectively about what they can do to prevent hell on earth from breaking loose.”³⁰ My point should be treated as a statement of aspiration rather than a validation of reality. The world organization still serves as the *symbol* of global unity in a disunited world and cannot act freely on its own initiative without the active support of member states. William Tow and Russell Trood are still right: “Unfortunately, we cannot presume that the world’s humanitarians will be left alone to implement their bold agenda unencumbered by the affairs of states. The coordination of strategies and resources needed to advance security on a global basis cannot be achieved by relying solely, or even primarily, on the present assortment of universalist organizations and regimes.”³¹

In short, then, pluralistic security communities remain state-centric: they are made up of independent states assumed to develop dependable expectations for peaceful change (no longer prepared to resort to war as the means to settle their disputes). Neither do they need to rely on supranational institutions. As community members, states trust one another enough to co-exist peacefully, but the level of their mutual trust may never completely transcend balance-of-power logic.

A Theoretical Argument: Toward Democratic Realist Institutionalism

The biggest question is what causes states to collaborate effectively on pluralistic security community building and maintenance. Neo-liberal or rational choice institutionalists give us little to go on. At the risk of oversimplification, the theory assumes that individual actors are egoistic in the pursuit of self-interest and as such can build institutions that will serve their individual objectives. Designed and built through information flows and transparency, ‘chosen’ institutions are instrumental to their *individual* interests.³² This type of institutionalism raises some difficult questions: Why are some institutions weaker than others? Why should *egoistic* state actors work together to overcome their collective-action problem when they prefer someone else to supply the institution that will serve a *common* purpose?

Historical institutionalism explains continuity or stability better than neo-liberal institutionalism, but does not explain change well. Ontologically, it assumes that there is a reality ‘out there’ that can be explained. Epistemologically, it agrees with positivism as far as *causal effects* on actors’ behavior are concerned. Unlike positivism, however, deep and unobservable structures (such as structured inequality) that can *determine* behavior or *affect* decision-making cannot be directly observed.³³ Institutions are treated as *historical products* that exist *anterior* and *a priori* to any agent operating with them. Regardless of who the actors are, the existing institutions remain unchanged because they constrain agents and produce path-dependent policy-making. Change is possible but only in incremental fashion, when responding to changing demands by agents.³⁴ But if institutional change is subject to demands, historical institutionalism sounds more like rational-choice or neo-liberal institutionalism emphasizing the role of agency and rationality.

Neo-liberal/rational choice and historical institutionalisms are in fact different in that “historical institutionalists did not need to explain stability as much as they needed to explain change. They were fine on why things did not change all that much, but tended to be rather surprised when they did.”³⁵ Mark Blyth offers a useful solution to the problem by adding ideas to help explain change. Ideas do not violate the ontological claim of historical institutionalism as much as they violate the ontological claim of rationalism, which tends to assume that ideas are *instrumental* of rather than *determine* agents’ preferences. Based on foundationalism as its ontological position

but realism as its epistemological position, historical institutionalism *plus* ideas can be regarded as more if not “truly progressive.”³⁶

Normative or cultural institutionalism proves more helpful in terms of its ontological ability to allow for the possibility of explaining change through norm creation. Cultural norms are treated as determining ‘appropriate’ behavior,³⁷ but remaining dynamic: they allow room for individuals or groups considered to have some power of independent thinking to challenge and change existing norms through such actions as campaigning and persuasion. The norm of humanitarian intervention, for instance, has its roots in the campaign of advocates involved in humanitarian affairs. Prior to that, the norm of non-intervention reigned supreme, as it still does in various regions of the world. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) engaged in the campaign to protect people during wartime and its advocacy gave rise to international humanitarian law. Efforts to ban anti-personnel landmines led to the Ottawa Convention, ratified by 137 states in the early 2000s, but it was the ICRC that made the first call for a landmine ban. Other states and non-state actors subsequently became involved. As a result, negotiations on landmines began and the Ottawa process got underway.³⁸ The same can also be said about global efforts to eliminate small arms and light weapons around the world. Multilateral diplomacy and non-governmental actors have played crucial roles in advocating and creating new norms that have shaped states’ interests on human security issues.³⁹

Still, there are limits to what norms can do to bring about change, such as better security communities. The norms banning small arms, light weapons, and landmines have succeeded to the extent that they do not threaten states’ security interests protected by strategic weapons. The new norms advocated to govern conventional arms today remain as ineffective as they were in the past, as “every state [still] has a right to defend itself by manufacturing, exporting, and importing any weapon it deems fit in the name of national defense.”⁴⁰ Also, when it comes to national security, the norm of secrecy still prevails over that of transparency.

As an alternative perspective, the democratic realist institutionalism advanced as this study’s analytical purpose builds on both historical and normative institutionalisms by adding two variables: liberal democratic norms and material power. These variables, which can be epistemologically

assumed to have *causal effects* on actors’ behavior, are both normative or non-material structures (such as democratic norms, which must be interpreted) and material structures (such as capabilities that can be quantified to help us measure power differential or distribution among actors), which *determine* behavior or *affect* decision-making.

It may be helpful to clarify first what I mean by liberal democratic norms. They do not exist just because elections are held on a regular basis and on a free and fair fashion, nor do they imply that only democratic states perform better than autocratic states in economic terms.⁴¹ People and leaders in democracies can learn to respect the norms of equality among themselves in the political and racial sense. The argument that liberal democracy is an evil form of government or that multiethnic societies do not need it ignores the fact that political and racial tolerance remains a key liberal norm. Liberal democracies practice such tolerance.

There still exists the question of whether liberal democratic norms help states meet the requirements for community building. Alexander Wendt remains agnostic about whether Immanuel Kant’s republican states are the only type of states that can internalize democratic norms of the liberal peace.⁴² Others contend that states cannot build security communities if they do not share a strong view of the status quo and do not have a regional culture and well-developed institutions, but downplay the role of democracy by making the following qualification. In their words: “Democracy may not be a necessary condition but, as suggested by the democracy and peace literature (and by the empirical cases to date), it is a huge asset.”⁴³

But it remains difficult to sustain the argument that non-democratic states can internalize and apply liberal democratic norms to the extent that they help transform their institutions, such as security alliances or regimes, into security communities. We have now learned that non-democratic states may have tried to build pluralistic security communities, but evidence works against their political vision. Michael Barnett, for instance, advances the argument that non-democratic states in the Arab region did make efforts to form alliances among themselves based on pan-Arabism, but their collective identity was weaker than collective identities among democratic states. Heads of Arab states “routinely paid lip service to the [non-democratic] ideals of pan-Arabism while engaging in power-seeking behavior.”⁴⁴ Pan-Arabism

was supposed to give rise to a regional political community that defends Arabs wherever they may reside, works toward political unification among them, and strengthens the bonds of Arab unity. Arab states even sought to build security arrangements based on the liberal norms of nonviolence, consultation, and compromise. But none of their groups, most notably the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), has been considered a regional security community. The GCC remains based on a certain shared Arab identity, rather than on shared liberal democratic norms: its member “states were all monarchies”⁴⁵ and remain undemocratic.

We also have no concrete examples of security communities whose members contain a mixture of democratic and non-democratic regimes. This further helps explain why the two different types of states may form security institutions, but do not identify each other as long-lasting or close friends or members of a security community. Based on the democratic dyadic model, evidence suggests that democratic states do not trust autocratic states. If both types of states are in a major crisis, democracies may not seek compromise through negotiation.⁴⁶

The ‘democratic peace’ thesis further demonstrates that democratic and non-democratic states may attempt to build security communities together in their regions, but these projects tend to fail, sooner or later. One obvious reason is that democratic states are not less prone to war against non-democratic states than the latter, which also have a strong record of waging war against each other. Kantian internationalists do not argue that liberal democracies are pacific toward non-liberal states.⁴⁷ In fact, they say, liberal states have waged wars against non-liberal states and may be even more war-prone than the latter. Liberal states, for instance, have a strong record of invading weak non-liberal states in different parts of the world (for example, colonial wars and US intervention in Third World states). When disputes between democratic and non-democratic states arise, the former may also escalate ongoing tensions and initiate military hostilities.⁴⁸ This explains the dangers of war posed by powerful democracies, but still validates the liberal peace thesis.

Among themselves, however, democracies tend to be *pro-status quo*, tend to share liberal cultural values that promote the norms of nonviolence and mutual respect, and tend to develop more stable institutions. First and

foremost, empirical studies strongly show that democratic durability may have more to do with the fact that liberal democracies tend to be *pro-status quo*: they enjoy more satisfaction with their positions vis-à-vis each other than non-democracies, which tend to be revisionist.⁴⁹ Other studies also show that rising democracies prove less likely to escalate war against leading democracies or less likely than autocracies to become revisionist and thus less likely to use force to challenge the *status quo*.⁵⁰

Second, democracies share a set of liberal cultural norms that promote peaceful conflict resolution on the basis of mutual tolerance and respect. Democratic powers tend to resolve their mutual disputes in a manner short of war.⁵¹ Democracies tend to perceive each other as peaceful because of the democratic norms governing their domestic decision-making processes.⁵² What, then, are the democratic norms most conducive to the process of trust building? Some of the most important are peaceful dispute settlement (non-recourse to war, negotiation, and compromise) and legal equality (voting equality and certain egalitarian rights to human dignity).⁵³

Liberal state leaders who adopt the norm of nonviolence tend to favor negotiation and compromise. According to one study, “democracies are unlikely to initiate crises with all other types of states, but once in a crisis, democracies are clearly less likely to initiate violence only against other democracies.”⁵⁴ Levels of mutual trust among them are high enough that, even in crisis times, their leaders are less likely to initiate violence against each other. France and the United States, for instance, had their differences soon after NATO came into existence, but “in no instance did one party conceive of, or threaten to, employ force against the other; no military capabilities were mobilized to signify total commitment to an objective, and communication between Paris and Washington did not break down.”⁵⁵

Democratic states have a tendency to rely on the need for conflict resolution because of their shared normative commitment to peace through respect for the rule of law. Democratic leaders prove better equipped than autocratic state leaders when it comes to diffusing conflict situations at an early stage, before they escalate to military violence. When disputes arise, democratic leaders seek accommodation. They comply with the democratic norm of “bounded competition” common to all democracies in that they “agree not to employ physically coercive or violent means to secure a winning position on contentious

public issues.”⁵⁶ Among themselves, liberal democratic states tend to rely on institutional means to resolve their conflicts. They resort to binding international arbitration by agreeing to accept arbitrators’ final decisions. According to a study of 206 dyadic disputes, “The presence of joint democracy in dangerous, war-prone dyads has a strong positive effect on the probability of referring interstate disputes to binding third-party settlement, even when controlling for alliance bonds and geographic proximity.”⁵⁷

The norms of peaceful conflict resolution depend on other liberal norms, however. If some states regard other states as politically or racially inferior, no security community can be formed and effectively maintained. For instance, the United States and Canada went to war in 1812, despite the fact they both were democratic states. The United States was a liberal democracy, but not all American leaders adopted the liberal norms of political equality vis-à-vis Canada. American leaders with annexationist ambitions saw Canada as a British colony, and this perception may have led some of them to regard their neighbor’s parliamentary system as “anti-democratic and tyrannical.” According to Sean Shore, “[Americans who then rejected British systems]...could not accept that British Canada could ever be part of the North American experiment in democracy.”⁵⁸

Even among some liberal democracies, the threat of racialism to community building may still pose an enormous challenge. According to E. H. Carr, long known as a classical arch-realist in the field of international relations, racialism can implicitly place a high bar on different nations taking steps to build a community:

The vividness of his [the Englishman’s] picture of ‘foreigners’ will commonly vary in relation to geographical, racial and linguistic proximity, so that the ordinary Englishman will be likely to feel that he has something, however slight, in common with the German or the Australian and nothing at all in common with the Chinese or the Turks.⁵⁹ (Italics added)

Liberal internationalists may thus talk about liberty, but Carr contended that the liberal principle of international equality alone would not fully reflect the existence of “discrimination” within the “international community.” In his words, “Equality is never absolute, and may perhaps be defined as an absence of discrimination for reasons which are felt to be irrelevant.” He

thinks “the principle would be infringed, and the community broken, if people with blue eyes were less favorably treated than people with brown, or people from Surrey than people from Hampshire.”⁶⁰ Germany under Adolf Hitler may have initially been democratic, but its political elites emerged as racists who rejected the norms of racial equality and then dragged their country into war against other democratic states, most notably those in Europe.

Carr was at the time critical of Western liberal racialism, which did not initially give rise to the norm of racial equality among nations or states. The “doctrine of progress” or the “harmony of interests” is disguised in racialist terms: liberal states pursued this doctrine “through the elimination of unfit nations” and “[t]he harmony of interests was established through the sacrifice of ‘unfit’ Africans and Asiatics.”⁶¹ Liberalism embedded in racialism can thus perpetuate militarism. According to Michael Mann, “the association of liberalism, constitutionalism or democracy with pacifism is a complete and utter fabrication.” Western liberal regimes committed terrible atrocities in the past. History shows “European racism . . . encouraged the worst atrocities. Thus the Spanish and Portuguese colonies saw fewer atrocities than the British, while the democratic American, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand ex-colonies perpetuated more than had their former colonial masters.”⁶²

If unmanaged or minimized, racialism can thus hinder the process of trust building essential to the process of security community building. Some further contend that “Xenophobia against citizens of neighboring states . . . has no place in a security community, since a regional *community* demands a sense of ‘we-ness’ among the members of that community.”⁶³ Critical theories also shed light on how racialism exists in liberal democracies and can generate division within and between them. Military values in Western liberal democracies still nurture racialism.⁶⁴

When leaders and people in democratic states regard one another on the basis of equality in political and racial terms, the chance of creating a security community looks brighter. For instance, NATO as a military alliance transformed into a security community resulted from the United States’ commitment to it. From the beginning, U.S. policymakers saw their European allies “as relatively equal members of a shared community.”⁶⁵

Race also played a crucial role. Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Will Clayton, who expressed hopes that NATO would serve as the first step toward the formation of an Atlantic Federal Union, asserted that, “my idea would be that in the beginning the union would be composed of all countries that have our ideas and ideals of freedom and that are composed of the white race.”⁶⁶ Liberal democracy, however, makes it possible for state leaders and their peoples to combat racism openly, as evident in the United States since the 1960s. In short, liberal democracy based on the norms of political and racial equality appears to help transform the Lockean society of sovereign states into a Kantian community.

Third, democracies tend to develop relatively robust, durable, stable, and effective institutions, when compared with non-democratic states. Other liberal scholars, such as Anne-Marie Slaughter, have further advanced a neo-liberal legal institutionalist proposition that regimes whose members include liberal and non-liberal states or have only non-liberal members are less robust than regimes with members that are liberal democracies.⁶⁷ Kurt Gaubatz argues that, “democracies are no different than nondemocracies when it comes to relationships with nondemocracies. It is only alliances between democracies that appear to be more durable.”⁶⁸ The durability of military alliances between or among democratic states, which can subsequently form into security communities, further suggests that most realists, who exclusively stress the system effect of anarchy on state behavior, overlook the pacifying effect of liberal norms and democratic institutions.

If strong institutions are supposed to help mitigate war-prone behavior and resolve conflicts peacefully among states (as neo-liberal institutionalists tend to suggest), we also need to ask if we treat such institutions as completely separable from the matter of democracy. Bruce Russett makes an important observation: “individual autonomy and pluralism within democratic states foster the emergence of transnational linkages and institutions – among individuals, private groups, and government agencies.” He adds that, “Those linkages can serve to resolve transnational conflicts peacefully and...inhibit their national governments from acting violently toward each other.” In comparative terms, “Democracies are open to many private and government transnational linkages; autocracies rarely are.”⁶⁹

Democracies, however, do not rely exclusively on liberal-democratic norms to transform themselves into security communities. Such norms themselves prove insufficient for explaining the existence or persistence of security communities. Bruce Russett acknowledges that democratic norms “do sometimes break down” (or “may be violated and break down”).⁷⁰ Risse-Kappen similarly admits “norms can be violated.”⁷¹ John Ikenberry argues that liberal hegemonies help institutionalize and stabilize international politics.⁷² Other social constructivists have argued that material power still matters in the process of community building. Powerful states can lead weak ones, not vice versa. In Wendt’s words: “A Lockean culture with 200 members will not change just because two of its members acquire a Kantian identity, unless perhaps they are also its only superpowers, in which case other states may follow suit.”⁷³ Still other constructivists believe material power matters, although they emphasize the positive images of powerful states. According to some, “power can be a magnet; a community formed around a group of *strong* powers creates the expectations that weaker states will be able to enjoy the security and potentially other benefits that are associated with that community.” In other words, “those *powerful* states who belong to the core of strength do not create security *per se*; rather, because of their positive images of security or material progress that are associated with powerful and successful states, security communities develop around them.”⁷⁴ They view “the development of a security community” as “not antagonistic to the language of power; indeed, it is *dependent on it*.”⁷⁵ Martha Finnemore makes it clear that “norms, rules and routines...will serve the interests of powerful actors; they will not survive long if they do not.”⁷⁶ A realist, Stephen Walt further observes that “constructivists admit that ideas will have greater impact when backed by powerful states and reinforced by enduring material forces.”⁷⁷

Without democratic leadership, security communities may not be effectively maintained. Democratic leadership provides powerful binding glue, especially when democratic members of security communities get involved in crises. The point can be illustrated by the divergence of views during the 1956 Suez Crisis between the United States on the one hand and its allies, France, Britain, and Israel, on the other. Apparently, democratic leadership mattered during the Suez Crisis. According to Risse-Kappen,

“No longer bound by the norms of appropriate behavior, the U.S. used its superior power and prevailed...the U.S. and British worked hard to restore the transatlantic community, suggesting that they did not regard the sort of confrontations experienced during the Suez crisis as appropriate behavior among democratic allies.”⁷⁸ The role of democratic leadership has also been essential to the maintenance of the U.S.-Israel security community. If the United States was unable to provide Israel with uninterrupted assistance, their alliance would have been unstable and might not have been transformed into a security community.

One positive effect of democratic community leadership is that military alliances among democracies, which are not always equal in material terms (for example, NATO), tend to prove more durable than those among autocracies. Realist works confirm that even if a new democracy becomes powerful and subsequently seeks to balance the incumbent leader in an effort to become the new hegemon, power transition among them is less likely to be prone to war. Even some neo-classical realists believe that this may be the case. William C. Wohlforth, for instance, wrote in defense of a unipolar world, viewing it as more peaceful and durable than either bipolarity or multipolarity. He contends, for instance, that although Japan and Germany are two prime contenders for polar status by balancing American power, they are unlikely to do so, because these states “are close U.S. allies with deeply embedded security dependence on the United States.”⁷⁹ Why did they remain close allies after the end of the Cold War and the Soviet threat? Wohlforth would argue that the preponderance of U.S. power became so undisputed that balancing is now a futile game. This appears to be the case because “the evidence suggests that states are only now coming to terms with unipolarity,”⁸⁰ but these three powers are democratic states sharing the same liberal national identity. Wohlforth seems to agree when he makes the following remark: “None of the major powers is balancing [the US power in the post-Cold War era]; most have scaled back military expenditures faster than the United States has. One reason may be that democracy and globalization have changed the nature of world politics.”⁸¹

Contrary to some realists’ assumption that when challenged from below, hegemony resort to preventive war,⁸² powerful democratic states are less

likely to wage war against non-democratic states in order to prevent the latter’s rise to the top in the international system. The United States, which enjoyed a nuclear monopoly during the first four years of the Cold War, could have launched a preventive nuclear war on the Soviet Union, which did not yet possess nuclear capabilities. Randall Schweller demonstrates that since 1665 powerful but declining democracies (whose citizens behave on the basis of idealism/pacifism and “liberal complaisance”) waged no war against rising, challenging powers, regardless of the latter’s regime type (democratic or autocratic). In his words: “Declining democratic states...do not [wage preventive wars against rising opponents]. Instead, when the challenger is an authoritarian state, declining democratic leaders [under domestic constraints] attempt to form [defensive] counterbalancing alliances; when the challenger is another democratic state, they seek accommodation.”⁸³ Schweller does not argue “that a faltering democratic hegemon graciously concedes its leadership to a democratic aspirant,” but strongly emphasizes “that preventive war is never seriously considered...the declining democratic state is satisfied with an increase in its absolute gains through accommodation with the democratic challenger.”⁸⁴

Leading democracies on the decline prove far less likely than declining autocracies to wage preventive wars against rising democratic powers. According to Barry Buzan, “Britain did not find it necessary to challenge the rise of the U.S. Navy during the late nineteenth century.”⁸⁵ After World War I, Great Britain was on the decline, but did not perceive the growth of American power with great alarm. Preventive war is thus less likely to happen when major states involved in power transition are democratic. Leading democracies are more likely to accept the rise of fellow democracies than the rise of autocratic challengers. Schweller, for instance, notes that “Germany’s democratic allies to the west and smaller neighbors to the east...have not expressed great alarm over the anticipated rise in German power and influence.”⁸⁶ Even realists continue to disagree on how states respond to U.S. power. For some, attempts at balancing power in the present unipolar world are more “rhetorical” than real. Although he does not make any distinction between democracies and non-democracies, Wohlforth wrote: “Most of the counterbalancing that has occurred since 1991 has been rhetorical. Notably absent is any willingness on the part of the other great

powers to accept any significant political or economic costs in countering U.S. power. Most of the world's powers are busy trying to climb the American bandwagon even as they curtail their military outlays.”⁸⁷

Liberal Democratic Norms' Serious Implications for East Asia

The normative aspect of liberal democracy in the process of security building and maintenance has enormous implications for states in East Asia. There is no doubt that the region has not been transformed into a security community. Both Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver – both known for a theoretical inclination toward realism - contend that “the end of the Cold War opened the way for an external transformation in the regional security architecture of East Asia. From the 1980s economically, and during the 1990s also in a military-political sense, the states of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia increasingly began to merge into a single RSC [regional security complex].”⁸⁸ However, “[t]here seems little prospect that either East Asia, or Asia as a whole, will be able to form a security community in the foreseeable future.”⁸⁹

Why states in the region have not been transformed into a security community is a matter of debate. If a strong shared view of the status quo, a shared culture, and/or well-developed institutions are the key variables for building security communities, as Buzan and Wæver contend, we must ask whether liberal democracies are better at meeting these conditions. For instance, if the regional institutions in East Asia remain underdeveloped, it is mainly because they tend to rely on their non-liberal or Asian norms. Constructivists have long made the case for the ‘ASEAN Way’ being different from the so-called ‘Western [liberal] Way’.⁹⁰ The ‘ASEAN Way’ may contain some liberal norms, but it does not have its roots in a liberal democratic tradition. In fact, few states in East Asia are liberal democracies.

The U.S.-Japan security alliance helps validate the liberal democratic peace thesis. Bilateral security relations between the United States and Japan suggest that their shared democratic norms matter a great deal. Both Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal also observed that “the Atlantic community and Japan have established an interdependent security community.”⁹¹ More specifically, the United States and Japan have now established themselves as “a security community.”⁹²

As liberal democratic states, the United States and Japan have now learned to treat each other with more mutual respect for the principle of political and racial equality. Their leaders used to regard each other in racist terms. Until the end of World War II, Japanese Asianists saw the benefit to Japan of a racially justified regional hegemony, foresaw a coming race war, and saw Japan on a “great mission to purify world thought.”⁹³ After World War I, Japan joined China in a call for a racial equality clause in the Treaty of Versailles, but U.S. President Woodrow Wilson ignored the plea.⁹⁴ In recent years, American leaders have affirmed the principle of such equality. But this bilateral community is unlikely to grow ‘tight’ as long as Japan continues to identify itself as an Asian nation with a weak commitment to liberal values. According to Kenneth Pyle, “Democracy is not an indigenous phenomenon that Japan has ever sought to export...it is not in their life’s blood. These were not values the Japanese themselves had struggled for and made their own.”⁹⁵

Counterfactual evidence further shows that non-democratic states are unlikely to turn their temporary military alliances into security communities. Evidence suggests that non-democratic (including socialist) states in East Asia have not long maintained military alliances, let alone security communities. The military alliances between socialist states in the region – most notably the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam - did not outlast the Cold War.⁹⁶ The socialist Russian-Vietnamese military alliance has long ceased to exist. Vietnam still behaves more or less according to balance-of-threat logic (against China) by moving closer to the United States rather than according to balance-of-power logic, which predicts that Vietnam would form a military alliance with China to balance the preponderance of U.S. power.

Democratic and non-democratic states may try to build a security community in East Asia, but their mutual ties can be easily restrained because levels of their mutual trust remain low. Both non-democratic China and democratic Taiwan still exhibit a kind of Hobbesian behavior. They have yet to resolve their sovereignty disputes. Beijing considers Taiwan a rebel province and has applied constant pressure for it to accept the ‘one-China’ principle. In 1996, Taiwan held a presidential election and China test-fired ballistic missiles over the Island. Christensen devotes his analytical attention to the Sino-Taiwanese enmity, which threatens to escalate into an interstate war. China is not a *status-*

quo power: it does not accept a *de facto* territorial condition associated with Taiwan's stance on its political independence.⁹⁷ Non-democratic North and democratic South Korea remain technically at war. The North possesses one of the five largest armed forces in the world. South Korea, although its armed forces are quantitatively inferior to the North (with 560,000 ground troops, about 190 naval vessels, and 490 combat aircraft), "has been devoting its efforts to modernizing its military equipment."⁹⁸

Sino-Japanese-U.S. relations have not improved much, either. There have been incursions of Chinese surveillance ships into Japanese waters and signs of China's reluctance to delineate their territorial waters. This shift of Japanese policy toward China came after China's nuclear weapons tests, military threats against Taiwan, and shows of nationalism. After Chinese President Jiang Zemin's disastrous visit to Tokyo in December 1998, the negative Japanese view of China was solidified: "In the space of only a few years, Japan's fundamental thinking on China shifted from a faith in economic interdependence to a reluctant realism."⁹⁹ Beijing then refused to hold bilateral summits with Japanese leaders. Koizumi's last visit to the Yasukuni War Shrine in October 2005 (his fifth since taking office in 2001) allowed Beijing to justify its refusal to hold a summit meeting with Tokyo. Japan's then-Foreign Minister Taro Aso made a series of provocative statements (such as calling China "a military threat") and accused Beijing of "using beautiful Chinese women as spies to lure Japanese diplomats into revealing classified information."¹⁰⁰ According to Thomas Christensen, "Chinese analysts view Japan with much less trust and, in many cases, with a loathing rarely found in their attitudes about the United States."¹⁰¹ Beijing reacted with alarm to the Japan-U.S. Guidelines (revised in 1997) and joint agreement to research the Theatre Missile Defense system (TMD). China still worries about Japan's future militarization.¹⁰² The truth is that "China is not responding to the threat of regional American predominance as much as to its mistrust of Japan as a military power."¹⁰³ Still, China remains resentful of Western (especially U.S.) attempts to promote a "peaceful evolution" against Beijing,¹⁰⁴ resistant to democratic values, and suspicious of long-term U.S. intentions.

Evidence from East Asia suggests that non-democratic states have militarily challenged powerful democracies, even with little expected benefits from war,¹⁰⁵ but democratic states tend to show little tolerance toward

non-democratic states' belligerence. If the missile tests by North Korea provoked anger from other states in the region, it can be said that Washington was partly to blame. President Bush included North Korea in the 'axis of evil'. One leading journalist observes that "Bush's blustery refusal to negotiate led the Dear Leader [Kim Jong-il] to ramp up plutonium production, so today North Korea has enough plutonium for four to 13 nuclear weapons."¹⁰⁶ After the missile tests by North Korea in 1998 and 2006, Japan (a democracy) began to modify its approach to security. As late as April 1988, Defense Agency chief Tsutomu Kawara still maintained a pacific attitude, saying that "possessing offensive weapons would exceed the limits of the minimum-required level of capability for self-defense and cannot be allowed under any circumstance...the Self-Defense Forces should not be allowed to possess intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range strategic bombers or offensive aircraft carriers."¹⁰⁷ In March 2003, however, then-Defense Agency Chief Shigeru Ishiba put it differently: "Unlike the past, ballistic missiles can now arrive in a matter of minutes, so we have to think about what we can do."¹⁰⁸ Less than three years later, following the 2006 North-Korean missile tests, Foreign Minister Taro Aso contended that, "When missiles are being targeted at Japan, we cannot just stand by and wait to get hit."¹⁰⁹ In July 2006, Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe and Defense Agency Chief Fukushima Nukaga considered the possibility of reinterpreting the Constitution to permit Japan's preemptive strikes on North Korea's nuclear facilities.¹¹⁰

Hostility and tension between non-democratic and democratic states in ASEAN have also hindered them from building a security community. The group is no longer the "club of dictators" as it has often been labeled by its critics, but only two ASEAN states - Indonesia and the Philippines - can now be considered democracies. Thailand has not been a real democracy since the military coup in September 2006. Cambodia remains a poor candidate for consolidated democracy. Malaysia and Singapore are semi-authoritarian or electoral autocracies. Brunei remains an absolute monarchy. Burma is under the thumb of its military junta. Laos and Vietnam officially claim to uphold Marxism-Leninism. With Thailand (before the coup), the Philippines, and Indonesia becoming more democratic and a number of new antidemocratic or autocratic states joining ASEAN, the political rift

between the two types of states apparently has widened.¹¹¹ Their mutual distrust and rivalries still exist. The violent crackdowns on peaceful protesters by Myanmar's junta leaders in September 2007 further complicated relations among states in ASEAN.

Since the early 1990s, the regional group has taken the lead in promoting regional cooperation, including the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), but neither ASEAN nor the ARF has proven effective as a regional institution. According to Kavi Chongkittavorn, "It is doubtful if ASEAN can realize its plan to establish the security community...by 2015 as planned." The group established the High Council based on the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which "is supposed to serve as a conflict settlement mechanism for Member Countries. However, key ASEAN members such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore preferred to use the extra-judicial process – the International Court of Justice [in] The Hague...to settle their disputes." The group has not established or strengthened any other mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution among themselves. In his view, "the drafters of the ASEAN Charter have not yet agreed on what kind of dispute settlement mechanisms (DSM) ASEAN should adopt."¹¹² The ASEAN Charter adopted in November 2007 by its members offered no real institutional breakthroughs.

The negative impact of non-democratic norms on community building should not be underestimated. Experienced policymakers and journalists in the region seem to understand this challenge better than intellectual and diplomatic rhetoricians. Indonesia's former foreign minister Ali Alatas, for instance, has acknowledged that the member states have not developed an "ASEAN mindset" because they think more nationally and less regionally. The national secretariats in the members' foreign ministries remain more powerful than the ASEAN Secretariat. The critical challenge for ASEAN lies in one critical fact - its member states' "different political systems" - and this helps explain why they "never push for political convergence."¹¹³

Another challenge to security community building lies in East Asian states' unwillingness or inability to accept each other fully as equals in political and racial terms. Within Southeast Asia, non-liberal democratic states such as Singapore and Malaysia have promoted racial homogeneity within their

national borders. Malaysian leaders in particular have made efforts to build a community of Asians. Former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has relentlessly or consistently defended his vision to build a regional community whose members are made up of only Asians. In his words, "Australia and New Zealand cannot be regarded as Asians and cannot be members of the East Asian grouping."¹¹⁴ At the 2005 inaugural East Asian Summit, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi further repeated this line of racist thinking: "You are talking about a community of East Asians. I don't know how the Australians could regard themselves as East Asians, or the New Zealanders, for that matter."¹¹⁵

Still, East Asians do not always regard themselves as one harmonious race, thus reflecting the region's inadequate practice of liberal democratic norms. Racial and ethnic hatreds have contributed to instability in the region.¹¹⁶ In Southeast Asia, xenophobia remains. In an editorial, *The Jakarta Post*, for instance, contends that Indonesia "is becoming more and more xenophobic, if not paranoid towards foreigners...Neighbours will respect Indonesia only when we can prove we are able to play a leading role in improving security and prosperity in the region, while treating individual countries equally."¹¹⁷ Some state leaders, such as those in Singapore and Malaysia, often perceive each other in racist terms. In Northeast Asia, xenophobia also remains strong. As of mid-2006, Prime Minister Koizumi's cabinet contained several racial supremacists.¹¹⁸ According to Kenneth Pyle, "Japan remains inhospitable to foreign residents. They tend to be shunned, and because their status and position are unstable they tend to be 'shut out of Japanese society and discriminated against.'¹¹⁹ The Japanese sense of racial superiority vis-à-vis Koreans has not healed the wounds inflicted on the latter by its colonial rule from 1910 to 1945. Alleged racialism within Japan (against over one million people of Chinese and Korean descent) remains "deep" and "profound"¹²⁰ and often provokes anger from Koreans.¹²¹ Korean racialism also remains strong. Pyongyang has advocated Korean racial purity. South Koreans regard North Koreans as "long-lost brethren, objects of pity, sources of kitsch, or targets of ridicule – but rarely enemies"¹²² and prefer reconciliatory options. Japan, however, wanted tougher actions, including the possibility of preemptive strikes on North Korea, which infuriated Seoul.¹²³

In short, then, the absence of a security community in East Asia can be explained by the fact that most states in the region have not become maturely democratic. Non-democratic states in the region also tend to be revisionist, rather than *pro-status quo*. Moreover, most states have had difficulty applying the liberal norms of peaceful conflict resolution and equal treatment (in political and racial terms). Most importantly, they have not developed effective regional institutions. All these factors prove to be key hindrances to the process of security community building in East Asia. Both historical and normative/sociological institutionalisms helps explain institutional continuity in East Asia better than any other type of institutionalism because the regional institutions remain relatively unchanged.

The Virtue of Community Leadership: Implications for East Asia

Unless East Asia has a powerful democracy to lead other democratic states, the prospect for security community building and maintenance remains far from ideal. The crucial role of the United States as the democratic leader among democracies must not be overlooked. Democratic leadership defined in political, economic, and military terms has made a difference in the Japan-U.S. Security Community.

The contrast can be seen before and after World War II. Japanese militarism in the 1930s eroded newly acquired democratic norms and pushed Japan into World War II. The post-war U.S. occupation gave rise to what Ikenberry and Kupchan call “internal reconstruction,” helping turn Japanese militarism into pacifism and autocracy into democracy through military, political, and social reforms.¹²⁴

Japan’s economic security depended on the United States and European states before WWII, but its economic dependence came to an end by the late 1930s and re-emerged after the War. Dale Copeland argues that, “Japan was almost totally dependent on trade with the U.S. and European powers: American for oil and iron ore; British Malaysia, French Indochina, and Dutch Indies for rubber, oil, tungsten, and other minerals.”¹²⁵ Japan decided to launch a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 because it could no longer count on the United States for its economic survival. Japan had nothing to lose when the United States and other European states could no longer be depended upon, especially after the United States imposed a series

of embargoes. During the Cold War period, Japan’s economic dependence on the United States deepened, thus making it vulnerable and highly resented, but it has never been severely interrupted. Japan’s economic dependence can be further explained by the end of the economic miracles it experienced up until the 1980s (especially after the bust in 1991) and the strange absence of a bilateral free-trade arrangement between two of the largest, most industrialized states in the world.

Japan’s military dependence on the United States has since the Cold War period been deep, if still controversial, and thus largely conducive to their security community building and maintenance. During the period leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor, non-democratic Japan’s military power had grown to the extent that it could pose a real challenge to the United States. The balance of power among the great powers at the time shifted in favor of Japan. “British and French forces were drawn home” as they engaged in the war against Hitler’s Germany in Europe and as “the U.S. fleet was divided between the Atlantic and Pacific theaters.”¹²⁶ In late 1940 and early 1941, Japan enjoyed “temporary military superiority” and its “leaders felt they had to attack soon, before economic decline progressed too far.”¹²⁷

During the Cold War and after, however, Japan’s military dependence on the United States remains indispensable for its security. Tokyo continues to finance the U.S. military presence (over \$4 billion per year) and pays annually an additional \$1.5 billion on other security activities, such as its troops in Iraq in support of the U.S. forces. This does not suggest that Japan’s reliance on the United States means that it always does what the United States would like. In 2006, Japan, for instance, decided to withdraw its troops from Iraq. Overall, however, Japan has been dependent on the United States for its security. Scholars like Dale Copeland recognize this. On the one hand, Copeland asserts that U.S. hegemony “has allowed Japan to flourish since 1945.” On the other hand, he predicts that “one can imagine the fears that would arise in Tokyo should the United States ever reduce its naval and military presence in the Far East.” He adds that, “Japan would be compelled to try to defend its raw material supply routes, setting off a spiral of hostility with regional great powers like China, India, Russia, and perhaps the United States itself.”¹²⁸ Thomas Berger further contends that material factors seem to matter far more significantly than history and culture

alone. When faced with a powerful aggressor, he predicts, Japan would first seek to appease it, but would then look to the United States if this policy failed. In the back of the Japanese mind, however, the United States remains the final source of external assurance. Japanese antimilitarism is thus not a *fait accompli*: it rests not on the absolute guarantee that it will never degenerate. That is, antimilitarism is likely to erode “if the United States allows the Cold War alliance structures to decay.”¹²⁹ Tokyo would then be compelled to consider a dramatic expansion of its military capabilities, possibly including the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Japan-U.S. relations still rest on Japan’s military dependence. Japanese antimilitarism keeps Japanese ambiguous about American militarism, but they see the need for the United States to serve as the final guarantor of their national security. The Japanese remain “satisfied with the existing security arrangement, a combination of the American security guarantee and the Japanese self-defense force that is proscribed from going to battle outside of the Japanese territory.”¹³⁰ Americans have over the years grown more comfortable with Japan as an ally and are even urging the latter to allocate more budgets for its own national defense.

Less asymmetrical power relations may now make the two security allies more of partners, even though bilateral tensions may become more frequent or intense at times. The U.S.-Japan Security Community remains virtually unchanged and has even become stronger, despite structural changes at the international level (from Cold War bipolarity to post-Cold War unipolarity and possibly multipolarity in the future). Democratic norms shared by Japan (the lesser power) and the United States (the greater power) have made all the difference: they have stuck together in bad times by balancing the threats of powerful and weaker non-democratic states and in good times by successfully maintaining their bilateral ties. But racialism may have made the U.S.-Japan community less tight than that of U.S.-Australia.¹³¹

The United States has no doubt served as a positive force for diffusing tensions between its two democratic Asian allies in Northeast Asia. By sending Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Christopher Hill crisscrossing the region in July 2006 (following the nuclear launches by North Korea), for instance, Washington helped defuse the growing tensions between them by emphasizing their need to speak with one voice.¹³² Democratic leadership

has helped prevent mutually hostile democracies as well as democratic and non-democratic states hostile to each other from going to war. The fact that territorial disputes between South Korea and Japan did not escalate into armed conflict may also have had to do with the United States being the democratic leader of these two Asian democracies.¹³³ Powerful democracies may also have prevented democracies and autocracies from waging war against each other. The U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia has also done much to prevent autocratic China from launching offensive attacks on democratic Taiwan.

One reason why the United States may have proved unwilling to take the lead in building a multilateral security community in Pacific Asia may have something to do with its treatment of Asian nationals in culturally and racially different (if not inferior) terms, perhaps because they were not as liberal or democratic as other Western states. American decision-makers had developed superior attitudes toward Asians,¹³⁴ if less so toward Japanese in recent years. Both Hemmer and Katzenstein explain why there is no NATO or a multilateral security community in Asia, arguing that American policymakers did not treat their Asian allies in equal terms (politically, culturally, or racially). “America’s potential Asian allies...were seen as part of an alien and, in important ways, inferior community.”¹³⁵ European allies were identified by U.S. policymakers as trustworthy because of their shared religion, democratic values, and common race, as noted.¹³⁶ In contrast, the norms of cultural, religious, and racial inequalities identified by “condescending” U.S. policymakers led many of them not to regard “Asians as ready or sufficiently sophisticated to enjoy the trust and the same degree of power that the United States had offered to European states” or not to “take them very seriously” or even to “regard them as inferiors.”¹³⁷ When still U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson “visited Europe at least eleven times,” but claimed that that he was “too busy to make even a single visit to East Asia.”¹³⁸

It remains unclear whether U.S. policymakers have changed their attitudes. Evidence does not provide much encouragement. Robert Gilpin noted that “despite the Clinton Administration’s rhetoric regarding the importance of APEC,” the U.S. president “thinks about Asia on the day before he is scheduled to visit the region.”¹³⁹ The U.S. president continues to make the

logistical excuse that he cannot make more than one annual trip to Asia. According to Ralph Cossa, this is a weak excuse.¹⁴⁰ According to Kenneth Pyle, “Thus far, the Americans have remained on the sidelines and have not committed to a vision of multilateral institution-building that would enhance regional integration and serve Japan’s purposes.”¹⁴¹

Evidence shows that non-democratic hegemons have never contributed to security community building in East Asia, either. The region has a long history of alternating between regional anarchy and hegemony.¹⁴² In ancient China, there were 3,790 recorded wars from the Western Zhou (c. 1100 BC) to the end of the Qing dynasty (1911). In the Ming period, the average number of external wars per year was 1.12.¹⁴³ After having achieved unification during the Qin and Han dynasties, China became expansionist when the first emperor began to incorporate the “barbarians” of present-day southern China down to Guangzhou (Canton) and to the northern part of contemporary Vietnam. China occupied Korea (108 BC-AD 313) and Vietnam for about 1,000 years (from 111 BC to AD 939). The Chinese Empire, while maintaining regional stability for hundreds of years (1300-1900), did so by way of material and non-democratic cultural, racist forces. According to Suisheng Zhao, sinocentrism and the Chinese world order were maintained for centuries by the strength of the Chinese civilization as well as by military force,¹⁴⁴ or “from China’s military strength in East Asia”, because “China was a ‘world empire’ without rivals” in the region for many centuries. Chinese racialism was evident throughout its history, as Chinese leaders characterized other races as ‘barbarian’ or inferior.¹⁴⁵

States under Chinese suzerainty did not unconditionally accept Chinese hegemony.¹⁴⁶ Vietnam and Japan, for instance, sought to escape from the Chinese sphere of influence and even waged war to do so (such as Japan in 1895). Japan’s decision to enter the Western world was driven by the need to counter the China-centered tributary system, which was not always benign,¹⁴⁷ not by the vision to westernize itself as such. Paying tribute to the Chinese emperor was seen by Japan as a sign of submission. Japan’s absorption of Western technology and its drive for modernization rested on the need to cope with Chinese influence. According to Takeshi Hamashita, “the course of Japan’s modernization has been studied as a process of overcoming its subordination to Western powers.”¹⁴⁸ But “the main issues in Japanese

modernization were how to cope with Chinese dominance over commercial relations in Asia” and “how to reorganize relations among Japan, China, Korea, and Liu-chi’iu (Ryukyu) in a way that put Japan at the center.”¹⁴⁹ China dominated East Asia until the late nineteenth century when Japan sought to dominate the region by force. Japan attempted to take Korea away from China in 1867 and dominated others by coercive means: by defeating China in 1895 and forcing it to hand Taiwan over to Japan, by defeating Russia in 1905, and by making Korea its protectorate in 1905 and colonizing it from 1910 to 1945. Having replaced China as the central power in East Asia, Japan subsequently attempted to create under its domination a Greater East-Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in the region. It invaded and brutally occupied Manchuria in the early 1930s and the rest of China as well as almost all of the states in Southeast Asia during World War II. Japan will not jump on China’s bandwagon, as culturalists or commercial pacifists assert (where Asian states would follow China because of cultural affinities or commerce).¹⁵⁰

Overall, most states in the region prefer the United States to China. From Tokyo to Jakarta, from Seoul to Singapore, and from Hanoi to Manila, state leaders have put more trust in the preponderance of U.S. power than the rise of non-democratic China. The thesis that the hierarchical regional order may become a modern version of the Sino-centric ‘tribute system’ overlooks the fact that a regional equilibrium remains based on the predominance of U.S. power. But the alternative thesis that the hierarchical regional order rests on the relative benignity of U.S. power (due to its lack of territorial ambition in the region and its role as an honest broker) also has inadequate explanatory power: it ignores the fact that the United States has been a democracy and the only superpower after the Cold War. As noted, liberal democracies tend to be more *status-quo*-oriented than autocracies.

If China were to become democratic, the problem of power transition would become more effectively mitigated. A democratic Chinese state would not, in all probability, disturb regional peace as much as it would if it were still undemocratic. While we have no concrete evidence to predict how a democratic Chinese state would behave and how other states would respond, we have better evidence to suggest that democratic leadership would seem more acceptable to democratic states than autocratic leadership. Taiwan would not follow a Chinese autocracy and will continue

to press ahead with democracy, largely in search of an international democratic guarantee against the perceived China threat. In September 2000, for instance, Chen Shui-bian declared boldly: “We don’t think unification is the only principle. There could be two or three or countless different conclusions. We see Taiwan as a democratic country, with the people in a position to decide.”¹⁵¹

Even if China were to become democratic, there would be no automatic guarantee that it would help build a multilateral security community, unless lesser states in the region also became democratic. Autocratic resistance to its leadership would remain stiff. Evidently the non-existence of a multilateral security community in Pacific Asia today has resulted from the fact that the United States has never been regarded as leader by non-democratic states. Most states in Pacific Asia remain undemocratic and find the United States potentially threatening.

Conclusion

The lingering weaknesses of domestic democratic institutions in East Asia have resulted in most of the hindrances to the process of security community building in the region. The evidence shows that non-democratic states – most notably North Korea and China - tend to be revisionist, rather than pro-status quo. Regional institutions (including military alliances) that non-democratic states have attempted to build tend to remain fragile, if not futile, unless underpinned by powerful strategic reasons. Democracies tend not to threaten war against autocratic states but tend to show hostilities toward them and escalate ongoing tensions with them.

Historical institutionalism helps explain institutional continuity in East Asia better than rational choice institutionalism, but democratic realist institutionalism further contends that the lack of institutional change has much to do with the fact that most states in the region do not embrace liberal democracy and its norms. As a result, they continue to maintain a spirit of mutual suspicion and do not regard the most powerful among them to be the leader. The theory predicts that security community building remains possible, but only if at least two basic requirements – democratic norms shared by states and community leadership – are first met.

Democratic realist institutionalism as a theory proposed in this study offers a perspective far more progressive than neo-classical realism¹⁵² regarding the subject of security community building. This type of realism takes an approach to security by drawing insights from Kantian liberalism, constructivism, and theories critical of racialism without at the same time completely sacrificing realism, which tends to converge on the importance of relative power. The constructivist policy agenda of engagement through socialization can help, but is likely to have a limited impact on security community building. Constructivists argue in favor of the need to engage non-democratic states through deconstructing their *realpolitik* culture,¹⁵³ but this prescription will have no real lasting effect on regional peace unless or until Russia, China, and North Korea become truly democratic. Within their orbit, democracies also tend to regard their leader as legitimate. The United States still has a leadership role to play. Because of its powerful reach when compared with other states, it should take effective action to build a multilateral community in Pacific Asia.

This study thus presents a difficult effort to draw various insights from *theoretical eclecticism*. By no means do I suggest that the concept of national security found in the wisdom of realism has now been relegated to the dustbin of history, but I strongly feel the need to suggest that we ‘soften’ it by learning to listen to critical voices without accepting everything at face value. A word of caution is necessary, though: just as we must not stretch any analytical concept too far so as to make it amorphous and meaningless, so also we must not carelessly combine insights from different theoretical perspectives to the extent that our arguments become unintelligible. There are limits to eclecticism.¹⁵⁴ If possible, clear theoretical statements should be made to allow us to test our insights against empirical evidence or evaluate our commitment to policy action on security community building.

I thus propose democratic realist institutionalism as a theory based on the foundationalist ontology that there is a ‘reality out there’ to be explained and the realist epistemology that acknowledges causal factors rooted in deep normative and material structures, which constrain or enable decision-making. The theory calls for a more eclectic way of promoting regional security: It is based on the assumption that liberal democracy and material capabilities in the form of community leadership enable state actors to build security communities as a realistic policy agenda.

Notes

1. See, for instance, Sorpong Peou, "Regional Community Building for Better Global Governance," in *The United Nations System in the 21st Century*, edited by Volker Rittberger (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2002); Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye also argue that "Japan became part of the U.S.-centered security community," see *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd ed. (New York: Longman, 2001), p.240.
2. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
3. John Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization* (London & New York: Routledge, 1998), pp.230-31.
4. K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1987), p.439.
5. Ole Wæver, "Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-war Community," in *Security Communities*, edited by E. Adler and M. Barnett.
6. Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community," in *The Culture of National Security*, edited by Peter Katzenstein.
7. Michael N. Barnett, "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East," in *Security Communities*.
8. Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," *International Security* 18, no.3 (Winter, 1993/94), p.5.
9. *Ibid.*, p.5.
10. *Ibid.*, p.11.
11. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
12. *Ibid.*, p.280.
13. Inis L. Claude, *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962), p.6.
14. Cited in Lynn H. Miller, "The Idea and the Reality of Collective Security," in *The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World*, edited by Paul F. Diehl (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p.81.
15. Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan "The Promise of Collective Security," *International Security* 20, no.1 (Summer 1995), pp.52-61.
16. A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.295.
17. *Ibid.*, p.299.
18. *Ibid.*, p.299.
19. Karl Deutsch et al, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), p.6.
20. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the study of security communities," p.30.
21. *Ibid.*, p.30.
22. Ole Wæver, "Insecurity, security, and asecurty in the West European non-war community," in *Security Communities*, pp.69-118.

23. Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein, "Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," *International Organization* 56, no.3 (Summer 2002), p.589, 599.
24. K. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security* 25, no.1 (Summer 2000), p.31; the German journalist Josef Joffe also wrote a book whose central theme might help validate Waltz' realism. In his view, Europeans have a crisis of collective identity, but the nearest thing they can share is their "[collective] opposition to the United States [Uberpower] – to both its culture and its clout," in *The Imperial Temptation of America* (W.W. Norton & Co., 2005?), cited in Roger Cohen, "The burden of unprecedented global power," *International Herald Tribune* 15-16 July 2006, p.8.
25. See Kenneth Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," *American Political Science Review* 91, no.4 (December 1997); Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise?" *International Security* 17, no.4 (Spring 1993): 5-51; Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security* 21, no.4 (Spring 1997): 44-98; Wohlforth only suggests that unipolarity "will last several more decades," thus still implying that balance-of-power politics will return later. W. C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* 24, no.1 (Summer 1999), p.39.
26. Even Kant seemed doubtful if his pacific union of states would completely end their rivalries or balance-of-power politics. See Kenneth Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," *The American Political Science Review* 56, no.2 (June 1962): 331-40, especially p.338.
27. Emanuel Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 26, no.2 (1997), p.255.
28. Sean M. Shore, "No fences make good neighbors: the development of the Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, p.344.
29. Bellamy, A. and MacDonald, M., "The Utility of Human Security: Which Humans, What Security? A Reply to Thomas and Tow," *Security Dialogue*, 33, no.3 (2002), p.376.
30. Sorpong Peou, *Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battlefield to Ballot-Box*, Kuala Lumpur, New York and Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.304.
31. William Tow and Russell Trood, "Linkages between traditional security and human security," in *Asia's Emerging Regional Order* (New York, Paris and Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000), p.28.
32. See, for instance, Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power* (Boulder, San Francisco and London: Westview Press, 1989).
33. Realism is based an epistemology assuming that there is an object reality out there and that we can offer causal explanation. See David Marsh and Paul Furlong, "A Skin not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science," in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, 2nd ed. 2nd ed., edited by David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (New York and Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p.30-32, 37, 38, 39; David Marsh, "Marxism," in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, p.159, 160.
34. Vivien Lowndes, "Institutionalism," in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, , p.101, 105.

35. Mark Blyth, "Institutions and Ideas," in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, p.305.
36. *Ibid.*, p.293.
37. J. March and L. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions* (New York: Free Press, 1984) & their "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *American Political Science Review* 78 (1989): 734-49.
38. Hampson et al., *Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Order* (Ontario, Canada: Oxford University Press, 2002), Chapter 5.
39. See, for instance, Keith Krause, "Multilateral Diplomacy, Norm Building, and UN Conferences: The Case of Small Arms and Light Weapons," *Global Governance* 8, no.2 (2002): 247-63.
40. Edward Laurance et al., "Managing the Global Problems Created by the Conventional Arms Trade: An Assessment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms," *Global Governance* 11, no.2 (Apr.-June 2005), p.236.
41. See, for instance, Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is...and Is Not," in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), especially p.49.
42. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.297.
43. Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, p.173.
44. Michael N. Barnett, "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East," p.401.
45. *Ibid.*, p.423.
46. David L. Rousseau et al., "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-1988," *American Political Science Review* 90 (1996): 512-33.
47. Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.11, 30-31; Erich Weede, "Some Simple Calculations on Democracy and War Involvement," *Journal of Peace Research* 29, no.4 (November 1992): 377-83; Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80, no.4 (December 1986): 1151-69.
48. Democracies are not "unconditionally constrained from initiating military hostilities against others". William Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 88 (March 1994), p.18 (14-32).
49. David L. Rousseau et al., "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-1988"; Lemke and Reed (1996); Arie M. Kacowicz, "Explaining Zones of Peace: Democracies as Satisfied Powers?" *Journal of Peace Research* 32 (1995): 265-76; Mark R. Brawley, "Regime Types, Markets, and War: The Importance of Pervasive Rents in Foreign Policy," *Comparative Political Studies* 36 (1993): 178-97.
50. Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee, *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
51. For the works of proponents of the democratic peace thesis, see the following: Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth, and Political Stability: Is the lack of conflict among democracies a statistical artifact? *International Interactions* 17 (1992):

- 245-67; Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Type and International Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33 (1989): 3-35; Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80 (1986): 1151-69; Steve Chan, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall...Are Freer Countries More Pacific?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (1984): 617-48; Rudolph Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (1983): 27-71; Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The War-proneness of Democratic Regimes," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1 (1976): 50-69; some democracies almost went to war, but they did not. See Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19, no.2 (Fall, 1994): 5-49.
52. Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, p.373; see also his *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
53. William Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict"; Mao Zeev and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," *American Political Science Review* 87 (September 1993): 624-38; Gregory Raymond, "Democracies, Disputes, and Third-Party Intermediaries," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38 (March 1994): 24-42.
54. David L. Rousseau et al., "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-1988," p.527.
55. K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, p.437.
56. William Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," p.16.
57. Gregory Raymond, "Democracies, Disputes, and Third-Party Intermediaries," p.24.
58. Sean M. Shore, "No fences make good neighbors: the development of the Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," p.349.
59. E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939*, 2nd ed. (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press and Papermac, 1946), p.164 (italics added).
60. *Ibid.*, p.164.
61. *Ibid.*, p.49.
62. Michael Mann, "Authoritarianism and liberal militarism: a contribution from comparative and historical sociology," in *International Theory: positivism and beyond*, edited by Steve Smith et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.235.
63. Anne Hammerstand, "Democratic Threats, Regional Institutions? The challenge of security integration in Southern Africa?," *Review of International Studies*, 31, no.1 (2005), p.76 (italics original).
64. Sandra Whitworth, "Militarized Masculinities and the Politics of Peacekeeping," in *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, edited by Ken Booth (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 2005).
65. Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein, "Why is There No NATO in Asia?" Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," *International Organization* 56, no.3 (Summer, 2002), p.575.

66. Cited in *Ibid.*, p.593.
67. Anne-Marie Slaughter, "International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda," *American Journal of International Law* 87 (1993):205-39 and "International Law in a World of Liberal States," *European Journal of International Law* 6 (1995): 503-538.
68. Kurt T. Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment to International Relations," *International Organization* 50 (1996): 109-39.
69. Bruce Russett, "Why the Democratic Peace?" in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, p.85.
70. *Ibid.*, p.92, 113.
71. Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," p.369.
72. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraints, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
73. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.365.
74. Emanuel Adler & Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," in *Security Communities*, p.40.
75. *Ibid.*, p.52 (Italics added).
76. Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), p.30.
77. S. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1998), p.43.
78. *Ibid.*, p.385.
79. W. C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," p.34.
80. *Ibid.*, p.35.
81. *Ibid.*, p.18.
82. According to realists, history shows that power transition among great powers appears to be dangerously prone to war. Robert Gilpin, for instance, observes that, "...there do not appear to be any examples of a dominant power willingly conceding dominance over an international system to a rising power in order to avoid war. Nor are there examples of rising powers that have failed to press their advantage and have refrained from attempts to restructure the system to accommodate their security and economic interests". R. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.209; however, Gilpin makes a subtle but profound remark about the difference between the United States, viewed as "tolerant" and "un-oppressive" and Germany. Great powers that operate on the basis of "shared values and interests" account for peaceful change. *Ibid.*, p.209
83. Randall L. Schweller, "Democratic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" *World Politics* 44 (1992), p.238.
84. *Ibid.*, p.251.
85. Barry Buzan, "Is international security possible?", p.36.
86. R. Schweller, "Democratic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" p.269.

87. See W. C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," p.35.
88. Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, p.144.
89. *Ibid.*, p.173.
90. See, for instance, Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001).
91. Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking East Asian Security," in Michael T. Klare & Yogesh Chandrani, *World Security: Challenges for a New Century*, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1998), p.109.
92. Henry Nau and Richard Leone, *At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), p.153.
93. Richard J. Samuels, *Securing Japan* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2007), p.20.
94. *Ibid.*, p.186.
95. Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese and Purpose* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), p.351.
96. Reports in recent years seem to suggest that Russia has become increasingly autocratic and moved closer to China. Some even suggest the possibility of a Sino-Russian alliance (recently the two powers conducted their first-ever joint military exercise). But no formal alliance between them exists.
97. "As a result, Chinese citizens have been fed a steady diet of patriotic, anti-Japanese media programming designed to glorify the CPP's role in World War II". Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security* 23, no.4 (Spring 1999), p.54; Thomas Christensen, "China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma," in *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, p.28.
98. National Institute for Defense Studies, *Eastern Asian Strategic Review, 1998-1999*, p.88.
99. Michael J. Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p.78.
100. *The Straits Times*, 10 June 2006, p.10.
101. Thomas Christensen, "China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma," p.27; on historical legacies, see pp.27-29; he also notes that, "The most common belief in Beijing security circles is that, by reassuring Japan and providing for Japanese security on the cheap, the United States fosters a political climate in which the Japanese public remains opposed to military buildups and the more hawkish elements of the Japanese elites are kept at bay." p.31.
102. Thomas J. Christensen draws our attention to this problem in the following remarks: "According to security dilemma theory, defensive systems and missions, such as TMD, should not provoke arms races and spirals of tension. In contemporary East Asia, however, this logic is less applicable. Many in the region, particularly in Beijing, fear that new defensive roles for Japan could break important norms of self-restraint, leading to more comprehensive

Japanese military buildups later. See S. J. Christensen, "China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security* 18, no.3 (Winter, 1993/94), p.51. "Most Chinese analysts fear almost any change in the US-Japan alliance," *Ibid.*, p.58.

103. Paul Midford, "Asian Reactions to the New US-Japan Guidelines," (Unpublished manuscript), p.21.

104. Li Ma, "China and Vietnam" Coping with Threat of Peaceful Evolution," pp.44-45 & 55.

105. Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor in 1941; see Scott D. Sagan, "The Origins of the Pacific War," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (Spring 1988).

106. Nicholas D. Kristof, "Dear Leader's boiling cauldron," *International Herald Tribune*, 12 July 2005, p.7.

107. *The Asahi Shimbun*, 12 July 2006, p.21.

108. *Ibid.*, p.21.

109. *Ibid.*, p.21.

110. *Ibid.*, p.21.

111. As one senior ASEAN official put it: "We have democracies, full and partial; we have absolute monarchies; we have communist dictatorships; we have military dictatorships. With that diversity, if you start advocating interference you are going to break up the group," *Asianweek*, 6 August 1999, p.18; ASEAN also remains divided over Burma's repressive actions against opposition groups. Thailand has taken other liberal initiatives — insistence on incorporating the term 'civil society' into the 'ASEAN Vision 2020,' on creating an ASEAN Human Rights Commission and an ASEAN parliamentary body — none of which has come to fruition.

112. Kavi Chongkittavorn, "ASEAN Security Community: In Need of a Common Policy," *AsiaViews* (July-August, 2007), p.9.

113. Interview with Ali Alatas, *AsiaViews* (July-August 2007), p.15.

114. Mahathir Mohamad, "Let Asians build their own future regionalism," *GlobalAsia1*, no.1 (September 2006), p.14.

115. Cited in Ralph Cossa, "East Asia Community-Building: Time for the United States to Get on Board," *Policy Analysis Brief* (Muscatine, Iowa: The Stanley Foundation, September 2007), p.5.

116. Thomas Berger, "Set for Stability? Prospects for Conflict and Cooperation in East Asia," *Review of International Studies*, 26 (Spring 2000).

117. Reprinted in *The Straits Times*, 26 May 2007, p.S16.

118. One of them is the current Foreign Minister Taro Aso, who, when still Minister of Interior and Communications, proclaimed Japan as "one nation, one civilization, one language, one culture, and one race, the like of which there is no other on this earth" (Cited in Christopher Reed, "The Persistence of Racism: The Ghosts of Japan's Past," *Counterpunch* (14 November 2005); Aso remains a devotee to the Yasukuni and has supported Koizumi's visits to the Shrine. According to Reed, "Aso's open advocacy of the mythical racist superiority theory that propelled Japan's 1931-45 military hostilities". Like Koizumi, he also disregarded other Asians' feelings. In August 2005, he showed his arrogance by stating that, "Whatever

China and South Korea say, we should behave as if nothing happened [at Yasukuni shrine]. The most ideal way of resolving the Yasukuni dispute is that it works out peacefully after they realize that it is useless for them to complain any more," *Ibid.*; another racist member of the Koizumi cabinet is its Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, a hawkish on Asian diplomacy who has sought to minimize the 'comfort women' scandal involving an estimated 200,000 Asian women forced into sex slavery for Japanese Imperial Army soldiers during the 14-year Japanese conquest of Asian countries up until the end of WWII. While Japan has never fully accepted responsibility for this form of slavery, its leadership has put on its top agenda the North Korean abduction of at least 13 Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s and even refused to hand over former President Alberto Fujimori of Peru to the new government in Lima, primarily because Tokyo regarded him as a Japanese citizen with a Japanese name, despite the fact that he was born in Peru, educated in Peru and the West, and hardly speaks Japanese.

119. Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese and Purpose*, p.361.

120. A UN report filed in January 2006 by Special Envoy Doudou Diene condemned Japan for its failure to accommodate the needs of descendants of its former colonial subjects from Asia, most notably Chinese and Koreans, and for its lack of political will to combat racism. David McNeill, "The Diene Report on Discrimination and Racism in Japan," (www.zmag.org/content/print_article.cfm?itemID=10066§ionID=1, accessed on 21 July 2006).

121. Korean leaders view Japanese colonialism in racist terms. At the World Conference against Racism in South Africa in 2001, North Korea's Head of Delegation spoke against Japanese racialism: "Korean people suffered with extreme national discrimination under the Japanese military occupation. The policies of Japanization of the Korean names and Oneness of Japan and Korea, under which all Koreans were forced to change their names in Japanese and to speak and write only in Japanese, were the most evil policy to eradicate one nation which cannot be found anywhere else in the world history of colonialism" See his statement at (www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/55a/171.html).

122. "Launchings put Japan and South Korea on different paths," *International Herald Tribune*, 12 July 2006, p.3.

123. On 11 July 2006, a spokesperson of President Roh Moo Hyun responded in anger, assailing Tokyo in the following words, "We will strongly react to arrogance and senseless remarks of Japanese political leaders who intend to amplify a crisis on the Korean peninsula with dangerous and provocative rhetoric such as 'pre-emptive strikes...[which] exposed Japan's tendency to invade". "Seoul assails Tokyo on pre-emption," *International Herald Tribune*, 12 July 2006, p.3.

124. G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," pp.304.

125. Dale Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and the Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations," in *International Relations Theory & the Asia-Pacific*, edited by G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), p.329.

126. *Ibid.*, p.331.

127. *Ibid.*, p.332.

128. Dale Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations," in *Theories of War and Peace*, edited by Michael E. Brown et al. (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1998), p.499.

129. Thomas Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p.210.

130. Hikari Agakimi, "We the Japanese People' – A Reflection on Public Opinion," p.3.

131. John Baker and Douglas H. Paal correctly characterize the U.S.-Australia alliance as "America's most intimate partnership in Asia" and observe that, "No other alliance relationship in the Asia-Pacific region even comes close to the nature of the U.S.-Australia alliance"; "shared concerns about democracy and free enterprise," "common bonds," "common values," "shared interests" and "a very special intelligence partnership" are cited as the reasons for this tight alliance relationship; see their "The U.S.-Australia Alliance," in *America's Asian Allies*, p.88, 118; they even add that, "At present the top three U.S. foreign policy offices, those of secretary of state, secretary of defense, and national security advisor, are occupied by individuals with comparatively little exposure to the Asia-Pacific," p.101.

132. Evidently Washington was able to help reduce the tension between Japan and South Korea and to get them to go along with its strategy. Both Tokyo and Seoul subsequently accepted the UN Security Council's Resolution and urged Pyongyang to abide by it. The resolution did not satisfy Tokyo's earlier proposal, which demanded that a UN resolution make reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which would pave the way for Japan to impose economic sanctions on North Korea and possibly to take military action against the latter. Tokyo eventually acquiesced to the U.S. refusal to support its resolution. As one senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official put it, "When Washington says so, we can't help but go along," cited in *The Asahi Shimbun*, 17 July 2006, p.19.

133. When Greece and Turkey, two of NATO's democratic members, plunged into a crisis in 1996 and were nearly on the brink of war, U.S. President Bill Clinton had to remind them that they were democratic members of the multilateral alliance.

134. According to Eric T. L. Love, race is and will remain a vital part of the story of American imperialism. See his *Race over Empire: Racism and U.S. Imperialism, 1865-1900* (University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

135. Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why is There No NATO in Asia?" p.575.

136. *Ibid.*, p.588.

137. *Ibid.*, p.597, 598.

138. *Ibid.*, p.597.

139. Robert Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), p.291; U.S. reluctance to defend East Asia and institution building remains evident throughout its history of engagement in the region; the United States did not defend Asia by making "the biggest *non*intervention decision of the entire Cold War – in Asia". In 1949, Washington "decided to accept the communist victory in China" because

"the priority was now decidedly Europe first," Philip Zelikow, "American Engagement in Asia," in *America's Asian Allies*, p.23; Washington decided then "not to defend Taiwan, South Korea, or Indochina with U.S. forces" and despite positive changes of policy that renewed its commitments to Asia after the Korean invasion in 1950, "the United States never built up political, economic, or military institutions in Asia of a strength and durability comparable to those created in Europe," *Ibid.*, p.24 (italics original).

140. Ralph Cossa, "East Asia Community-Building: Time for the United States to Get on Board," *Policy Analysis Brief* (Muscatine, IA: The Stanley Foundation, September 2002), p.1.

141. Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese and Purpose*, p.369.

142. Barry Gills, "The Hegemonic Transition in East Asia: A Historical Perspective," in *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*, edited by Stephen Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

143. Alastair I. Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p.27; seen in this context, it is empirically useless to question whether hierarchy in East Asia could exist, as shown by David Kang, "Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations," in *International Relations Theory & the Asia-Pacific*, p.169; the question should be: if hierarchy could exist, would it last or would it be replaced by anarchy derived from states' balancing behavior?

144. Suisheng Zhao, *Power Competition in East Asia: From the Old Chinese World Order to Post-Cold War Multipolarity* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p.19, 23.

145. A study of Ming China's strategic culture (1368-1644), for instance, shows that Chinese elites regarded the Mongols as racially inferior, calling them "dogs and sheep," "not of our race," who "should be "rejected as animals". See Alastair I. Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p.187, 188, 189, 230, 247, and 250.

146. David Kang argues that they did. He cited David Marr, "This reality [China's overwhelming size], together with sincere cultural admiration, led Vietnam's rulers to accept the tributary system"; Japan leaders, such as "The Tokugawa rulers tacitly acknowledged Chinese supremacy and cultural leadership in the East Asian world," see David Kang, "Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations," p.174-75; but then he provides evidence suggesting that Japan did seek to balance Chinese power when the latter weakened: "Centuries later, as the Ming dynasty began to weaken, the Japanese general Hideyoshi twice attempted to invade China through Korea (in 1592 and 1598). Did cultural admiration or leadership draw other Asian states to bandwagon with China for good?"

147. The Sino-centric tributary system was of a mercantilist nature. Tributary states had resisted Chinese hegemony, long before the Opium War, and subsequently adopted Westphalian international principles and methods and turned them against China. Takeshi Hamashita, "The Intra-regional System in East Asia," in *Network Power: Japan and Asia*, edited by Peter Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraiishi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p.117.

148. *Ibid.*, p.129.

149. *Ibid.*, p.128.

150. See Michael Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002).

151. *International Herald Tribune*, 2-3 September 2000, p.1; more recently, he still viewed China as a growing threat to Taiwanese democracy, *International Herald Tribune*, 21 July 2006, p.3.

152. Rose Gideon, "Neo-classical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51 (October 1998): 144-72.

153. Alastair Iain Johnston, "Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way in International Relations Theory," in *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific & Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*; for a critique of this perspective, see Hongying Wang, "Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Limits of Socialization," *Asian Survey* 15, no.3 (May-June 2000): 475-91.

154. James Johnson, "How Conceptual Problems Migrate: Rational Choice, Interpretation and the Hazards of Pluralism," *Annual Review of Political Science* 5 (2002): 223-48.



Mutual Understanding and Security Strategies: China, Two Koreas, and Japan

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Collective identity and a culture of cooperation may be established through interactions whereby each feels that the other restrains from doing provocative behavior. Repeated interactions with restraints would foster a positive understanding of each other and narrow attitudinal gap. In this regard, the countries in Northeast Asia are not so much prepared. This paper suggests two points that are necessary for the cultivation of a collective security identity in the region. First, since the issues in the historical context are volatile at anytime, the countries should make a negative list to prohibit provocative behavior. This does not limit to Japan but applies also to China and the two Koreas. Second, since the Six-Party Talks is the first multilateral attempt in Northeast Asia, the countries being involved in this mechanism should make best efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. The North Korean nuclear test has caused a further conservative turn in Japan's mood, interfered with China's attempt to resolve its own security dilemma, and tested the diplomatic capacity of China. The Six-Party Talks is an important litmus test, in kind, to see either success or failure of regional cooperation.

Introduction

FOSTERING REGIONAL cooperation in East Asia involves both facilitation of economic exchanges and cultivation of a culture of mutual recognition and security cooperation. In view of the increase in intra-regional economic exchanges, one may be tempted to say that economic interdependence would quell major conflict in security affairs. But the question of whether or not economic exchanges affect inter-state security relations positively remains unanswered in the field of international relations. Proponents of the school of realism generally believe that an increase in economic interactions contributes to the conflict circumstances in the sense that the overall costs, including non-economic costs, normally exceed benefits; and that this situation encourages military conflicts rather than pacific coexistence, even if not always leading to war.¹ In contrast, scholars in the school of liberalism maintain that economic interdependence, particularly in trade relations, discourages conflict on the ground because the countries concerned fear losing the benefits yielded by their increasing economic interactions.²

It is not an easy task to prove which argument is more plausible than the other. It appears that the relationship between economic interaction and peaceful coexistence relies largely on the ways in which the economic partners understand each other and on the degree of the state's role in the economic transactions. In the era of globalization, the role of private organizations has increased and diversified, and capital flows that the state cannot control have expanded tremendously. This is true in Northeast Asia, too.³

It seems common sense to say that a cooperative atmosphere in security affairs would foster economic interactions and benefit all parties concerned, even if not equally or evenly. Any political tension between countries, whatever the cause may be, may shrink the behavior space of investors and traders. The anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in the spring of 2005, in reaction to the Japanese government's approval of textbooks that watered down its history of imperialist aggression, discouraged Japanese businesses from expanding their investment in China. For this reason, the Chinese government, which has continuously stressed economic growth and national strength, intervened to stop anti-Japanese demonstrations.⁴ (Moreover, the Chinese leaders seemed aware of the danger that the demonstrations might

evolve into an anti-government movement.) Therefore, it is fair to say that tensions in non-economic affairs would discourage or delay further economic interactions. Indeed, the existing security tensions in Northeast Asia have interrupted the concerted attempt to build a regional community in East Asia. The countries in Northeast Asia — China, the two Koreas, and Japan are simply benefiting from the bandwagon effect of ASEAN-centered regional initiatives toward building a regional community.

The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of the attitudes of China, the two Koreas, and Japan towards each other and to examine the way in which clashing security strategies interfere with regional cooperation. For this purpose, this paper introduces a matrix that illustrates the distinct context of each country's security strategy.

Mutual Understanding between Northeast Asian Countries

Perceiving others as well as self, as Alexander Wendt has noted, is not pre-theoretically given but relational, which means that mutual understanding may progress during interactions.⁵ On the basis of this logic, if interactions yield more trustworthy consequences or if each country's leader yields consistently trustworthy actions, then mutual understanding would gradually improve. Indeed, what Wendt implies is that despite the existence of negative perceptions, exercising restraint from doing the things that cause greater concern for neighbors would promote positive mutual understanding and eventually lead to durable cooperation.

Wendt's theorem is being tested in Northeast Asia, where memories of war, invasion, and colonialism remain potent, even after more than a half century. Countries in this region—China, the two Koreas, and Japan—still maintain asymmetrical understandings,⁶ skewing particularly against Japan. There exists a relatively deep attitude gap between the countries. As seen in Table 1, the Pew world-wide survey study shows differences in attitude between three clusters: (1) countries with experiences of military conflicts, (2) China, South Korea, and Japan (and the U.S. and Russia), and (3) Western European countries. The peoples of Northeast Asia are more preoccupied by cultural superiority, foreign threats, and territorial disputes than is the case with Europe, even if less than those countries with more recent conflict experiences. Considering that such attitude gap originates from the public

TABLE I. Comparison of Mutual Attitudes 2003

| | Our culture is superior | We must protect against foreign | Parts of other countries belong influence to us |
|-------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------|---|
| India | 74 | 61 | 60 |
| Turkey | 57 | 69 | 40 |
| Bangladesh | 63 | 62 | 54 |
| Pakistan | 50 | 52 | 51 |
| China | 21 | 27 | N/A |
| Japan | 29 | 20 | 23 |
| South Korea | 33 | 30 | 22 |
| U.S. | 23 | 30 | 9 |
| Russia | 23 | 35 | 26 |
| Britain | 9 | 20 | 10 |
| France | 10 | 24 | 5 |
| Italy | 14 | 28 | 13 |
| Germany | 8 | 17 | 9 |

* The scale in the box indicates the percentage of respondents who completely agree with corresponding questionnaires of the survey.

SOURCE: *The Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2003*, p. 95-109.

perceptions of neighbors, the European experience—a sequential shift from the military conflict during World War II to the economic prosperity of the EEC period, and finally to the integration of Europe in supra-nationalist fashion — is not likely to be replicated in other regions.⁷ This situation suggests that countries in conflict should pursue extraordinary efforts to alleviate such negative attitudes, and to facilitate interactions towards eliminating conflicts in their security strategies, as shall be discussed in the following sections. Without such efforts, it will not be easy to envision a collective identity in Northeast Asia and an East Asian community.

Security Contexts in Northeast Asian Countries

Are the countries in Northeast Asia ready to contribute to the building of a collective security community in Northeast Asia in particular and East Asia in general? Can Wendt's theorem — that interactions with restraints

produce trustworthy actions and eventually change mutual understanding in favor of cooperative culture — be applied to Northeast Asia? In responding to these questions, this section will examine how each country's strategy is contextualized and what are the zones or areas where they clash. I look at two dimensions: power distribution within a state (and its relevant form of regime) and the context of security issues. Power distribution is a continuum that ranges from monolithic, authoritarian, to polyarchic (or democratic) regimes, whereas the context of security issues varies from historical, to strategic, and to imminent or pending.

(I) Power Distribution within a state

Controversy has surrounded the issue of whether or not the power of state over society matters in international relations. By taking the example of U.S. transition from protectionism to trade liberalism after World War II, Peter Gourevitch argues that in the analysis of domestic-international linkages, coalitions or alliances are more important than power distribution in a country.⁸ He underscores the point that, regardless of social forces in the United States, most American interests were shifting toward free trade and that, in this respect, the identification of power structures is meaningless.⁹

Nevertheless, it should be noted that power distribution or regime form is conducive to value differences whereby policy interests in a certain country are mobilized, articulated, and rationalized. Unity and conformity are significant values in monolithic regimes, whereas diversity and variety are significant values in polyarchic regimes. The authoritarian regime is located between the two, leaning more toward unity and conformity than toward other values. Distinctiveness between the three different forms of power distribution may result in divergent paths of political processes for foreign policy making and international relations. Furthermore, the power distribution or regime form is relevant to perceptual contexts, as will be discussed.

It is notable that the authoritarian regime excludes social groups from the political arena but mobilizes their support by compensating them with relative professional autonomy or by integrating them into associational organizations designed and controlled by the state, just as shown in the notion of exclusionary state-corporatism.¹⁰ For instance, in China, the People's Liberation Army is an organization that enjoys the privilege of

relative autonomy in setting its own professional priorities even if it exercises little policy influence.¹¹ Similarly, sub-elite groups may be represented by “public intellectuals” who exist across a broad range of fields, from economics, to politics, and to culture.¹² The intellectuals work closely with the government, by being affiliated with government think tanks and organizations, whereas they receive some types of privilege in their public activities.

The theorem of democratic peace is not really relevant, or useful, to my concern over Northeast Asia. The theorem does not tell us anything more than that a proneness to war-avoidance is perhaps discernable among democracies. The theorem has no grounds on which to explain the relationship between democracies and either non-democracies or transition regimes.¹³ There are ample examples wherein a democratic country goes to war against a non-democratic country.¹⁴ The Iraq War in 2003, led by the United States and the United Kingdom, exemplifies that a democracy is sometimes prone to wage a war against a non-democratic regime. The utility of the democratic peace theorem, furthermore, disappears when we turn our attention to contentions in Northeast Asia.

It is correct to say that power distribution does not by itself determine a country’s propensity for either regional cooperation or confrontation. In contrast to the argument that non-democratic regimes are prone to conflict, a binding agreement for regional cooperation can be reached among countries of different regimes as well. Countries among Southeast Asia exemplify this case. They have diverse political, cultural, and religious backgrounds. The countries, however, have retained policy preferences favoring security cooperation and engagement with the global economy, regardless of the differences in their regimes. Furthermore, these countries have established a “culture of consensus and openness” that has allowed Indochinese countries to enter the ASEAN and facilitated Western and Northeast Asian countries to join the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).¹⁵

On the other hand, polyarchic regimes value diversity. There are not only competitions between ruling parties and opposition parties but also differences in policy preferences, even within ruling parties. In the presidential system in particular, the president sometimes fails to obtain majority support from the legislature to ratify foreign policies. If the division parallels power

struggles reflecting severe cleavages between social forces, the political processes make it difficult to reach an agreement, whether the foreign policy is for regional cooperation or not.¹⁶ Japan — and South Korea to a certain extent — belongs to this form of regime in which any shift in foreign policy is checked by different political and social forces. Of course, this does not mean that the polyarchic regimes are free from instigating nationalist emotions over historical issues.

(2) Contexts of Security Issues

The context of security issues ranges from the historical to the strategic and to the pending (or the imminent). This differentiation is simply ideal, so that an issue may be located between two different contexts or that an issue can move from one context to another. Nevertheless, an analysis of these contexts helps understand issues of each country in Northeast Asia both systematically and comparatively. First, the *historical context* is usually related to a deeply-rooted national emotion and sentiment against others. The issues that are interpreted in this context reflect lingering problems that originated from war, foreign occupation, colonialism, or other unequal relations between countries. They also involve territories, textbooks, war crimes, and so on. The reason why a territorial dispute, for example, must be seen in a historical context hinges on the dispute’s relevance to national integration and belongingness. Not only natural resources and indigenous presence but national pride or humiliation fuel the dispute, intensifying nationalism as well as lengthy quarrels over the legality of a current territorial occupation.

In Northeast Asia, Japan has become a target at which China and the two Koreas aim. A powerful example concerns former Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, who for six consecutive years during his entire tenure beginning in 2001 and ending in 2006 visited Yasukuni Shrine, where the mortuary tablets of fourteen Class-A war criminals including wartime Prime Minister Tojo Hideki are kept. In response to Koizumi’s actions, a deep anger and disappointment were registered in South Korea and China.¹⁷ Also, conservative Japanese politicians rationalized Japan’s past occupation of South Korea, therefore South Korea became even more skeptical about the sincerity of Japan’s professed re-evaluation of its colonial past. When Ishihara Shintaro, the Governor of Tokyo Prefecture, issued a statement

that the annexation of Korea in 1910 was a choice made by the general will of the Korean people, the Korean public became infuriated at the distortion of history.¹⁸ In this context, China and South Korea interpret Japanese politicians' statements and behavior as reflecting a shift in Japan's conception of the region, attributed to Japan's desire to revive military ambitions. The territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands (as they are known to the Japanese) or the Diaoyu Islands (as known to the Chinese) is another example in which historical legacy affects the interpretation of a security issue.¹⁹ It is noteworthy that the intense focus on history as a guide to current policy development significantly distinguishes the Northeast Asian region from Southeast Asia.

Second, *strategic context* is directly related to national interest, particularly maintenance of sovereignty. Strategic context includes the development of material capabilities, bilateral or multilateral security alliances, and other forms of diplomacy to ensure security. For the political leaders in charge of security policy, issues that are read in the strategic context are more significant than those in the two other contexts. Issues in the strategic context generally involve how to ensure a country's own security, but such attempts may also worry neighboring countries, thus resulting in a security dilemma. All the countries in Northeast Asia indeed face such dilemma, and their approaches in coping with the dilemma are different from country to country. The absence of a multilateral security mechanism to alleviate each country's security dilemma renders the region as a whole vulnerable to conflict and contention. North Korea's path to becoming a nuclear state, Japan's apparent move to "normal state", and China's military modernization, are all evidence of this.

What makes the security situation in Northeast Asia more complicated is the United States' strategic engagement in regional politics and its ensuing influence in the region. The United States has maintained security alliances with Japan and South Korea and provided the two allies with the nuclear umbrella for more than a half century. In response, rising China expresses its own concern about the likely expansion of Japan's security role, particularly in relation to the Taiwan Strait, even while keeping to the One China principle.

The overall strategic situation, complicated by unresolved security dilemmas in each country, has acutely been reflected in domestic politics. For example, the Japanese Diet's passage of the Emergency Laws in June

2003 was interpreted by China and South Korea in a strategic context as Tokyo moving towards legalizing direct involvement in regional security affairs outside of Japan, and that the legalization paved the way for the United States' further engagement in the region by way of Japan.²⁰ Along with the U.S.-Japan cooperation on the Missile Defense (MD) program since 1999, the Emergency Laws stoked Chinese and South Korean worries. In South Korea, both of these occasions stimulated the formation of civil activist organizations that have politicized both the issue of MD development in Northeast Asia and the American unilateralist approach to North Korea's nuclear crisis.²¹ In China, the passage of Emergency Laws, following NATO's bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, became a source of growing worry about the U.S.-Japan alliance and added fuel to nationalist activism.²² It is noteworthy that in China, the top leaders sometimes incite nationalism for domestic political purposes and then in contradiction, often quell it for diplomatic purposes. The latter is true particularly because nationalism in China is a "double-edged sword" in the sense that if the general public is not allowed to vent their feelings against the United States, then they would redirect their criticism against their own government.²³

Third, the *imminent context*, or the *pending context*, is relevant to the previous two contexts in that under certain circumstances, a historical or strategic context expands into a pending context. The pending context differs from the other two contexts chiefly with regard to the pending context's distinctive calls for a swift and urgent solution to a given security issue. This does not mean that a security issue interpreted in the pending context necessarily brings about a crisis that seriously threatens the security of the entire region. Without a solution to the issue, however, domestic politics often impedes the progress of dialogue and negotiations that concern related issues, in particular, and regional cooperation, in general. This is the typical sequence of events that, owing to easy entrapment in domestic politics, characterizes the disruption or the retardation of regional cooperation.

If any domestic political force views an issue from the imminent context, the government may not have room to treat the issue in a flexible or considerate manner. For example, in the midst of the Six-Party Talks for a solution to North Korea's nuclear crisis, the abduction of Japanese people by North Korea in the 1970s and the 1980s became a sensitive issue in

Japan's domestic politics. The groups supporting the families of abductees²⁴ demanded that the Japanese government impose economic sanctions on North Korea, a demand that reveals just how skeptical Japan has been of the discussions underway with the Kim Jong Il regime.²⁵ Indeed, this demand constrained the behavior space of the Japanese negotiator at the Six-Party Talks. The negotiator, keenly aware of the sensitivity of the issue, had to present the abduction issue to the dialogue table at the first round of talks for the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons development program.²⁶

Here is a point in regard to the *relationship* between the power distribution and the context. The strategic context is the most salient context regardless of regime form. There is, however, a preferential correlation between the power distribution and the context. For instance, historical context and strategic context are closely intertwined with each other in a monolithic regime like North Korea, whereas imminent context operates more sensitively in democracies, such as Japan and South Korea, than in other regime forms.

A notable point afflicting, and sometimes protecting, democracies may be that an issue in the imminent context comes to be intertwined with other contexts, particularly with a strategic context. Openness, an imperative trait of democracy, is conducive to public debates. When a domestic force strongly advocates an immediate solution to an issue as a precondition for cooperation, the regional, and, more intricate, cooperation is interrupted or delayed.²⁷

Contentious Zones in Security Contexts

As shown in Table 2, a composite of each country's security context, and related issues, reveals the region's present complex security situation, in which contentious zones emerge. The zones have potentials of evolving into conflict for the following reasons: the contentious zones appear not only in the historical context but also stretch to the strategic and imminent contexts. Let us take the example of the North Korean nuclear crisis, which is the most frequently quoted imminent issue but is intertwined with incompatible strategic contexts of the countries in the region.

The origin of the North Korean nuclear problem may be traced back to the Korean War and the American nuclear threats during the Cold War period.²⁸ The current nuclear crisis, inflamed by Pyongyang's 2006 nuclear

test, demonstrates that the Cold War has not ended in this region. In dealing with the North Korean crisis, each country takes different approaches, because of differences in each country's strategic consideration. South Korea wants to maintain the momentum of engagement with the North in the belief that the engagement policy is the only means to eventually lead a soft-landing of the North Korean system, if unable to induce it to reform and opening.

TABLE 2. Configuration of Northeast Asian Security

| | Historical context | Strategic context | Imminent context |
|-------------|--|---|--|
| China | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Senkaku/ Diaoyu • Japanese imperial past | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Peaceful rise" and multilateral diplomacy • One China principle • Securing natural resources • ASEAN Plus Three | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mediating between the U.S. and North • Energy exploration in East China Sea |
| North Korea | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anti-American sentiment/ approach to the U.S. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nuclear state status • Normalization with the United States | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sanctions by UN, the U.S., and Japan • Nuclear program |
| South Korea | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dokto/ Takeshima • Japanese imperial past • Chinese interpretation of Korean ancient history | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Engagement with North Korea • Peaceful coexistence and reunification | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nuclear North Korea • Six-Party Talks |
| Japan | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Textbook revision on imperial period part • Northern Islands, Senkaku/ Diaoyu, Dokto/ Takeshima | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S.-Japan alliance (realignment of U.S. bases, MD cooperation) • Expansion of security domain (collective security provision thru constitution revision) • East Asian Summit (including Australia, New Zealand, and India) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sanctions against North Korea • Abduction issue • Energy exploration in East China Sea |

China makes attempts to mediate between the United States and North Korea at the Six-Party Talks, taking a moderate posture toward the North. One of the underlying motives of China's attempts might be the country's worry about North Korea's possible implosion and the ensuing massive influx of refugees. As mentioned before, however, the strategic context is more important than the short term concern. Overall Chinese policy toward North Korea is in line with the strategic context of its peaceful rise, whereby Beijing intends to resolve its security dilemma. China is concerned about further strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance and the expansion of Japan's domain in security affairs; that is, China is more concerned about the ensuing fallouts of North Korea's nuclear path rather than the nuclear weapons' threat per se.

For Japan, how to cope with the North Korean nuclear crisis is related to domestic politics as well as the strategic context at the national level. Japanese public sentiment about North Korea and its leader Kim Jong Il had already deteriorated because of the abduction issue.²⁹ The public sentiment further worsened since North Korea's missile launches in July 2006 and the nuclear test three months later.³⁰ Given this, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, who was already hawkish toward Pyongyang, has heightened the level of sanctions, on the occasion of the UN Security Council's adoption of the Resolution 1718 in relation to the North Korean nuclear test.³¹ What attracts our special attention is that some leading Japanese politicians argue that Japan needs to discuss whether or not Japan should become a nuclear state. Abe stated that Japan would maintain the three no-nuclear policies in order to quell international concerns and worries. But it seems that the advocates for the discussion of a nuclear option intend, rather than to establish Japan as a nuclear state per se, to open widely a public space that favors a constitution revision to guarantee Japan's collective self-defense and to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. In this regard, the North Korean nuclear crisis triggers conservative spiraling both in domestic politics and in the national strategic context.

Contentious zones in Northeast Asian security are not simple policy differences between the countries but have evolved over the past six decades and became more solidly structured in the past decade. It was not until the mid-1990s that the security contentions in Northeast Asia escalated. The

North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in 1993-1994, the Taiwan Strait confrontation occurred in 1995-1996, and the U.S.-Japan security alliance was strengthened between 1996 and 1997. In particular, the contention at the regional level, even if it has not involved armed conflict, is developing around a potential rivalry between the Chinese strategic goals and the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japan's strategic goals. The U.S.-Japan security alliance has solidified owing to the East Asia Strategic Report (the so-called Nye Report) in 1995 and the establishment of the New Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in 1997, which presupposed Japan's security role in the Asia-Pacific region and a practical integration of Japanese Self Defense Forces into U.S. military actions at the operational level. For China, this development was a new challenge in the post-Cold War era. The contention between the U.S.-Japan alliance and China has continued to produce tensions in the region in the new millennium. At the Consultative Committee meeting held in Washington DC in February 2005 (called the "2+2 meeting" because of the joint conference between state and defense secretaries on the U.S. side and foreign affairs and defense agency ministers on the Japanese side), the allies explicitly mentioned "peaceful resolution of the issues concerning the Taiwan Strait" and China's improvement of "transparency in military affairs" as their common security concerns in the region.³² For China, it appears that the allies are standing on Beijing's doorstep.

On the other hand, China's strategic context is not immune from producing contentions. In particular, its stance on the Taiwan Strait issue grew provocative from 1995 onwards. China's missile launch into the Straits in 1995 and 1996 — which could not block the rise of Chen Shui-bian, a strong advocate of Taiwan's independence in 2000 — represented the extreme sensitivity of the Chinese strategic context with regard to the Taiwan Strait issue. Despite the relatively stable cooperation between the United States and China — for instance, continuous U.S. support for the One China principle, establishment of a "constructive strategic partnership", and Chinese cooperation with the U.S. on the war on terror — the two countries have maintained disharmony on the issue of US arms sale to Taiwan. Furthermore, the U.S.-Japan alliance now expedites missile defense cooperation. Following North Korea's missile launches in July 2006, the Japanese became more enthusiastic than ever before on alliance cooperation.³³ The Chinese concern

originated from the view that the MD is powerful enough to nullify Chinese missile systems aimed at Taiwan and that it will provide a “shield for the sword” to Japanese forces equipped with high-tech weapons.³⁴ China, already sensitive to the Taiwan independence issue, has paid particular attention to the development of Japan’s security context. It seems that China has once more been awakened by North Korea’s recent provocative behavior because the latter tends to encourage concerted actions of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Conclusion

Collective identity and culture of cooperation (or conflict) is not a given entity, but these are established through interactions in which each country refrains from engaging in provocative behavior. Repeated self restraint would foster positive understanding of each other and narrow the attitudinal gap between the actors. In Northeast Asia, the countries are not well prepared for security cooperation. This is particularly because the strategic contexts of China and Japan are at odds with each other.

The following points are necessary for the cultivation of a collective security identity in the region. First, since the issues in the historical context are volatile at anytime, the countries should make a negative list of provocative behavior that they will prohibit. For the time being, self restraint will be a great virtue. This does not hold true only for Japan but applies also to China and the two Koreas.

Second, since the Six-Party Talks are the first attempt at multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia, the countries involved in this mechanism should exert their efforts to resolve the nuclear crisis. The North Korean nuclear test in October 2006 has caused a further conservative turn in Japan’s mood, interfered with Beijing’s attempts to resolve its own security dilemma, and tested the diplomatic capacity of China. The Six-Party Talks is an important litmus test to see whether the five engaging countries, which maintain high security stakes in this region, may work together to coordinate their differing strategies and transform the nuclear crisis into an *opportunity* for regional security cooperation.

Notes

1. Kenneth Waltz, “The Myth of National Interdependence,” 205-53 in Charles P. Kindleberger, ed., *The International Corporation: A Symposium* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970) and *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979); Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Katherine Barbieri, “Economic interdependence: a path to peace or a source of interstate conflict?” *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 33, no. 1 (1996), pp. 29-49.

2. Solomon W. Polachek, “Conflict and trade,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 24, no. 1 (1980), pp. 57-78; Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Solomon W. Polachek and Judy McDonald, “Strategic trade and the incentive for cooperation,” 273-284 in Manas Chatterji and Linda Forcey, eds., *Disarmament, Economic Conversion, and Peace Management* (New York: Praeger, 1992).

3. T. J. Pempel, “Introduction: emerging webs of regional connectedness,” in T. J. Pempel, ed., *Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 21.

4. In the same vein, Japan’s business sector, as with *Nippon Keidanren* (the Japanese Business Federation), has not wanted regional economic relations disrupted.

5. Alexander Wendt, “Collective identity formation and the international state,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 2 (1994), p. 385 and *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 347.

6. Tsuneo Akaha, “Conclusion,” in Tsuneo Akaha, ed., *Politics and Economics in Northeast Asia: Nationalism and Regionalism in Contention* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 377.

7. Peter J. Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, “Rethinking Asian security: a case for analytical eclecticism,” in J. J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, eds., *Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 16-20.

8. Peter Gourevitch, “The second image reversed: the international sources of domestic politics,” *International Organization*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Autumn 1978), pp. 902-4.

9. This thinking has been inherited by those scholars who have focused on domestic coalitions—such as Snyder on comparisons of overexpansionist coalitions and Solingen on domestic coalitions in regional orders. See Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) and Etel Solingen, *Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

10. On this basic notion, refer to Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 79-80.

11. Tai Ming Cheung, “The influence of the gun: China’s Central Military Commission and its relationship with the military, party, and state decision-making systems,” in David M. Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese Foreign Policy in the Era of Reform* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 89-90.

12. See Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen, "The domestic context of Chinese foreign policy: does 'public opinion' matter?" in Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese Foreign Policy in the Era of Reform*, pp. 153-5.

13. Haruhiro Fukui, "Contending conceptualizations of civil society and their implications for democracy and peace in East Asia," manuscript, p. 10.

14. John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The classical liberals were right: democracy, interdependence, and conflict, 1950-1985," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 267-94.

15. Etel Solingen, "East Asian regional institutions: characteristics, sources, distinctiveness," in T. J. Pempel, ed., *Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 31-53.

16. Helen V. Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 67-68.

17. In April 2004, the Fukuoka District Court ruled that Koizumi's first official visit there, in August 2001, had violated the constitutional separation between religion and state. According to the court, the visit was a religious act performed in Koizumi's capacity as prime minister. However, it did not seem that the court's rule quelled the fury voiced in neighboring countries.

18. *Joongang Ilbo*, November 17, 2003.

19. The most recent clash between China and Japan occurred in October 29, 2006, when Chinese activists, who boarded on a Hong Kong ship and attempted to slip into the islands, were watered down by the fire hose of the Japanese coast guard patrols. The Chinese government accused the Japanese coast guard of injuring Chinese citizens. This voyage of the activists marked the 10th anniversary of the death of Hong Kong activist David Chan Yuk-cheung. *Japan Times*, October 29, 2006.

20. *Joongang Ilbo*, June 8, 2004.

21. In South Korea, the establishment of two peace organizations was distinctive: one is the Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea, founded in September 1999, which contributed to bringing the arms control issue to the political arena; and the other is the Center for Peace and Arms Control, established in February 2003, which is a wing organization of the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy and which has presented various policy alternatives on contending security issues such as the U.S.-South Korea alliance, South Korean military spending, and national defense policy.

22. With regard to the U.S.-Japan alliance, China has a dual assessment. Given China's historically rooted distrust of Japan, Beijing fears both a breakdown of the alliance and a significant strengthening of the security cooperation between the two countries. Strengthened U.S. support means an enhancement of Japan's role with American support, whereas a breakdown implies the potential unleashing of Japan's armaments. On China's dual perspective, see Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the security dilemma in East Asia," in Ikenberry and Mastanduno, eds., *International Relations Theory and Asia-Pacific*, pp. 36-38.

23. Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen, "The domestic context of Chinese foreign policy: does 'public opinion' matter?" in David M. Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese Foreign Policy in the Era of Reform* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 182.

24. The groups include the Diet Members' Union for the Rapid Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (DUR), the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (NAR), and the Association of Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea (AFV).

25. Wada Haruki, "Ushinatta kanousei no kaihukuo: Iraq senso no nakade niccho koshyo o kangaeru (Recovering a lost possibility: Japan-North Korea negotiations in the wake of the Iraq War)," in *Sekai*, No. 713 (May, 2003), pp. 136-44.

26. *Asahi Shimbun*, August 28, 2003.

27. When the significance of a certain issue is inflated by the strategic context not because of its substantial significance but because of political division, the interstate or regional cooperation may also be interrupted or delayed. For instance, the opposition party in South Korea has contended that Roh Moo-hyun administration's engagement policy to facilitate North Korea's openness encourages a betrayal, as seen in the nuclear test in October 2006. Divergent understandings of Pyongyang led to quite opposite prescriptions for a security strategy. The government has argued that the engagement, if given with good intentions, would eventually bring about a cooperative response from the North. The opposition party has maintained that the engagement would strengthen the North's capacity and in the long run threaten both the South's national strategy and regional security environment. This divergence in strategic context is exaggerated because of a political cleavage but not due to a prudent calculation of regional dynamics, especially caused by Bush administration's hard-line policy toward North Korea.

28. For details, see Bruce Cumings, *North Korea: Another Country* (New York: New Press, 2004), p. 53; Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, *Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 1-2; Balazs Szalontai and Sergey Radchenko, "North Korea's efforts to acquire nuclear technology and nuclear weapons: evidence from Russian and Hungarian archives," Working Paper No. 53 (Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, 2006).

29. The survey, conducted in late 2003 by the Japanese Cabinet Office, shows that 90.1% of the respondents said that their main concern was the abduction issue, while 66.3% answered that they were keeping an eye on North Korea's nuclear weapons development program. *Japan Times*, January 11, 2004.

30. A survey conducted after the North Korea's nuclear test shows that 82% of respondents felt threat of the test and that 62% of respondents supported for sanction whereas 26% for dialogue. *Asahi Shimbun*, October 11, 2006.

31. The Japanese government makes it clear that it will continue to implement the UN Security Council resolution against North Korea even in the case of the latter's return to the Six-Party Talks. *Japan Times*, November 2, 2006.

32. Joint Statement of U.S.-Japan Consultative Committee, Washington DC, February 19, 2005, p. 2.

33. Right after the missile firings, Japanese minister of state for defense Nukaga Fukushima appeared on TV and advocated the need to speed up the MD cooperation. Furthermore, then Japanese cabinet secretary Abe Shinzo advocated on July 10, 2006, deeper discussions about the compatibility of a pre-emptive strike and the Peace Constitution.

34. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the security dilemma in East Asia," p. 42.



Fukuda Doctrine Revisited: Is There a Japanese Vision for Asian Regionalism?

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This paper argues the need for new principles in Japan's policy toward East Asia, through comparative examination of the Fukuda Doctrine, which has shaped Japan's policy toward ASEAN from the 1970s till now, and the concept of 'Arc of Freedom and Prosperity,' which was launched by Mr. Taro Aso in 2006 as a guiding concept of 'values-oriented diplomacy' in the new strategic environment. The new agenda for Japan's policy toward Asia include profound challenges such as how to deal with the rise of China, how to participate in the politics of Asian regionalization, and how to contribute to peace and stability particularly in the areas of non-traditional security issues and peace building. Under such a new strategic environment, Japan would need a guiding principle with some elements of 'values-oriented diplomacy,' emphasizing rule of law, democracy, and human rights, in order to make the region harmonious with others, including the United States. But the process of achieving such goals would require Japan to be more flexible in thinking, respecting the diversity in the region. In this sense, the Fukuda Doctrine remains relevant as its philosophical grounds such as tolerance, solidarity, constructive commitment to regionalization, and self-restraint against excessive military commitments, would be highly appreciated by ASEAN countries.

Introduction: the Fukuda Doctrine as a Cornerstone of Japan's Diplomacy

ALMOST THIRTY years after Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda delivered his policy speech, setting out a philosophical vision of Japan's policy toward Southeast Asia (which later became known as the 'Fukuda Doctrine'), Foreign Minister Taro Aso in November 2006 expressed his views on a new direction for Japan's foreign policy. He spoke of a design for an 'arc of freedom and prosperity', as a key framework for how Japan views and shapes her relations with the world.¹ Prior to his speech, Mr. Aso referred to Fukuda's speech in 1977 as a 'blueprint' of Japan's diplomacy toward Southeast Asia.

In his speech in Manila in 1977, Prime Minister Fukuda pledged that Japan, a nation committed to peace, was resolved to contribute to the peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia, and would never become a military power; that Japan, as a true friend, would consolidate the relationship of mutual confidence and trust based on 'heart-to-heart' understanding with Southeast Asian countries in wide-ranging fields; that Japan would cooperate positively with ASEAN and its member countries in their own efforts to strengthen their solidarity and resilience, as an equal partner; and that with other like-minded nations outside the region, Japan would aim at fostering a relationship between the nations of Indochina and ASEAN countries for the sake of peace and prosperity of the region.³

Indeed, the Fukuda Doctrine has been shaping Japan's relations with Asia since the 1970s till now. It showed Japan's determination to be a proactive player in committing herself to the regional order in Southeast Asia, even while her role was strictly confined to non-military fields, especially economic development and cooperation. Japan since then never expanded its military projection to Southeast Asia. Although security of sea lanes has been vital to Japan's national economic interests, sea lane defense of Japan remained limited up to north of the Philippines, and was not extended to the southern part of Southeast Asian areas before the end of the Cold War.

Fukuda Doctrine was also important in transforming Japan's 'economistic (or mercantilist)' diplomacy in the 50s and 60s into one based on proactive, political partnerships with regional countries. As symbolized by a discourse saying that Japan could achieve the objectives of wartime "Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere," a slogan of the imperialist Japan during the

war, even without military projection, and the harsh anti-Japanese demonstrations of people, such as those Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka faced in Bangkok and Jakarta in 1974, Japan's relationship with Southeast Asia before the Fukuda Doctrine was driven extensively by her own economic interest, promoted through such means as reparations, economic aid, and trade. While the major tools for establishing relationships remain economic ones even now, ways to utilize such economic policy tools have shifted, with the Fukuda Doctrine, from the self interest-driven ways to visionary ones driven by the mutual interests of both Japan and Southeast Asian countries.

Another important element of the Fukuda Doctrine was its strategic security implications. Despite the lack of military tools and the will to use force, Japan's diplomacy under the Fukuda Doctrine bore a critical strategic value in two ways. First, after failure in Vietnam, the United States could no longer behave as a powerful hegemon in Asia, and Japan feared that the power vacuum which would emerge after the U.S. withdrawal would result in competition for political influence between two big communist powers, namely China and the Soviet Union. Japan realized that strengthening ASEAN as a regional institution to cope with the threats of a communist "domino" was in Japan's vital interest, and that Japan needed to strategically take a proactive role in nurturing ASEAN as a reliable institution and partner for maintaining the peace and stability of Southeast Asia. Japan also thought that if Japan could mediate between the then ASEAN-5 and Indochina for building a harmonious and cooperative relationship, it would be beneficial to both Japan and Asia.⁴ Second, it showed Japan's readiness to conduct self-reliant diplomacy, one that was rather independent from the U.S. presence in Asia (while maintaining complementarity with U.S. strategy). In the environment of diminishing U.S. influence, Japan seemed determined to become a kind of bridge between Asia and the United States, even if there were institutional constraints such as dependency on the U.S.-Japan alliance. Thus, the Fukuda Doctrine marked a turning point for Japan's diplomacy toward Asia, and had valuable implications for regional order.

After 30 years, the international environment in East Asia has been significantly transformed. Asia is now seen as an engine of the global economy, with two gigantic growing economies, namely China and India, as well as

significantly developed ASEAN countries. The Cold War was over and the threat of the communist domino is gone. Instead, new dynamics have emerged.

Despite new challenges in the strategic environment of Southeast Asia, however, it seems that there are similarities in key elements of Japan's strategic choices, comparing the situation in the 70s and the present one, for which Japan faces the challenge as well as the opportunity of defining a new proactive role in shaping a new regional order.

First, in the 70s, after encountering antipathy against her economic diplomacy toward Asia, Japan was urged to reconsider the principles of her approach toward Southeast Asia, and to be ready to commit herself to building a peaceful and stable regional order by utilizing her economic potentials. Now, however, that the 'flying geese' model has become obsolete, Southeast Asia and Japan need to address further economic development and integration through economic partnership agreements, or free trade agreements, on equal footing. A new modality for regional economic order is being sought within a context of building regional institutions.

Second, in addition to the fact that movements for regionalism are growing rapidly and steadily in Asia, China's emergence as a powerful actor poses a serious challenge to Japan's vision of a peaceful and stable regional order. In the 70s, the decline of U.S. influence after its withdrawal from Indochina was also a critical strategic factor that drove Japan to reconsider its own regional strategy, which did not just follow the path of the United States, but still remained complementary to the U.S.-Japan alliance. Now, the rise of China and her relatively successful approach toward Southeast Asia, and the uncertain future of the U.S.-China strategic relationship are the most critical elements in Japan's strategic thinking. To be certain, it is not desirable or wise for Japan to force other regional players to choose between Japan and China. And as evident from various U.S. voices reacting to the Japan-China confrontation on history issues during the Koizumi administration, the United States also sees such confrontational rivalries between Japan and China as counter-productive.

Third, thirty years ago, Japan attempted to act as a bridge between ASEAN and Indochina for the stability of the region. Although her attempts were not necessarily perceived as successful, Japan's efforts catalyzed to

some extent this strengthening solidarity of Asia. Now, there remains a gap between the old members of ASEAN, which are economically developed countries, and new members in Indochina or the Mekong region (in more recent terminology) such as Vietnam⁵, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, who have yet to enjoy economic growth. Efforts to fill this gap are required. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a renewed commitment to extend Japan's assistance to the Mekong region, with a view to assisting the formation of "One ASEAN," or a "well-balanced integrated entity" by "their efforts to close existing gaps through cooperation with each other".⁶

Japan is now at a critical strategic juncture which is somehow similar to what she faced in the 70s. One question is whether the Fukuda Doctrine is still relevant. If its essence is to contribute through non-military ways, from 'heart-to-heart' cooperation to the creation of 'one' Asia, or the realization of Asian regionalism without leaning too much on a single dominant power (whichever power it may be), then such a principle is still applicable to the present situation.

'Values-oriented' Diplomacy at Work: New Agenda for Japan's Diplomacy

While similarities in the environment surrounding Japan's Asia policy today and that of the past were stressed in the previous section, significant differences also exist, and they are more substantial and profound than they appear, which would require Japan to re-shape her foreign policy philosophy. Non-traditional security threats, the accelerating process of regionalization, and the increasing influence of China require Japan to envision a strategy for coping with such new realities while at the same time, responding to U.S. demands to move together in building an international order shaped by values that the United States has long advocated - democracy, human rights, and market economy. For Japan, pursuit of such values in her diplomacy is also desirable because such values would ensure the foundations of a stable, predictable, and prosperous community in Asia.⁷ In other words, the creation of a regional community based on these values means that the regional order will be on terms and conditions that favor Japan and the United States over China or other undemocratic elements of Asia. A guiding principle of such 'values-oriented' diplomacy was the concept of "Arc of

Freedom and Prosperity.”⁸ However, the outcomes so far are mixed. Japan seems to be struggling with challenges and difficulties associated with this rather doctrinal diplomacy. However, in some areas Japan has made remarkable contributions.

(1) Peace Building and Disaster Relief

After the Cold War, especially after the 9.11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the world has come to pay much attention to non-traditional security issues such as terrorism, piracy, disaster relief, infectious diseases or pandemics, climate change, energy security, but also conflict resolution and peace building. These are very relevant to Asia, although they were slow to be perceived as threats by countries in the region, and skepticism on prioritizing them remains in some sectors. Let us take peace building and disaster relief as examples.

Japan's contribution to regional security and stability is seen in the area of peace building and disaster relief. In 1992, Japan sent her self-defense forces overseas to a U.N. peace-keeping operation (PKO) in Cambodia (UNTAC) for the first time since the end of the Second World War. Since then, Japan has rather cautiously continued to contribute to international peace operations, mostly under U.N. Security Council resolutions (although in some cases such as the Iraq war, the clarity of the U.N. mandate is questioned). In Asia, other than the U.N. PKO in Cambodia, Japan sent her Self Defense Forces (SDF) to Timor Leste and civilian staff to other missions as well. SDF was also sent for humanitarian relief to Aceh, Indonesia after the huge earthquake and tsunami disaster in 2004.

Japan also participates in the peace-building process in Mindanao. In the beginning, Japan's commitment to the process was limited to peace support development assistance.⁹ In 2006, Japan decided to send a civilian staff member (a senior advisor on reconstruction and development) to the International Monitoring Team, consisting of the militaries of Malaysia and Brunei, and civilian staff of Libya. This case had distinctive features that demonstrate the potential of what Japan must work for, and how such contributions might be expected to be deployed. This was a rare experience for Japan. In the Mindanao peace process, which was formulated at a stage when there was no officially-agreed peace, and elaborated internationally without the involvement of the United Nations, there was no legal institution

in Japan that allowed the government to send staff members to such cases. But in Asia, and elsewhere, sovereign countries are rather reluctant that their local conflicts would be addressed at the United Nations Security Council. Such a situation would be embarrassing to them since the deliberation of domestic issues at the Security Council could be seen as symbolic of the lack of governability of the state. Therefore, if any similar peace-building case would emerge in Asia, it would also be possible that it be formed without a U.N Security Council resolution. In that case, Japan's contribution to the process will once again be limited.

Japan herself seeks to play a greater role and bear heavier responsibility for participating in peace-building processes in the future. However, as Foreign Minister Mr. Masahiko Komura states, Japan's record in personnel contribution is “less than impressive” as compared with those of Italy and France, which have about two thousand personnel each participating in peace-keeping operations. The same may be said with regard to China, which dispatched more than one thousand eight hundred personnel and last August 2007, gained the position of a force commander in the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.¹⁰ In fact, as far as the size of personnel contribution to U.N. peace-keeping operations goes, Japan is placed at the 82nd place with an average of 50 people on duty.

An expanded role for SDF staff in such peace-building activities does not mean the resurgence of Japan's militarism contrary to the Fukuda Doctrine. On the contrary, such activities, as long as peace-building activities are conducted within a multilateral framework under the auspices of the international community, shall be in conformity with the spirit of the Fukuda Doctrine. In particular, SDF activities in Aceh, and Japan's participation in the peace process in Mindanao are good examples of commitment to the solidarity of the region, as well as peace and stability. By the same token, facilitating regional cooperation in maritime security and safety, although there exist some military elements, must be considered an important area of deepening Japan-ASEAN cooperation in view of regionalism.

(2) Reconciling 'Asian' and 'Universal' Values

Establishing a peaceful and prosperous regional order or an East Asian community, which should be based on ‘open regionalism’ and

respect for universal values such as democracy and human rights, is a long-sustained, crucial effort for Japan. Since democracy and human rights are controversial notions in politics in Asia, pushing excessively such agenda in diplomacy is extremely unpopular as it is perceived not as the adoption of universal values, but the imposition of Western values. Also, 'open regionalism' that Japan advocates is seen by Asian partners with some doubt. Japan believes that 'open regionalism' provides a solution for her need to conform with the goals of both the U.S.-Japan alliance AND Asian regionalism. However, for Asian countries, it is sometimes interpreted as if implying the inclusion of the United States, and rendering the 'Asian way of regionalism' ineffectual. As we recall from the trend of decolonization of Asian countries and their pursuit of the 'non-aligned movement' throughout the post-war era, we must realize that their inclusion into the U.S. global strategy is a somewhat uncomfortable strategic choice for them. As Japan struggles between the two seemingly contending orientations of these two important partners, it might be difficult for Japan to pursue 'values-oriented' diplomacy effectively in Asia. Due to the United States' 'unilateralist' posture, efforts to intervene in regional and domestic politics, as well as imposition of its own values, antipathy toward the predominance of the United States has intensified in Asia. Similarly, if Japan would try to pursue 'values-oriented' diplomacy as a departure from its traditionally quiet 'heart-to-heart' posture, Japanese influence in the region could also be undermined. If Japan is to pursue 'open regionalism,' it is important to elaborate the notion with emphasis on a vision for a path of development and prosperity of the Asian region as a whole.

Diplomacy over Myanmar's human rights situations was an example. Japan's diplomacy toward Myanmar used to be rather dialogue-oriented, symbolized as 'quiet diplomacy', taking an approach different from that of the United States. Japan maintained channels of dialogue with Myanmar's military junta government, and maintained economic assistance, albeit in a limited framework. But after shifting her diplomatic posture from dialogue to pressure, Japan has lost leverage vis-à-vis Myanmar, and has not been able to mediate between Myanmar and the international community, such as in the United Nations. Instead, it is China that played such a role.¹¹

(3) How to Deal with the Rise of China?

Japan's posture toward the rise of China is the most crucial element in Japan's diplomacy toward Asia and its quest for 'values-oriented' diplomacy. China's position stands clearly in contrast to 'values-oriented' diplomacy which the United States and to some extent Japan have pursued. China has been deploying its unique style of rather pragmatic, interest-led diplomacy. She maintains good relationships with Sudan, Venezuela, Iran, Myanmar and other countries with problematic records in democracy and/or human rights, and with which the United States is confronted. It seems that China's pragmatic approach has so far been rewarding. Such diplomacy provides a strong counter-argument against 'values-oriented' diplomacy; it enables China to extend the horizons of her diplomacy, and such diplomacy has so far been successful in Asia.

China takes a negative attitude toward the linkage of diplomacy with 'universal values' such as human rights. She claims that the principles of non-intervention, the supremacy of sovereignty, and the right to develop should matter more than human rights, and that there are a variety of 'human rights' depending on social/economic conditions and cultural background.¹²

Another contest between Japan and China was over Japan's quest for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, which China has been blocking. Japan found it shocking that it failed to gain support from the ASEAN countries (except for the Philippines) in co-sponsoring a resolution for the reform of the Security Council, which was submitted by Japan, Brazil, India and Germany (G4). Many in Japan saw that China cast a shadow over ASEAN's position on the reform of the Security Council, although it may be ASEAN's perception that the influence of China on their decision was not decisive.¹³ For ASEAN countries, Japan's tactical choice to be in league with Brazil, India and Germany seemed rather awkward. They felt that Japan had lacked in efforts to gain consent from China, a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power, while asking ASEAN countries for their support. That would have made it easier for them to express explicit support for Japan's proposal of the U.N. reform and her quest for a permanent seat at the Security Council. If Southeast Asian countries would be forced to choose who they would support, Japan or China, they would feel extremely embarrassed. And

such a situation would not help the region in shaping an international security order for peace and prosperity.

If any lesson should be learned from it, the Japanese government's view toward China has shifted (or consolidated) toward welcoming China's constructive engagement in resolving issues that could affect negatively both herself and the region. Japan, for example, welcomes the Chinese mediating role in the Six Party Talks, giving credence to the argument of encouraging China to become a 'responsible stakeholder.'

In Japan and the United States, it has often been argued that Japan is expected to show greater presence in the international community, playing a strategic role as a 'normal' country, which is appropriate to her international status as an economic power. In East Asia, where China is increasing her presence, with the possibility that it might become a challenger to U.S. primacy in the present international order, the United States places high expectations on the role of Japan. Because Japan shares with the United States the values of democracy and freedom, the United States relies on its alliance with Japan. Moreover, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and even Singapore which used to be rather negative regarding Japan's expansive role in security matters in the region, now see Japan's proactive political and strategic role as non-threatening, and useful in offsetting the presence of China, which could become excessively influential.

However, as we can see from the changes of 'adjectives' attached to China in American strategic papers and discourses (e.g. 'strategic competitor' to 'constructive cooperative relationship' to 'responsible stakeholder'), US views on China and her role in the US-dominated international system have clearly shifted. The new perceptions are that China should no longer be seen as a challenger to be dissuaded; that the rise of China is not necessarily a threat to an international order that the United States leads; and that the relationship with China should be constructed based on engagement policy to bring her into various international systems of the liberal democratic world, while at the same time hedging in case that China should try to challenge the international system.

The pace of China's rise and her adoption of international norms, however, is so much faster and more powerful that an engagement strategy (one that supposes China to be outside the system) is no longer viable.

China has already become an insider, a powerful one, and has committed herself to building regional and international order. Although it is premature to pursue a 'condominium with China', as the United States and Japan on one hand and China on the other have different value systems, and as it is uncertain whether each side has a clear understanding of others' interests, the United States has come to think that areas of cooperation with China should be expanded while involving other democracies and regional powers in Asia and Pacific.¹⁴ For this reason, Japan should exert efforts 'to create a multilateral regional framework through which China can realize that its interests are best served by acting as a constructive partner and by interacting with its neighbors on an equal footing'.¹⁵

It is also important that Japan should not cease to cooperate with China for her sustainable development. Assisting China in areas of environment and energy would help reduce uncertainty in China's stable growth. Since the Japanese economy and Asian economies are deeply interlocked with that of China, continued cooperation with China is in the interest of all in the region.

(4) Cooperation in Energy Security

As energy consumption is steadily and rapidly increasing, Asia needs to strengthen multilateral cooperation in the area of energy policy. Often politics over energy and natural resources is referred to as geo-politics or the 'great game,' implying a 'zero-sum' game of real politics. However, in Asia, such a zero-sum game over energy security would bring about a 'lose-lose' situation for all players. If energy supply is to tighten even as energy consumption is increasing in Asia due to economic growth, the region as a whole will need to build a strategy for an effective, efficient and fair energy resource supply and allocation. There is a lot to be done in multilateral cooperative frameworks for regional energy security. For example, the security of sea lanes, the establishment of a strategic reserve of resources such as oil, and technical cooperation for the development and diffusion of energy-saving/conservation technologies, are some of the possible areas of regional, multilateral cooperation. As imports of oil and gas from the Middle East grow, the security and safety of the Straits of Malacca and Lombok and the sea areas of the Spratly Islands have become ever more important as the

common interest of all players in the region. For such a common interest, there should be a compelling need for substantial cooperation and division of labor and costs, which must go beyond rhetorical and ideological political discourse. As for the storage of energy resources, under present conditions it would be difficult to effectively respond to an emergency stoppage of energy supply as only a few countries other than Japan have the ability to respond. As economic growth continues and resource demand in Asia increases, and if supply would stop, this would impact not only on the countries to which energy supply was stopped, but also surrounding countries and the region as a whole. For maritime security cooperation and building regional strategic reserves, Japan can and should play the leading role.

Conclusion

Thirty years after the launch of the Fukuda Doctrine, the international environment in East Asia has seen drastic changes. Now, there is no threat of communism, or ‘fear of communist dominos’ after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of pragmatic, non-ideological China. The ‘flying geese’ theory of regional economic growth, which argued that Japan would lead economic growth in Asia, is no longer relevant in explaining Asian economic dynamism in the midst of awaking giants such as China and India. Nevertheless, elements of the Fukuda Doctrine should remain relevant in the context of Japan’s diplomacy toward East Asia. Non-military contribution to peace and stability of the region, equal footing, heart-to-heart partnership with regional powers, and building solidarity of the region are all principles of the Fukuda Doctrine, and at the same time, goals that the present Japanese ‘values-oriented’ diplomacy toward East Asia tries to embody.

What is seemingly - and probably mistakenly - perceived as the difference between the Fukuda Doctrine and the concept of ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ is that the Fukuda Doctrine’s ‘heart-to-heart’ relationship accepts diversity, and demonstrates flexibility vis-à-vis differences in values, while the concept of ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ carries an exclusivist character, categorizing groups of friendly and unfriendly countries by whether or not they share certain values. Because of such a perception, Japan’s attempt of advocating ‘open regionalism’ is viewed with skepticism by regional powers.

In general, the strategy and ethics as well as the essence of ‘values-oriented’ diplomacy are correct in the long run. However, it seems that Asia is not ready to immediately put into implementation such values as leading principles of their societies. Thus, when Japan proposed to invite Australia, New Zealand, India, and the United States into dialogues of Asia in this context, Asian countries became rather cautious about the real motives behind Japan’s advocacy of an ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity,’ as it might be an obstacle to the creation of an ‘East Asian’ community. Japan should make clear the principle of her commitment to regionalism in Asia: that she would cooperate with all partners in the region for building a future Asian order or a community that is flexible and open to the outside (comprehensiveness and inclusiveness), aimed at realizing the common interests of members (effectiveness and solidarity), not driven by parochial interests of individual countries, and established based on shared values (universality) – as the best way to eliminate mutual suspicion and intolerant nationalism.

Notes

1. Speech by Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs on the occasion of the Japan Institute of International Affairs seminar “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizon,” on November 30, 2006. <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html>>, accessed on February 10, 2008.
2. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Remarks by H.E. Foreign Minister Taro Aso on the occasion of Friendship Day commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations Between Japan and the Philippines,” Manila, July 23 2006. <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/philippine/remark0607.html>>, accessed on February 10, 2008.
3. Fukuda Takeo, *Kaiko 90 nen* (Memoir 90 years) (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1995), pp.363-370.
4. Tomoda Seki, *Nyumon Gendai Nihon Giko* (Introduction to modern Japanese diplomacy) (Tokyo: Chuko shinsho, 1998), pp.57-58.
5. Vietnam appears to have taken off the ground in terms of her rapid economic growth.
6. Policy speech by Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, on the occasion of his official visit to Indonesia, “*Japan and One ASEAN that Care and Share at the Heart of Dynamic Asia*,” <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech.html>>, accessed pm February 10, 2008.
7. Address by Foreign Minister Taro Aso at Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., “*Working Together for a Stable and Prosperous East Asia: Lessons of Past, Vision for the Freedom to Dream*,” May 3, 2006. <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/address0605.html>>, accessed on March 1, 2008.

8. It seems that after Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, a son of Takeo Fukuda, the launcher of the Fukuda Doctrine, assumed the office of Prime Minister, reference to 'Arc of Freedom and Prosperity' has been sharply decreased. But the tendency toward 'values-oriented' diplomacy seems to persist.

9. Japan pledged a 400 million dollar aid package for support peace and stabilization of Mindanao in December 2002.

10. Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr. Masahiko Komura, "Japan: A Builder of Peace," 24 January 2008. <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/speech0801.html>>, accessed on February 25, 2008.

11. One alternative explanation was the simple fact that China is a permanent member of the Security Council, and Japan is not.

12. Asukata Mao, "Beichu-kankei ni okeru jinken mondai (Human rights issues in US-China relations)," Takagi Seiichiro ed., *Beichu Kankei: Reisengo no kozo to tenkai* (US-China relations: structure and evolution in the post Cold War era) (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2007), pp.142-164.

13. For an ASEAN view of China's influence over ASEAN's position on Japan's campaign for a Security Council seat, see: Jusuf Wanandi, "Nihon-ASEAN kankei no kako to mirai (original title: Japan and ASEAN Relationship: Past and Future)," *Kokusai Mondai*, No.566, November 2007, p.53.

14. Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020*, CSIS Report, Washington, D.C., February 2007, p.14.

15. Taro Aso, "Working Together..."



Revaluating the East Asian Security Architecture: The Question of "The Asian Way" of Regional Cooperative Institutions

PAN YI-NING

Since the end of the Cold War, East Asian countries have taken initiatives to establish regional cooperative institutions in an attempt to escape the fate of "Europe's past". From the beginning of the 21st century, they even have commonly come up with the idea of an East Asian Community. The paper is intended to reevaluate the regional security architecture, with focus on "the Asian way" of regional cooperative institutions. It puts forward the argument that "the Asian way" of building regional cooperative institutions has not contributed much to improving the fundamental security relationships in the region, nor to reducing the feeling of mutual insecurities over the past decade. It further points out that revitalizing East Asian traditions creates some paradoxes for regional cooperative security, which have actually weakened the foundations for a regional cooperative institutions. If the regional cooperative security building process fails to keep abreast of the changing security environment, and if the current regional cooperative institutions remain ineffective in managing the serious traditional security concerns, optimism about the prospects of regional security may be unfounded and illusory.

Introduction

IN THE WAKE of the Cold War, superpower withdrawal or partial withdrawal from East Asia¹ left almost all countries of the region falling into an obsession with systemic inter-state security dilemmas. Traditional security concerns thus began to loom large and the balance of power/threat politics was pervasively practiced. From the Western Realist perspective, East Asia's future was bound to look like Europe's past due to the absence of an effective mechanism guaranteeing regional security.

To escape such a fate, East Asian countries have taken initiatives to establish various institutions, notably the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), for bilateral or multilateral political and security dialogues and consultation. By the end of the 20th century, East Asian countries had even commonly come up with the idea of an East Asian Community. In light of these achievements, scholars of the liberalist and constructivist inclinations became optimistic about the prospective security scenario in East Asia.

Aside from that, a number of analysts have tried to argue from the theoretical perspective as well as historical standpoint that Western international relations theories may not be appropriate for explaining Asian realities and developments, because different regions of the world have distinctive features of international relations and distinctive security cultures. They contend that there exist non-Western approaches to addressing regional security problems.² As Michael Haas suggested, Asia has an Asian way to peace.

However, Western realist scholars are not at all convinced by East Asia's limited achievements in building up regional security regimes. They are particularly skeptical about the so-called "Asian Way" or "ASEAN Way", so much so that Gerald Segal dismissed the existence of any "Asian security paradigm".³

Evidently, the emerging East Asian security architecture accommodates multi-levels of approaches based on different Western international relations conceptions and Asian cognizance. The academic debate so far raises one critical question: whether or not the distinctive "Asian way" to regional cooperative institutions can be effective in helping mitigate East Asian security dilemmas and in helping resolve conflicts in the region.

This article attempts to explore the point by reevaluating the regional security architecture, with focus on "the Asian way" of regional cooperative institutions. According to the agenda of the ARF Concept Paper adopted in 1995, the region is supposed to go through three stages of "a gradual, evolutionary approach to security cooperation", i.e., promotion of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), development of preventive diplomacy mechanisms and development of conflict-resolution mechanisms. Undoubtedly, the initial neo-liberalist process of confidence and security building will also be crucial to the newly-developed concept of an East Asian Community, a constructivist-based security structure. Hence, rethinking the East Asian cooperative institution building over the last decade, we need to know how much progress the CSBMs have already achieved and whether the "Asian way" has effectively helped to push forward the process.

Consistent with Realist views, this article puts forward the argument that "the Asian way" of regional cooperative institution has not contributed much to improving the fundamental security relationships in the region, nor to reducing the feeling of mutual insecurities. It further points out that revitalizing East Asian traditions actually creates some paradoxes for regional cooperative security. It finally suggests that the development of a legal system or building a "concert of powers" could be the pragmatic alternative.

How Much Progress have CSBMs Achieved?

CSBMs involve comprehensive approaches to promoting regional cooperation and mutual trust. Considerable achievements have been accomplished so far in the areas of institutionalizing multilateral security dialogues, paving the way for economic interdependence and enhancing defense transparency and military cooperation. Such progress has made it possible for the regional cooperative institutions to play a role in regional security management.

However, when we assess how much these achievements have really contributed to improving the fundamental security relationship, especially lessening anxiety and suspicions among states of the region, there is more cause for concern than for celebration.

Indeed, there exist no commonly accepted standards to measure the effective progress of CSBMs. Yet, one standard that Desmond Ball suggested is applicable: i.e. “to what extent are the cooperative ventures keeping abreast of the changing components and configurations of security relations or of the systemic propensities for conflict or peace in the region?”⁴ As such, the following basic observations can be made:

The first area of observation is control of military activities. In this regard, the arms build-up pervading in East Asia has been a serious security concern. Over the past decade, most states in the region, big or small, have been enthusiastically embarking on military modernization to strengthen their self-reliant defense. As part of CSBMs and preventive diplomacy, it can be noted that transparency measures and arms control arrangements such as defense publications, a regional arms register, and systems of prior notification of military deployments, etc. have been worked out. Nevertheless, the propensity for robust military acquisition in the region persists, without any sign of arms control in sight. The SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) Year Book 2006 indicates that defense spending in East Asia from 1988 to 2005 has kept growing. To date, Japan, China and South Korea have been listed among the world’s 15 major military spenders. The danger of a conventional arms race, therefore, remains high. To make matters worse, the danger of nuclear proliferation has begun to emerge due to North Korean insistence on its nuclear development. Clearly, the CSBMs, while slowly evolving in its exploratory stage, have hardly constrained the regional arms build-up nor prevented the danger of an arms race.

The second area of observation is effectiveness of the security problem-solving institutions. There are a number of flashpoints that may potentially induce a regional war and scores of sovereignty disputes that may cause inter-state tension in East Asia. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the fruit of institutionalizing regional security dialogues and the major inter-governmental security problem-solving mechanism, has done much to address these security problems. As far as the South China Sea territorial dispute is concerned, it is fair to say that ARF has succeeded in providing the South China Sea parties with a channel of communications and some basic code of conduct. However, ARF has no way to proceed with the

substantive discussion of sovereignty and interest claims. So long as the crux is not tackled, the South China Sea security environment remains uncertain. Sovereignty claims and other interests will be reasserted, especially when inter-state cooperation is challenged by “resource nationalism” and consideration of relative gains. Given the non-negotiable nature of sovereignty, there is still the possibility that the dispute may erupt into a conflict any time in the future. As for the North Korean nuclear issue, this absolutely proves the impotence of regional security problem-solving institutions. ARF has failed to play any significant role in the issue, except inviting North Korea as a participant to the Forum, whereas the Six-Party Talks have also stalemated because North Korea stubbornly displays its “national independence”.

The third area of observation is threat perceptions and corresponding political and security relationships among states. East Asia is distinctive for its political, economic, social and cultural diversity. In the past 150 years of history, the region has been deeply divided by Western colonization and the Cold War. Hence, misperceptions or inaccurate perceptions of threat vis-à-vis neighboring states are widespread throughout the region, which tremendously affect the political and security relations among states. Paying much attention to the ideational problems, CSBMs are thus designed to alter misperceptions or inaccurate perceptions of threat and thereby foster mutual trust and amity. In this regard, the development of economic interdependence is conceived as the both the foundation and the critical approach of the CSBMs. In the Liberalist concept of Neofunctionalism, cooperation and integration in the economic sector are believed to create strong incentives for and spill-over effects on cooperation and integration in the political and security sectors. For the last decade, it is true that bilateral and multilateral economic relations among the states have been dramatically strengthened and regional and subregional economic cooperation has grown in East Asia. Since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, all states in the region have been more willing and ready than ever to engage in all kinds of economic cooperation arrangements. However, the pre-existing threat perceptions and traditional security concerns of the states have not changed much in the positive direction, along with progress of the economic interdependence. The perception of a “China threat”, in particular, has not

waned. Rather, it has been somewhat enhanced by economic competition and imbalanced interdependence. Nor have political and security relations correspondingly moved to a stage of less doubt and more intimacy as anticipated. In fact, a number of cases suggest the contrary. The Sino-Japanese relationship is a prominent case in point. The thin political and security relations between China and Japan have not in the least matched their high degree of economic interdependence. Contrary to the expectations, the relationship deteriorated in recent years. Polls conducted in the two countries indicate that mutual pre-existing threat perceptions have not been substantively reshaped, mutual apprehension has deepened, and mutual amity has declined.

To sum up, the contributions of CSBMs to improving the fundamental security relationships in the region have been limited for the last decade and the role of the ARF as a regional cooperative mechanism in resolving traditional security problems remains more superficial than substantive. The basic security environment in the region continues to be defined by deep mutual apprehension, active military development and unresolved sovereignty issues.

The observations as such are certainly nothing new. They were pointed out years ago mostly by the Western scholars. But the point reiterated here is that if the regional cooperative security building fails to keep abreast of the changing security environment, if the regional cooperative institution remains ineffective in managing the serious traditional security concerns, optimism about the prospects of regional security may be unfounded and illusory.

What is “Asian Security Culture”?

Some people would argue that this “Asian way”, which seeks a pace of progress comfortable to all - neither too fast nor too slow - has helped maintain regional stability, however ineffective the institutions may seem.

The argument truly touches upon a much deeper and more complicated issue: how should we look at “the Asian way”? When inquiring into this issue, the most contentious question we encounter is whether there is a thing such as “Asian security culture”. Hence, before measuring the extent to which the Asian way may have helped manage regional peace and war, we need to make clear what “Asian security culture” is, if indeed it exists.

Without doubt, the notion of an “Asian way” assumes that there exists an Asian security culture or traditions that shape a distinctive regional thinking, norms and modes of behavior. But in this respect, criticism has been severe. From the author’s observation, it is incorrect to deny the existence of commonly practiced traditions in East Asian international relations, yet it is also too general or too ambiguous to simply suggest an “Asian way”.

Two points justify this statement.

First is that **there were East Asian security cultures or traditions in history**. Before the Western powers expanded to East Asia, a regional international order had long been maintained in its own manner. There are at least two salient features which defined the traditional East Asian security culture. The most essential is the hierarchical relationship among actors. It was a socially constituted structure, which reflects not only the intra-regional distribution of power but also a shared mentality. Historically, in East Asia, the distribution of capabilities was pyramidal, broadly speaking. Imperial China loomed large in terms of hard power and soft power. The secondary tier included a number of medium-sized kingdoms such as Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Burma, Siam and Java. The rest of the less powerful countries formed the base. In line with such asymmetric structure, the powerful countries tended to develop concentric and hierarchical worldviews. Imperial China conceived itself as the world’s center. Similarly, the medium-sized states regarded themselves as the subregional centers. While imperial China treated its peripheral countries as vassals and barbarians, the subregional powers recognized China’s central status on the one hand, but treated their neighboring weaker states on the other. So the small and weak states usually found themselves in a situation of dyarchy.⁵ The multi-layered “core-periphery” structure of the hierarchical regional relationship was thus created and functioned. Of course, the structure of the relationships broke down occasionally when China declined and subsequently the vassals refused to pay tribute to it. Nevertheless, from a long historical view, the international system of East Asia and the common worldview of the states were by and large characterized by hierarchical relationships.

Another feature of the traditional East Asian international relations is “cultural moralism”, which can be understood as a focus on ethics and faith. Morality was highly valued in the traditional Chinese culture

and practiced as the major norm and principle of maintaining the Sino-centric international order. The core ethics and faith of Chinese political ideology were founded on Confucian morality. Based on Confucian beliefs, the Chinese emperors normally preferred non-violent measures to excessive use of force, internally and externally, for governing the whole imperial society so as to avoid undermining their authority and legitimacy.⁶⁷ When dealing with the peripheral states, therefore, imperial China particularly emphasized extending Chinese cultural appeal and acculturizing “barbarians”, rather than military conquest. Furthermore, the imperial Chinese rulers conceived of individual observance of ethics and virtues as a fundamental approach to preserving the hierarchical social order. According to Confucian philosophy, each individual in the different castes should follow his/her corresponding virtues and fulfill his/her appropriate duty. The emperor as a ruler, for instance, should be benevolent and righteous to his subjects. As the subjects, the people were required to be loyal and deferential to the emperor. In this manner, it was believed that social harmony and peace could be achieved. When the ethics and faith as such were applied to external relations, imperial China demanded that the vassals should recognize and show respect for the central power’s superiority by paying tribute while the suzerain itself had the obligation to care for the vassals. Therefore, the tributary system accentuated cultural formality and moral linkage rather than a substantive dominant relationship. The significance lies in the fact that a majority of the countries in ancient East Asia voluntarily engaged themselves in the Chinese tributary system in varying degrees and observed its rules most of the time. They were willing to do so, primarily because they had reverence for Chinese civilization and because the norm conformed to their hierarchical thinking. By commonly observing these ethics and virtues, the Sino-centric hierarchical regional order was thus maintained. True enough, where the Chinese cultural moralism failed, there would sometimes be a war.

All in all, the traditional East Asian security culture was deeply rooted in the historical power polarity of the region. A hierarchical relationship and Chinese cultural moralism can be clearly identified as the distinct regional traditions.

Nevertheless, East Asian security culture has undergone a transformation with the shifting security environment over the last two centuries. Therefore, the second point to be underlined here is that **East Asian security culture has become largely westernized**. Since the region was colonized by the European imperialists, the traditional East Asian international structure crumbled and all the states have been incorporated into the western-dominated global system. In this process, East Asian countries were initially obliged to follow the Western way of thinking, rules and behavior; later on, they woke up and took initiatives themselves to emulate the Western way of modernization so as to strengthen their national power. The notion of modernization is thus exactly westernization in essence. With respect to international relations, East Asian security culture has been rapidly overwhelmed by nationalism, Social Darwinism and Westphalian principles of power politics. As a result, modern East Asian countries are highly conscious of sovereignty and independence, especially national interest and dignity, self-determination, territorial integrity, inter-state equality, etc. They also share a strong sense of competition, which motivates all of them, big or small, to strive for a goal of being as powerful as possible. In this connection, they place much importance on material strength based on self-reliance, such that that economic and military development are always given priority in their modernization programs. Equally important, most of the countries have developed the habit of relying on external force, the Western powers in particular, to counterbalance their perceived neighboring threat. In addition to the influence of Western international political realism, the Western neo-liberalist and constructivist conceptions, such as common security, social justice and arms control, have also recently been injected into East Asian security culture. No matter what, it is evident that the foundation of traditional East Asian security culture has been virtually smashed and contemporary East Asian security culture has been reshaped by the new security circumstances in the region. All the states now tend to value what the Western countries value, think the way the Western countries think, and become more accustomed to the Western realist norms than anything else in the arena of international politics.

Here, we can see that **East Asian security culture today is of mixed-blood**. It is noteworthy that Westernized security culture tends to nullify the

distinct traditions, to the extent that horizontal relationship can hardly tolerate hierarchical relationships, whereas self-reliant material strength has precedence over ideational and cultural interactions.

Up to this point, we are ready to measure the extent to which “the Asian way” has helped regional cooperative security.

Has “The Asian Way” Effectively Helped to Push Forward Regional Cooperative Security?

Given the complex features of modern East Asian security culture, revitalizing East Asian traditions actually creates some paradoxes, which enormously affect the effective role of “the Asian way” in the process of regional cooperative security.

As we all know, the conceptions of common security and regionalism are basically European and, therefore, the European model is usually taken as the frame of reference. In the case of West Europe, the remarkable progress that has been achieved in common security and regionalism is mostly attributed to homogenous culture, common bitter experiences of devastating wars, a high degree of economic integration, and the shared mindset of a Social Contract between the individual and the State. By comparison, East Asia is devoid of all those basic determinants. This is why cooperative security has been envisioned in place of common security as the objective in East Asia. Despite the fact that homogenous culture and common war experiences are impossible to realize now, economic interdependence and the shared mindset of a Social Contract are possible to achieve in the region. With respect to the latter, we can observe that the East Asian elites prefer to look back to their own history to find the Asian version of Social Contract. Hence, revitalizing East Asian traditions actually serves this purpose. The result is that in establishing regional cooperative institutions, European states give much emphasis on the development of a legal system, whereas East Asian countries pay much attention to “the Asian way” or cultural traditions.

Then a paradox arises for East Asian cooperative security. On the one hand, recalling its distinctive historical and cultural roots seems to be a necessary means to cultivate regional identity and cohesion. But on the other hand, revitalizing old traditions simultaneously produces the negative effect

of increasing an already pervasive apprehension of China’s central role in the region.

As mentioned earlier, East Asian traditions have much to do with China’s historical hegemonic power and Chinese cultural moralism. Therefore, if traditions are reasserted, China’s role unavoidably becomes a focal issue. It becomes obvious that not a sovereign state in the region would like to see the process eventually head into a restoration of the historical international order. For one thing, their deeply embedded sense of sovereignty and independence, none of modern East Asian countries wants to descend into being a subordinate again; nor does China have the will to be a hegemony in the region. For another, most East Asian countries are not ready at all to accept Chinese cultural norms as the major principles of the regional security cooperation. The obvious reason is that China has lost much of the appeal of its great civilization to neighboring countries, as it was a chaotic and weak state for more than 150 years. And worse, there is a shared misconception now, based on long historical memory and recent Cold War experiences, that Chinese culture is negative given its lack of ethics of equality and democracy.

Yet, the current inevitable trend is that China, with its rapid development, has been playing a more and more significant role in regional cooperative security. As a result, promotion of East Asian regionalism is concurrent with an increasing anxiety on the part of many countries about the possibility of China’s re-emergence as the hegemon in the region. Great and medium powers of the region in particular have begun to fear that China would have too much say in shaping the regional norms and would exert overwhelming influence in the regional cooperative institutions.

Here, another paradox follows. East Asian traditions are intended for fostering regional consensus and unification. But because the Sino-centric old values and norms are basically denied, East Asian countries have to invent a modern version of distinct “traditions”. ASEAN takes the most enthusiastic part in advocating an “Asian way” and in fact attempts to interpret the notion and build the regional cooperative mechanisms in accordance with the ASEAN values. China bolsters the “the Asian way” of regionalism and has actively put forward initiatives based on its own “New Security Concept” as well as Chinese “harmonious culture”. Japan, afraid of being

marginalized in the region, has also articulated the “flying-geese” model of East Asian multilateralism resting on its more westernized values. By now, the so-called “East Asian traditions” are actually redefined and represented by differing, newly constructed conceptions and values, which we may broadly tag as the ASEAN way, the Chinese way and the Japanese way. The consequence is that not only the non-Asians but also the East Asians themselves are more and more confused of what is the distinct “Asian way”, due to its mixture of indigenous and Western substances. And more importantly, the diversified “Asian ways” together with the underlying competition for regional leadership have in effect functioned as a dividing force rather than a driving force in the region. Thus true consensus becomes difficult to achieve. The split over the issue of enlarging East Asian Community is a clear indication of the regional substantive division.

It seems that there is sort of consensus on the prevailing role of “the ASEAN way” in regional security cooperation. On the one hand, the states of the region tend to trust neither “the Chinese way” nor “the Japanese way”, for historical reasons. “The Chinese way” is easily associated with the tributary system, and so is “the Japanese way” associated with “the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere”. On the other hand, China and Japan are mutually suspicious of each other’s intention in the region. Therefore, both of them prefer to support ASEAN’s leading role in the process of regionalization. However, it should be noted that competition among the three self-centered cultural ways persists and thus the consensus is superficial and brittle.

In this connection, one more paradox is created. The East Asian traditions are supposedly revived to serve as the distinctive norms and approaches for East Asian cooperation and security community. But while “the ASEAN way” enjoys a prevailing role as the major norm and approach, its effective practice has come into question. The most obvious flaw is that “the ASEAN way” lacks material strength to back up agreements since ASEAN is made up of medium and small states, most of which are less developed in terms of the economy and military power. Historically, traditional Chinese cultural moralism practiced mostly due to imperial China’s superior civilization as well as material strength. The same is true of Western values and norms in the modern times. Therefore, in modern international politics where material

strength is particularly revered, the effective practice of norms and approaches is essentially determined by power. As a result, “the ASEAN way” can hardly play its role beyond the sub-region of Southeast Asia without the support of a great power. As it is, China’s dynamism is critical. Wide acceptance of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) is an apt example. TAC, embodying ASEAN’s values and norms, has been open to all states outside Southeast Asia since 1976. It was not until China joined the treaty in 2003 that TAC really become acknowledged as a code of conduct in a wider region. But clearly, China decided to accede into TAC for the sake of its own “New Security Concept” as well as realist interest. Because of China’s accession, Japan followed suit mainly for the purpose of balancing against China’s growing influence in the region. Australia, New Zealand and India were required to sign the treaty, as ASEAN, backed by China, set it as the prerequisite for entry into the East Asian Summit.

Aside from that, the *kampong* traditions contained in “the ASEAN way” seem inherently difficult to keep in accord with either Northeast Asian customs or Western habits. The former pays much attention to frequent brotherly meetings and a long process of patient dialogues in conflict resolution, whereas the latter commonly emphasizes efficiency. Of course, compared with Western habits, the Chinese still attempt to seek a balance between progressiveness and efficiency. As a consequence, despite the fact that the peacemaking intention of “the ASEAN way” is highly appreciated, North East Asian countries, while remaining patient, have begun to urge an improved approach. But the Western powers involved, losing their patience, have begun to criticize the forums sponsored by ASEAN as “talk shops”. In this sense, the appeal of “the ASEAN way” is virtually limited.

On balance, “the Asian way” is not well cultivated, because modern East Asian security culture is actually afflicted with “schizophrenia”. The notion is not only confusing in conception but also paradoxical in substance. The result is that the Asian version of a social contract becomes problematic. Accordingly, when the Asian version of social contract cannot be well developed, the foundation for the regional cooperative institution is weakened. Equally important, when the shared mindset of social contract cannot be established, confidence building is also impaired. It follows then that the cultural or ideational approach fails to function effectively, the states

of the region will be more dependent on material strength. Therefore, what remains really effective and can be ultimately trusted to maintain regional stability is the realist mechanism—development of self-reliant material power and, externally, a balance of power or threat.

Conclusion

Rethinking the East Asian cooperative institution building over the last decade, it is obvious that the process cannot keep abreast of the changing security environment. Far from helping push forward the regional cooperative security, “the Asian way” only weakens the foundation of the regional cooperative institution.

If the regional cooperative institution offers no promise for successfully managing serious traditional security concerns, the whole regional security architecture shall continue to rely on the realist mechanism. Then optimism about the prospects of our regional security may be unfounded and illusory.

Given the complicated security environment in East Asia, the development of a legal system or “concert of powers” building could be the pragmatic alternative. But this needs another paper to elaborate and discuss.

Notes

1. East Asia in this paper is a wide geographical concept, including Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia.

2. For example, Michael Haas, *The Asian Way to Peace, A Study of Regional Cooperation* (New York: Praeger, 1989) and David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: the Need for New Analytic Frameworks”, *International Security*, Vol.27, No.4 (Spring, 2003).

3. For details, refer to Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, “Rethinking East Asian Security”, *Survival*, vol.36, no.2, (Summer, 1994); Gerald Segal, “‘Asianism’ and Asian Security”, *The National Interest*, Winter 1995 and Michael Leifer, “The ASEAN Peace Process: a category mistake”, *The Pacific Review*, Vol.12, No.1, 1999.

4. Desmond Ball, *Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Prospects and Possibilities*, Working Paper, No.2, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, National University of Australia, April, 1999, p.7.

5. See the details in Takeshi Hamashita, *Modern China and its International Environment: Tributary Trade System and Modern Asian Economic Zone* (in Japanese), Tokyo University Press, 1990.

6. See the details in Tiejun Zhang, “Chinese Strategic Culture: Traditional and Present Features”, *Comparative Strategy*, Vol.21, 2002, pp.74-81.



The Dynamics of 21st Century Chinese Strategic Culture and Statecraft in Southeast Asia¹

RENATO CRUZ DE CASTRO

Using the concept of strategic culture, this article examines China's current statecraft in Southeast Asia. It asserts that Chinese strategic culture, which emphasizes the application of soft power, is reflected in Beijing's foreign policy of affecting a peaceful emergence in Southeast Asia. This gambit is primarily aimed at restraining and counterbalancing preponderant American power and influence in Southeast Asia. The article further observes that China's statecraft has been welcomed by most Southeast states because it conforms to their approach to regional security matters. This approach is premised on non-interference, consultation, and the non-use of force in resolving international disputes. In conclusion, it warns that unless the U.S. matches China's diplomatic gambit in Southeast Asia, Washington will find its strategic preponderance and initiative in the region severely curtailed by Beijing's soft power.

...

“To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken, use maneuvers direct and indirect. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory...”²

SUN TZU

Introduction

CHINA'S PEACEFUL emergence is currently causing concerns in Washington. Since 1997, the U.S. Congress has obliged the Department of Defense to study China's strategic and operational concepts. The 2005 Pentagon report painted an alarmist view of the Chinese military noting that the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) modernization looks too big for China's regional interests and that the U.S. should further improve its own military capability so that the balance (of power) in East Asia could be maintained.³ The Bush Administration maintains that as the Chinese economy continues to expand, Beijing will likely increase its military spending. This trend will enable the PLA to either produce or purchase military equipment that can change the *status quo* in the Taiwan Strait and challenge America's military preponderance in Southeast Asia. In 2005, then U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld claimed that Beijing's military spending was threatening the delicate security balance in Asia.⁴ Addressing a conference in Singapore, he contended that China's investment in missile and up-to-date military technology endangered the interests not only of the U.S. and Taiwan, but also of those nations that consider themselves as China's trading partners, not rivals.⁵

The Pentagon's 2006 report echoes this when it stresses that "China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset (sic) the traditional military advantages absent U.S. counterstrategies."⁶ In 2007, Mr. Rumsfeld's successor Secretary Robert Gates softened the Pentagon's strong rhetoric about the alleged Chinese military build-up by expressing the view that there are still common ties that bind Washington and Beijing and expressed his hope for a better understanding between the two major powers.⁷ Nevertheless, the Defense Department's 2007 report on the PLA's build-up still echoes Mr. Rumsfeld's view of China's potential over time to offset traditional U.S. military advantages.⁸ The 2007 report further argues that "the expanding military capabilities of China's armed forces are a major factor in changing East Asian military balances; improvements in China's strategic capabilities have ramifications far beyond the Asia-Pacific region."⁹

Then Secretary Rumsfeld's 2005 pronouncement and the two subsequent Pentagon reports reflect an existing view of American defense analysts and

officials who see China as the principal conventional military threat to *Pax Americana*.¹⁰ Since 2005, the current Administration has implied that the PLA modernization amounts to its actual military expansion and has justified the U.S. military's hedging strategy in East Asia.¹¹ American defense officials and analysts, however, seem to miss the crux of China's current geo-strategic gambit in Asia. The China challenge goes beyond Beijing's military modernization or arms buildup or a projected amphibious invasion of Taiwan.¹² More significantly, it pursues China's efforts to set a regional agenda shaping the preferences of member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the long run, it is about Beijing's skillful use of soft power to erode American power and influence in Southeast Asia.

This article relates China's strategic culture with its 21st century diplomatic gambit in Southeast Asia. It explains how China strategic culture interacts with its current foreign policy of undertaking a limited arms modernization, and developing the necessary economic and political power to constrain, and eventually ease out the U.S. as Southeast Asia's hegemon. Essentially, these specific questions are addressed: 1) What is the basis of Chinese current diplomatic gambit in Southeast Asia? 2) How does China's current statecraft reflect Chinese strategic culture? 3) How is China's statecraft affecting the Southeast Asian states; And 4) How will China's policy of peaceful emergence affect the security equation in the region?

Chinese Strategic Culture and Statecraft

As a term in Strategic Studies, strategic culture refers to the deeply embedded concepts which affect policy and decision-making processes relative to national security.¹³ Strategic culture involves images and symbols reflective on how a polity understands its relationship with other states, its position in the international pecking order, and the nature and scope of its national external ambition. According to Alistair Johnson, strategic culture consists of two parts. The first includes basic assumptions on the orderliness of the strategic environment in terms of the role of conflict in human affairs, the nature of the adversary and the threat, and the efficacy of the use of force. The second carries assumptions at a more operational level especially on the most efficacious strategic options in dealing with the threat environment.¹⁴

Far from being a dominant set of national beliefs determining choices throughout the history of a certain society, strategic culture establishes pervasive and long-lasting preferences by providing concepts on the role of military force in international politics and clothing them in an aura of factuality, reality and efficacy. These preferences, however, are subject to changes in non-cultural variables such as technology, threat, or social organization. Strategic culture molds public attitude and becomes institutionalized in the structure and process of decision-making as it affects how political leaders, bureaucrats, and even military services define central roles and missions in the area of national security. Strategic culture shapes military policies in peacetime, as well as in times of conflict, thereby producing definite national styles, differentiated by their propensities to the use of force in international affairs. It does not emerge from the permanent conditions of the state, and certainly not from any fixed ethnic or social characteristics. Rather, it reflects self-images of relative material strength or weakness; and it changes with the specific enemy with which the comparison is made.¹⁵

Chinese civilization has produced one of the first important military philosophers who tried to establish the principles in the proper conduct of statecraft and war—Sun Tzu. He derived his precepts from experience or the study of past experiences, transmitted through historical records, accounts of practitioners, and general principles on the proper conduct of war in an agriculture-based ancient China.¹⁶ An active general at a time when the contenders in war were feudal principalities fighting the equivalent of limited wars, Sun Tzu was concerned with conflicts on a large and protracted scale, or waging ruinous campaigns of attrition. To him, cost was all-important, given the restrictions on manpower in an agricultural society, and the adverse effects in political and economic terms of excessive taxation.

Sun Tzu's work reflects the assumption that underlies the Chinese cultural approach to war. War is neither a means in the hands of policy nor, and much less, an end in itself.¹⁷ It is regarded as a necessary evil, a phenomenon that a state has to confront and address in an imperfect world. War is seen as the disturbance of the *Tao* (or the way), thus, its conduct should be kept to the indispensable minimum.¹⁸ The military instrument is viewed as an ill omen or a tool by which a state can ruin or strain its resources. He warned

that maintaining a large military for a long time makes prices go up, and high prices drain people's resources. It also causes the state's treasury to be depleted. To Sun Tzu, no state benefits from a long war and maintaining a big military. Whereas the West emphasized the maintenance of a huge military and the application of maximum force against the enemy, Sun Tzu called for the use of diplomacy, dirty tricks, and battle maneuvers. If the military instrument is to be used, it should be applied in a carefully measured way, which is neither more nor less than what is necessary. In short, it should appear as sharp and calculated bursts.

Sun Tzu's military stratagem eventually became part and parcel of Chinese strategic culture. But Sun Tzu merely formalized his philosophy on warfare from the then existing corpus of ideas and practices. In a way, *The Art of War* integrated Chinese traditional military precepts and political theory into an intellectually coherent strategic discourse.¹⁹ It provides Chinese society with a "strategic cultural artifact" that embodies these ranked strategic preferences. His exhortations such as overcoming the enemy without actually fighting, the preference of foiling the enemy's plots and alliances rather than directly attacking the enemy head-on and conducting a siege, reflect China's cultural approach to conflict. Sun Tzu's gradualist and asymmetrical approach to warfare in any case was used by succeeding Chinese dynasties whose militia-based armies fought contingents of marauding non-Sinicized tribes along the empire's frontier areas. His work distilled the essence of Chinese strategy and statecraft of not imposing one's will on an enemy. The initial aim is to outwit or outmaneuver an enemy, and in the end, ensure the survival of Chinese society and civilization. Its ultimate objective is to preserve the social harmony of the existing world rather than changing it.

Chinese 21st Century Statecraft in Practice

During its early years as an independent and revolutionary state, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was confronted by militarily powerful enemies. The U.S. and later, the Soviet Union posed real military threats that could undermine China's very existence. At that time, China was a relatively backward country with an underdeveloped economy. Consequently, the PLA adopted a passive and low-tech military strategy based on a doctrine known as the "people's war."²⁰ From the late 40s to the late 70s, Chinese

policymakers had myopic views in terms of strengthening and using military power to defend their country against foreign invasion and military coercion.²¹ They concentrated on traditional security, and defense against external threats was the most important component of the country's security strategy. This mindset changed during the '80s as global developments forced Beijing to reappraise its concept of security, to downplay its military concern, and focus on economic growth and development. While recognizing their country's economic backwardness, Chinese leaders concluded that a world war could be averted for sometime, and that the immediate security environment in the light of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear stalemate in the '80s could be ameliorated.

In 1980, Deng Xiaoping set three priorities as China's security objectives, namely, economic development, national unification, and opposition to hegemonism.²² Among these three goals, economic development appears as complementary to national security, as well as the major determinant in the rise and fall of great powers. From the perspective of the Chinese political leadership, international rivalry has shifted to the economic arena, and the essence of competition is the contention for comprehensive national capabilities. More significantly, increasing China's material resources would enable the PRC to remove the vestiges of the humiliating past, promote its position in the world arena as a major global player, and in the process, transform the country into a great power

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early '90s reinforced this notion that the country's national security depends more upon overall national strength, based on a solid economy, than on its military capability. The 1991 Gulf War and 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in the Kosovo conflict underscored the importance of comprehensive national power (especially in science and technology) as the decisive element in international politics. Thus, Beijing views economic growth as the key to developing China's overall comprehensive power, instead of simply relying on the military instrument to ensure its security. At the same time, it is aware that military power is necessary to defend China's economic interests and development. However, economic security cannot be guaranteed by military capability alone. The political leadership knows that China's integration into the global economy requires widening the scope of

national security to include the economic realm. Thus, it has formulated a three-step strategy for economic development based on the projection that the Chinese economy would become a moderately developed one by the middle of the 21st century. To accomplish this goal, Beijing vigorously pursues the creation of a favorable environment for rapid economic growth. The PRC enhances regional and global economic cooperation, diversifies its external economic links, plays the market card, and actively participates in the regional and global production network.

Despite its focus on economic development and comprehensive security, however, Beijing is wary that the U.S. intends to be a global hegemon bent on disrupting Chinese irredentist and strategic agendas in the process.²³ Many members of the Chinese political elite are convinced that the U.S. is opposed to China's emergence as a regional power that can reduce or even displace American power and influence in East Asia.²⁴ Deng Xiaoping himself concluded that China must fully and comprehensively prepare for the possibility that the U.S. might launch a military aggression against China, manipulate another country into starting a war, or provoke a war by fostering Taiwan's independence force. Faced by overwhelming American military and economic prowess, the Chinese political leadership has no choice but to rely on its traditional approach to statecraft based on a form of asymmetric warfare.

The traditional Chinese notion of world order (and statecraft) is primarily based on culture, morality, and human harmony, while the European dominated international system focuses more on hard power—military and economic strength and competition.²⁵ Its emphasis on indirect warfare—on mastering the human will and harmonizing war with the *Tao*—has remained, despite the military revolution and the formation of the modern Chinese nation-state. China's current economic growth has enabled it to develop its own soft or co-optive power. This, in turn, provides it with the capability and opportunity to apply its traditional statecraft as a geo-strategic gambit against Washington's strategic preponderance in Southeast Asia. Largely influenced by the work of Sun Tzu, traditional Chinese statecraft is premised on the use of stratagem to undermine the enemy's will and the use of asymmetric tactics in warfare. Sun Tzu advocated the use of stratagem to undermine the enemy's will and the use of asymmetric tactics in warfare.

He argued that the key principle in warfare is not fighting, which, in fact, should be avoided. To fight and conquer in all your battles is not the manifestation of supreme excellence in warfare. Supreme excellence means breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. To Sun Tzu, the objective is not to impose one's will but to undermine the enemy's will to fight, which could be achieved through asymmetric tactics.²⁶ He prescribed the use of direct (head-on) attack along with the indirect (flanking maneuvers) to confuse the enemy. He suggested sudden attacks, baits, feints, and disinformation as appropriate tactics to sow confusion in the enemy ranks. He likened a military force to something amorphous like water, which adapts itself to the shape of the terrain. This jibed with his interest in asymmetric warfare—a staple in traditional Chinese military writings that recommended the use of psychological operations, covert actions, and disinformation more than most popular and published works on military science and strategy in the West do.

Hold Out Baits to Entice the Opponents

A key strategy China uses to undermine U.S. strategic/political preponderance is its attempt to co-opt Southeast Asian countries through its provision of side-payments to and fostering consultative relations with U.S. friends and allies in the region. However, this could only be possible if China's develops its economy. A major development in the global political economy is China's emergence as a regional economic power. In a matter of less than two decades, China was able transform its command and slow-growing autarkic economy into a dynamic market-driven one that has become the world's most formidable exporting juggernaut. China's economic strategy is simple: it processes vast quantities of raw materials and exports them as manufactured goods such as office machines, telecom equipment, and electronic machineries. Neighboring states are feeding the East Asian trade boom by exporting components and machine parts to China for final assembly. To date, the PRC has attracted nearly US\$500 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI). This has fueled an eightfold growth in Chinese exports amounting to US\$380 billion from 1990 to 2003.

China's economy is expected to be double the size of German economy by 2110 and to surpass the Japanese economy, the second largest economy

in the world by 2020.²⁷ The PRC is now a major player in the global economy and the power behind the rapid recovery of East Asian economies after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. In the past few years, China's gross domestic product (GDP) has outperformed other East Asian economic "miracles." The Chinese economy grew, on the average, by about 10 percent a year during the last 15 years.²⁸ The World Bank's and the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development's data show that the best 15-year performances for South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan never exceeded the 10 percent annual growth rate.²⁹ In 2006, it was reported that the PRC's GDP exceeded those of Britain and France, making the Chinese economy the world's fourth largest economy.³⁰ Commenting on China's rapidly growing economy, an American academic boldly notes:

The once poor and inward-looking China, with growth rates of averaging 10 percent between 1980 and 2004, now has the fourth largest in the world, just behind the United States, Japan, and Germany. In fact, in terms of GDP measured by purchasing power parity—a metric that adjust for relatively low prices of services in developing countries—the World Bank now ranks China as the second largest economy.³¹

The PRC tries to co-opt smaller states in Southeast Asia through the provision of side-payments and providing institutional voice to the smaller states in Southeast Asia through: a) its rapidly growing economy; and b) supporting cooperative and integrative projects in East Asia. The PRC uses its booming economy to mete out opportunities to ASEAN countries and to draw them to its growing political orbit. In particular, the vibrant coastal areas of China are projected to become an important market for the relatively high-quality exports of ASEAN member states.³² To facilitate the development of closer trade relations between China and the ASEAN states, Beijing offered its Southeast Asia neighbors during the Fifth China-ASEAN summit in November 2001 a free-trade deal that could be established in the next years. The following year, during the Sixth China-ASEAN summit, the two sides signed the Framework Agreement on China-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, which paved the way for the formation of a China-ASEAN free trade zone by 2010. Since 2005, China and the ASEAN states have agreed to lower their tariffs on more than 7,000 products.³³ Consequently, China-ASEAN trade has growth rapidly.

The two-way trade volume in 2006 between the two sides went up by US\$ 160.8 billion dollars, which translates to a 23.4 percent increase from the 2005 trade level.³⁴ China and ASEAN are now the fourth biggest trading partners of each. In July 2007, China and the 10-member states of ASEAN signed the ASEAN-China Agreement on Trade and Services. Chinese and ASEAN diplomats considered the agreement as a significant trade and services deal that provides cooperation in high-technology services, energy and construction and a major step toward the establishment of a comprehensive free-trade area in East Asia

In increasing its political/diplomatic profile in the region, China has been very skillful in increasing its economic ties with traditional U.S. allies such as the Philippines, and Thailand. As a case in point, since 2001, bilateral trade between the China and the Philippines has increased by an average annual rate of 41 percent.³⁵ In 2003, bilateral trade went up from US\$5.26 billion to US\$9.4 billion or an increase of about 78.7%. Last year, bilateral trade went up to US\$23.4 billion, representing an increase of 33.3 percent over the 2005's figure of US\$17.6 billion. Consequently, Philippine-China trade has become the fastest growing bilateral trade relations in Southeast Asia, making Beijing the Philippines' third largest trading partner after Washington and Tokyo. Interestingly, the Philippines is enjoying a trade surplus with China. This is attributed to the fact that the latter imports a huge amount of semi-conductors from the Philippines (almost 85% of Chinese imports).³⁶ The 2005 Philippine Export Development Plan for 2005-2007 notes that exports of goods and services to China increased by 9.4% in 2006 outpacing the increase in Philippine trade with its traditional trading partners, i.e. Japan and the United States. Thus, the plan asserts that the Philippines must maintain "strategic business partnership with China and capitalize on emerging buyers preferences in securing niche market segments, and hand-hold export oriented investments" in the country.³⁷ To further improve their growing economic ties, Manila and Beijing signed the Framework Agreement on Expanding and Deepening Bilateral Economic and Trade Cooperation in early 2007. The agreement aims to increase the two countries' trade volume to US\$30 billion by 2010 and to further improve the two countries' trade structures, promote mutual investment and actively explore new areas of economic cooperation.³⁸

In the case of Thailand, trade relations between Beijing and Bangkok has dramatically increased after the latter was the first ASEAN member state to sign an early-harvest chapter of the free trade agreement with Beijing in 2001. In 2007, the two countries signed a Joint Strategic Plan of Action (2007-2011), which provides a five-year plan geared toward closer cooperation between China and Thailand across a wide range of fields ranging from cooperation in politics to telecommunications.³⁹ Aside from this joint action plan, Bangkok and Beijing also signed an agreement providing for the mutual recognition of higher educational institutions and the establishment of cultural centers in both sides. The dynamic economic ties between China and the ASEAN states were emphasized by the China-ASEAN Business Council during a seminar on China-ASEAN economic ties that was held in Beijing in April 2007. During this event, business groups and analysts from both sides agreed that over the past 15 years, bilateral economic and trade cooperation between China and ASEAN has been developing rapidly and the mechanism for overall cooperation between the two sides has been operating better and better.⁴⁰ Consequently, it has been argued in the region that the export growth of the ASEAN countries will definitely come from East Asia countries like China and Japan, not from long-haul markets such as Western Europe and the United States.⁴¹ Southeast Asian economists now see China an "economic power that should be best viewed as a business partner not a competitor given the wide room it has for expansion in trade and investment relations."⁴²

China also dispenses side-payments to the smaller ASEAN states, through the framework of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process and multilateral arrangements. Chinese diplomats regard the APT as the "main channel of East Asian regional cooperation" signifying its relative importance compared with other regional forums.⁴³ Through the APT, the PRC has consolidated its bilateral links with the ASEAN countries. It donated US\$ one million to the ASEAN Development Fund, committed to train 8,000 ASEAN professionals in five years, and to administer and finance a number of agro-technology training programs for the member states of the regional organization this year.⁴⁴ During the ASEAN-China summit this year, China hinted that it will favorably consider establishing a number of economic and trade zones with sound infrastructure and complete industrial chains in

a number of ASEAN countries that will definitely be linked with its own economic zones along its coastal areas. China has also provided the ASEAN states US\$750 million in loans and has invested heavily in some major infrastructure projects in a number of Southeast Asian states. Just this year, Chinese companies signed a US\$2.8 billion contract to build coal-fired electricity plants in Indonesia, significantly outbidding other foreign companies.⁴⁵ In the Philippines, China has agreed to finance and construct the US\$ 450 million North Luzon rail project while Chinese agricultural technology has been assisting the country in developing hybrid rice and hybrid corn as Manila seeks to develop self-reliance in food production and supply.⁴⁶ Since 2002, China has also channeled its economic assistance and investments to Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam through the framework of the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS).⁴⁷ During the 2003 ASEAN Summit in Bali, China proposed to revitalize the moribund Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East Asian Growth Areas (BIMP-EAGA) through technical and capital assistance for its projects, for strengthened socio-economic relations, and intensified trade relations with the sub-regional group.⁴⁸

China also interacts with its Southeast Asian economic partners in several regional economic forums. The notion that regionalism elsewhere (e.g. EU, NAFTA) benefits member economies, and the fear of damage to domestic economic interests if access to foreign markets similar to that enjoyed by competitors is not negotiated, are the primary reasons behind the Southeast Asian enthusiasm for regional economic arrangements. Most prominent among them are the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN plus Three (APT), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Boao Forum for Asia, and the Tumen River Area Development Program. For China, this means that each regional forum has a slightly different political and economic dynamic. But they all serve China's foreign policy goals. With domestic economic growth very dependent on the regional economy, Chinese leaders see regionalism as a mechanism by which countries can work together to address the vagaries and instability of the world economy. Likewise, they view regionalism as a way of responding to the forces of globalization. As a form of multilateralism, regional groupings can advance China's national security concerns by counter-balancing U.S. financial and

military power, which have remained relatively unchecked since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

During the 15th anniversary commemoration of the establishment of China-ASEAN dialogue relations in early November 2006, Beijing joined the ASEAN states in a joint declaration for a secured and deepened China-ASEAN strategic partnership based on peace and prosperity. Then during the recent 10th China-ASEAN Summit in Cebu City, Beijing offered to ASEAN a five-point proposal to further consolidate and enhance ASEAN-China's strategic partnerships for peace and prosperity. The five-point proposal includes: the strengthening of political trust; the building up of the two sides' economic and trade relations to a new level; more intense cooperation in non-traditional security fields; China's active support to ASEAN community building and integration; and the expansion of social, cultural and people-to people exchanges between China and the ASEAN states.⁴⁹ As part of this strategic partnership, China also declared that it welcomes more ASEAN businesses to China and it encourages established Chinese companies to invest in the ASEAN countries. Aside from offering ASEAN deeper economic and political relations, China has made it a point to show that it has the capacity to proactively provide economic assistance to its neighboring countries through multilateral organizations. In 2006, Beijing donated US\$ 30 million to projects sponsored by the Asian Development Bank and another US\$ 20 million for the banks' poverty alleviation and regional cooperation programs.⁵⁰ Observing China's use of its economic largesse in co-opting the Southeast Asia states, an American analyst opines:

China's economic tools also have become more sophisticated...China's aid to the Philippines was roughly four times greater than America's. China's to Laos was three times greater, its aid to Indonesia was nearly double, and its aid to Cambodia nearly matched US levels.

Beijing has revamped its aid programs to better tie assistance to discrete policy goals including promoting Chinese companies abroad, cultivating important political actors, and bolstering China's benign regional image...China's embrace of free trade in the region and its promotion of the idea that it will become a major source of foreign direct investment also bolster its image.⁵¹

Taking the “Indirect Approach”

China’s main diplomatic gambit since the mid-‘90s is to not to directly challenge America’s strategic preponderance based on the latter’s well-established system of alliances and forward-deployed forces. Beijing’s stratagem involves stigmatizing these alliances and the powerful U.S. naval forces with a cold-war mentality already obsolete in the post-Cold-War era. Beijing’s offer of a new regional order and direction became apparent when it announced and began implementing its “New Security Concept” (NSC) in 1998. The NSC is premised on cooperative and coordinated security that proposes a pattern of diplomatic-defense relationship to countries that are neither allies nor adversaries of China. According to Beijing, the new concept is well-suited to what it claimed to be a new post-Cold War environment characterized by peace and development but threatened by non-traditional (non-state) security challenges, e.g., transnational crimes, international terrorism, etc. The NSC subtly conveys the idea that American security alliances are from a previous era and are indicative of a Cold War/*realpolitik* mentality.

This new security concept provides both a vision and a direction in Southeast Asian regional affairs in three ways. Firstly, it offers an alternative security blueprint to the U.S.-dominated bilateral system of alliances that has become a landmark in the regional security terrain since the ‘50s. The concept envisages a new multilateral regional security framework devoid of any alliance structure. It indirectly criticizes U.S. alliances’ thinking, encourages Asian states to pursue policies independent of U.S. hegemony, and emphasizes China’s new approaches to its Southeast Asian neighbors with rhetoric and actions designed to undermine American influence. However, tacit criticism of U.S. position in Southeast Asia has stopped in the aftermath of 9/11.⁵² Secondly, the NSC has paved the way for an unprecedented wave of Chinese diplomatic activism through economic, political, security, and cultural initiatives in Southeast Asia. Since the mid-‘90s, China has expanded the number and extent of its bilateral relations, organized and joined various economic and security arrangements, deepened its participation in key multilateral organizations, and helped address a number of global security issues. Chinese diplomacy has impacted on PRC’s relations with ASEAN. Beijing’s willingness to accommodate the political concerns of Southeast

Asian states has generated the good-will of officials from these countries. China has also invoked the concept of a partnership to describe its dealings with the ASEAN states. The use of the concept of partnership vis-à-vis ASEAN appears to be designed to signal that the Association and its members do matter to Beijing, even if ASEAN is seen and regarded as the weaker partner in the international politics of East Asia.⁵³ This consequently led ASEAN member states to appreciate China’s regional significance and to accept Beijing as a fully established good citizen in regional international society.

Thirdly, to foster a new form of relationship devoid of power politics in Southeast Asia, China has doubted and questioned the importance of military power in international relations. Chinese officials and scholars argue that with the end of the Cold War, security concerns should no longer focus on military defense. Rather, states must tackle a much wider range of security challenges, such as drug trafficking, terrorism, organized transnational crimes, environmental degradation, civil and ethnic conflicts, and resource scarcity. The policy concept also calls for a broadening of security parameters to include non-military issues, (e.g., economic and environmental concerns) and social problems (e.g., poverty, natural disasters, crimes, social discrimination and unemployment). China’s emphasis on the growing importance of these non-traditional security challenges is clearly stated in 2003 Ministry of Foreign Affairs *Diplomatic White Book*:

Challenges to world peace and security came in two types. The first was traditional security concerns such as conflicts or wars... The second was non-traditional security concerns, which of late became more pronounced. Their unprecedented complexity and destructiveness and the rising impact were made worse by globalization. Both types posed a threat to world peace and security.⁵⁴

China now advocates a comprehensive national security strategy in which military security is only a component. In fact, Beijing would rather rely on diplomatic and economic means to address its international security concerns, rather than on less relevant military means. By emphasizing non-traditional security concerns, Beijing has sought to infuse a sense of shared growth and security community into China’s overall relations with neighboring states. It is also aimed to foster a model of interstate cooperation that enhances

collective security for the participating states while not threatening any outside party. The inclusion of and focus on these non-traditional security challenges will make the highly militarized/realist American approach to security outdated and will promote cooperation among Southeast Asian countries in confronting non-military threats at the expense of U.S. influence in the region.

China has consistently emphasized this concept in its conduct in regional and international security affairs. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) basically incorporates China's news approach in security matters as it provides the organizational framework for its members to collectively cooperate in addressing non-traditional security challenges such as terrorism, separatism, extremism, and drug trafficking.⁵⁵ In line with this policy, China hosted the sixth meeting of the Council of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member countries heads of state and government. During this meeting, China and the organization's members signed a long-term, good-neighborly and friendly cooperation agreement that aims to enhance the members' cooperation in economic, trade and security matters.⁵⁶ And in cooperation with the ARF, Beijing hosted or helped finance and organize various symposia and workshops on counter-terrorism, addressing non-traditional security challenges, and prevention of weapons of mass destruction in China and in several Southeast Asia countries.⁵⁷ China also provided special assistance to Indonesia in dealing with the avian influenza epidemic disease in 2006 and in 2007 it announced that it would host a China-ASEAN symposium on prevention and control of human infection with pathological avian influenza. It also hosted several training courses on reconstruction and management of disaster-hit areas for ASEAN officials and experts.

The establishment of the East Asian Summit (EAS) in December 2005 is the culminating point of China's efforts to advance its NSC in the region. Malaysia initiated the convening of the EAS, but with China's support and active encouragement. The opportune timing of the summit bodes well for China's emergence as a regional power in East Asia. By virtue of its Pacific coast and vast economic and strategic interests, the U.S. has always regarded itself as part of East Asia. However, the EAS excludes Washington. The EAS also pursues the vision to develop an East Asian response to the dramatic

challenges in the post-Cold War era. Significantly, it aims to shape regional developments in ways that will best maintain economic dynamics, enhance regional security, and preserve peace and stability among the summit members *sans* the ultimate arbiter and guarantor of security in the region—the U.S.. Furthermore, the summit hopes to provide a confidence-building forum for the East Asian states, and a venue for substantive regional cooperation in dealing with non-traditional security challenges such as terrorism, piracy, and maritime and health security without any external powers (except perhaps Australia). The EAS incorporates the NSC's goals of smoothing China's relations with its immediate neighbors by fostering confidence-building measures and implementing a regional diplomacy that can eventually evolve a regional security environment without the U.S. Thus, it has been observed that the EAS is an “emblem of a quiet consolidation of Chinese influence in the region” at the expense of the U.S.⁵⁸

This became apparent during the 2007 EAS when China took the center stage at the summit meeting despite the presence of U.S. allies and friends in the event, i.e. Australia, Japan and to a certain degree, India.⁵⁹ Aside from signing a number of economic agreements with the ASEAN states, China indicated its support to ASEAN community building and integration. It also stated its intention to enhance cooperation with ASEAN in combating transnational crimes, maritime security, disaster reduction and relief, prevention and control of communicable diseases and environmental protection.⁶⁰ China also joined the ASEAN states and the other members of the EAS in signing a joint declaration on energy security that would assist in shaping a common regional policy for energy issues, including the development and use of alternative and renewable forms of energy.⁶¹ With the high cost of energy casting a dark shadow over the regional economy, the EAS was able to take the first tentative step toward the strengthening of regional cooperation on energy security that can hopefully ensure stable and affordable energy for the East Asian states. For their part, the ASEAN states gave Beijing their unqualified support for its efforts to reconvene the six-party talks with North Korea over its nuclear arms program that Manila agreed to host in February 2007. China's activism and the attention it got during the summit underscored its rising economic and political clout in East Asia. Possibly awed by China's support to the ASEAN during the summit, Philippine President Gloria

Macapagal Arroyo declared: “We also look to China to take the lead in promoting good neighborly relations and regional cooperation by handling sensitive issues with surrounding countries in a matter that is guided by the spirit of equality, respect, consultation, and mutual benefit.”⁶² The holding of the EAS and its accomplishments proved that East Asian countries can come out with an East Asian response to issues that affect them without the region’s primary security guarantor, the U.S.

Balking the Opponent’s Plans

Subtly, the PRC also neutralizes America’s strategic power and influence in Asia through cooperation. Faced with a more powerful state with abundant resources and high-tech and far more superior forward-deployed naval and air forces, China does not intend to form a countervailing capability. Instead, it attempts to formalize a cooperative substructure with the regional system to neutralize the more powerful traditional hegemon in East Asia—the U.S. A key element in this tactic is the establishment of friendly ties and cooperative relationship with all countries including the U.S. Although critical of U.S. hegemony, Beijing believes the world will be unipolar and that U.S. preponderance will persist for decades. It maintains that China cannot (and will not) challenge U.S. global domination and will accept its hegemonic power but not necessarily its behavior.⁶³ China did not exercise its veto power in the U.N. Security Council on the Iraq issue, in marked contrast with France and Russia. Clearly, the “fourth-generation” Chinese leadership is cautious in handling bilateral relationships with the U.S. American preoccupation with Iraq has not fundamentally altered the Chinese view of the U.S, as Chinese officials and analysts echo that Washington should not view China as a challenger to America. Thus, despite chronic tensions and misunderstanding in their bilateral relations, China has made it a point to keep its relations with the US stable and cordial through continuous high-level contacts, exchanges, and joint consultative committees.

President Hu Jintao visited Washington in 2006. Both countries reached a consensus on promoting China-US constructive cooperative relations in the 21st Century and acknowledged China and the U.S. as stakeholders and even constructive cooperators.⁶⁴ Beijing also made it a point to see to it that the First China-U.S. Strategic Economic Dialogue and the Third China-U.S.

Strategic Dialogue are successfully held and concluded. From October 2005 to July 2006, Chinese and American military officials have conducted exchange visits while in-depth exchanges through institutionalized defense consultations and maritime military consultations were held between the U.S. Armed Forces and the PLA.⁶⁵ China has also cooperated with the U.S. in the six-party framework of multilateral talks in working out a peaceful resolution to the North Korean nuclear arms program. From Beijing’s perspective, it is very crucial for China to work for the improvement and development of China-U.S. relations since at this point in time, it must foster a security environment conducive to its peaceful emergence and development.

Another means by which China neutralizes U.S. strategic preponderance in East Asia is multilateral consultation with the region’s smaller states. China was earlier averse to multilateral institutions fearing that regional groupings could be used by some countries to punish and constrain the PRC. During the second half of the ‘90s, Beijing was actively involved in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It quickly adjusted to ARF’s incremental style by using its soft power approach in containing inter-state disputes. In its dealings in the ARF, Beijing has emphasized the following norms:⁶⁶ 1) participation on an equal footing; 2) reaching unanimity through consensus; 3) seeking common ground while reserving differences; and 4) proceeding in an orderly and incremental manner. Consequently, China has been able to protect its own interest in ARF and to promote the continued acceptance of ASEAN norms as an underlying framework for co-operation in regional security affairs.⁶⁷ Similarly, it upgraded its participation in the regional forum in 1996 in response to its deteriorating relations in Northeast Asia with the U.S., as well as with ASEAN over the Mischief Reef Incident in 1995. As a result, Beijing prevented the ARF from being used as a means to balance and restrain China; boosted ASEAN’s leadership role in the regional forum by constraining the U.S. and Japan; and effectively projected the image of the PRC as a good neighbor.⁶⁸

To prove its point, Beijing has become extremely pragmatic in managing its territorial disputes with the ASEAN states over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Though the PRC still clings to its historic claims over these islands, it is willing to settle these territorial disputes through peaceful means, based on international law. In 2002, after four years of intensive negotiation,

ASEAN and China signed a declaration of conduct. The declaration expresses the intentions of both sides to demonstrate “restraint” in the South China Sea. Significantly, the final draft included most of the text proposed by ASEAN and little of what was offered by China.⁶⁹ In the aftermath of the second EAS summit, China expressed confidence that ASEAN and China would soon be able to agree on activities and projects envisioned by the 2002 Declaration on the South China Sea.⁷⁰ A clear indication of relaxation of tension in the South China is the holding of the Tripartite Joint Marine Seismic Survey in the South China Sea by three claimant states— China, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The survey involves a three-phase program of data-gathering, consolidation and interpretation of about 11,000 kilometers of 2D seismic data on the South China Sea. The initial phase ended in November 2005 and the second phase began in early 2007. The project is expected to be completed in June 2008. Accordingly, the joint seismic survey of the South China Sea serves as a model for cooperation in the region, and as a major move that could hopefully increase the momentum of trust and confidence among the claimant states.

During the EAS summit, China announced that it will host a China-ASEAN workshop on peace-keeping in the latter part of 2007, in order to promote defense cooperation and enhance mutual understanding and confidence among the armed services of China and the ASEAN states.⁷¹ The proposed China-ASEAN workshop on peace-keeping is considered the first of its kind between the two sides in the fields of defense cooperation and multilateral peace-keeping. It is seen as another important defense exchange program along with the China-ASEAN regional security seminar held in Beijing in 2003. At the same event, China also emphasized the growing importance of the People’s Liberation Army’s Navy’s (PLAN) ship visits on friendly calls in ASEAN ports as a means of fostering friendship and mutual political trust. Along with its numerous on-going security and military exchange programs with the ASEAN, this proposal can be seen as China’s gambit to marginalize and eventually exclude the U.S. from regional security affairs.⁷² This initiative, likewise marked a radical departure from Beijing’s position in the ‘90s, when it avoided any security dialogue with ASEAN member states, let alone with their armed services.⁷³ No doubt East Asian countries will consider these numerous security initiatives in the light of China’s growing economic and diplomatic clout. If ASEAN will

find these initiatives useful and benign, Beijing can gradually re-orient the ASEAN’s states attention and focus away from the United States. In the long-run, this can effectively erode America’s preponderant strategic influence in Southeast Asia since Washington is currently preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan.

Avoiding a Lengthy (and Expensive) Campaign

Beijing considers a strategic engagement with Washington as encouraging, and sees the need for managing the region with the U.S.⁷⁴ Undoubtedly, Chinese officials acknowledge Washington’s power and leadership in East Asian affairs. Beijing believes that recognizing American hegemonic position and unique status in the post-Cold War era will make Washington more accommodating of mainland Chinese interests in Taiwan. The PRC considers Taiwan as a province and always exerts military pressure on the island to prevent it from asserting its independence. Beijing has announced that it will use every possible means, including force, to preserve its national territorial integrity. While China wants to avoid any conflict with U.S. over Taiwan, this does not mean that it would not use force over the island. Beijing regards the eventual unification of China and Taiwan as essential to the mainland’s recovery from a century of national weakness, vulnerability, and humiliation, and to its emergence as a respected great power in East Asia.⁷⁵

The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996 brought to the fore the urgency of China’s military modernization program. In March 1996, China tested missiles over Taiwan to intimidate the votes of the island republic during a crucial presidential election into voting jurist a pro-independence candidate. Washington then deployed two carrier battle groups near the Taiwan Strait. This move forced China to back off from its provocative missile-firing exercise around the island. Despite Beijing’s hope for a stable external environment, Taiwan remains a potentially volatile issue. The core issues of China’s sovereignty and national honor, combined with the PLA’s mandate as the sole protector of the country’s patrimony, create an explosive mix that has made military modernization one of the primary concerns of the current political leadership.⁷⁶

The PLA’s current arms modernization is focused on a very specific objective—to develop its military capabilities solely to thwart Taiwanese

pro-independence efforts and any probable U.S. intervention in a cross-strait crisis.⁷⁷ In the latter part of the 1990s, Beijing decided to postpone indefinitely plans to buy an aircraft carrier. Instead, it acquired four Russian made Kilo-class submarines and two *Sovremenny*-class destroyers and this implied that its current goal is far more limited—the development of what is called “an assassin’s mace” or a “trump card” against Taiwan and possibly against the U.S. Navy.⁷⁸ These vessels could only operate near the Chinese coast, giving the PLA the capability to “fight and win short-duration, high intensity conflicts along its periphery.”⁷⁹ Moreover, these naval acquisitions—the purchase of two *Soveremenny*-class destroyers and four Kilo-Class submarines—hardly alter the strategic situation in Southeast Asia as these ships have limited range and are vulnerable to aerial attack. China’s new assets, at most, could complicate U.S. naval planning in any cross-strait crisis. But the U.S. Navy could jump on the PLA’s incipient C⁴, which is the most vital element of modern military effectiveness. Furthermore, these few Chinese destroyers and submarines will have to face the U.S. 7th Fleet’s two fleet carriers, Los Angeles Class attack submarines, and Aegis destroyers and cruisers. The PLAN’s incipient brown-water fleet will be pitted against U.S. air and naval forces that are being increased and modernized, and are currently backed by forward-based strategic bombers, and attack or cruise missile submarines on the islands of Guam and Diego Garcia.⁸⁰ The goal of the Chinese modernization program, however, is not to confront the vastly superior U.S. Navy. According to former Taiwanese Deputy Defense Minister Lin Chong-Pin, the aim is to “throw a monkey wrench into the decision-making process in Washington, to make the Americans think twice before intervening in Taiwan...”⁸¹ Beijing made sure that the PLA’s modernization would involve modest improvements in long-range cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and submarine capability. This hopefully could slow down U.S. response to a sudden political *fait accompli* presented to Taiwan, and is not meant for power projection.

Current Chinese arms modernization is focused on two major goals—drastic reduction of the PLA by one million personnel; and informatization of its main combat formations in an effort to build a lean, combined, agile and multi-functional military force.⁸² In pursuing these objectives, the PLA has reduced the number of headquarter and support units, regional

command posts, and military area commands. Limited resources now are being diverted to the creation of additional aviations units, command and control, maritime-information systems, information counter-measure units and acquisition of new generation weapons and equipment. These moves are directed at developing a PLA that is capable of conducting operations under conditions of informatization, and with an overall capability of conducting joint and integrated maritime operations in coastal waters.⁸³ As such the PLA has acquired or is in the process of acquiring a number of new high-tech weapons systems, including fourth-generation fighter aircraft, large surface combatants, new nuclear and diesel electronic submarines, precision-guided munitions, airborne early warning aircraft, air-to-air refueling aircraft, etc.⁸⁴ The Chinese military has also put considerable emphasis on modernizing its C4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Assets) by launching new satellites, developing an amalgam of electronic warfare devices, and offensive information warfare computer networks to attack the enemy’s C4SIR.

It has been observed, however, that despite the ongoing modernization there is little evidence that the Chinese military is engaged in a total overhaul of its organizational or institutional structures since the bulk of the PLA is still traditional infantry units and the its highly hierarchical and top-down structures have remained untouched. It has been noted that China’s current build-up is evolutionary, steady-state, and sustaining—rather than disruptive or revolutionary—innovative change.⁸⁵ This is because the current modernization is primarily aimed at achieving a policy of “asymmetric development strategy.”⁸⁶ Accordingly, this strategy aims to enable the PRC to build an informatized armed forces that is capable of winning moderns conflicts by the mid-21st Century or within a long-term five-decade period. In the next two decades, it will be in China’s interest to secure and maintain a favorable peaceful and stable international environment as it slowly expands its strategic capabilities and modernizes its armed forces.

Any Chinese effort to show its long-term military and strategic intentions might cause its neighboring countries to devote more resources to developing their defensive capabilities, especially to secure the sea-lanes of communication (SLOC), and may lead to a regional arms race that could undermine China’s economic growth and long-term strategic goals. So in

the near future, Beijing will probably abstain from developing a power projection force since an inherent buildup of offensive potential can trigger an increase in defense spending by Taiwan and Southeast Asian states as well as additional naval deployment by the U.S. Navy.

21st Century Statecraft cum Charm Offensive?

British scholar Christopher Hill explains that the application of soft power tends to be a slow-acting, opinion-shaping instrument that can still be a form of coercion, albeit barely understood by the target.⁸⁷ Accordingly, soft power seeks primarily to change the targeted state or the state's environment as it acts as "hidden-persuaders" and agenda setters.⁸⁸ This phenomenon is illustrated by the way China has been accepted and has gained prominence in Southeast Asia. Through its rapidly growing economic links and adroit diplomacy, Beijing was able to erase the perception among Southeast Asian states that China was a regional security threat and was bent on building up its military capability. With the end of the Cold War, China was seen by most Southeast Asian states as a great power and just like any great power, it would ultimately establish hegemonic control over its environment.⁸⁹ Faced with this prospect, these states hoped that they could "socialize" China into becoming a responsible and cooperative regional actor through multilateralism.⁹⁰

Since the mid-1990s, however, China has simply focused on the economic dimension of its emergence. This has tremendously improved its diplomatic status. Eventually, Southeast Asian states have become receptive to its economic/diplomatic presence in their midst. China began its soft-power statecraft in Southeast Asia during the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. The crisis provided an opportunity for China to demonstrate its political and economic value to the ASEAN states as a partner, and even as a regional leader.⁹¹ Taking advantage of the ASEAN disappointment with the American and Japanese response to the crisis, China financially assisted the stricken Southeast Asian states and promised not to devalue the renminbi to avoid another round of competitive devaluation of the region's currencies. To the ASEAN political elite, this gesture created an image of a China acting responsively and relatively eager to help. This positive development translated into a powerful political advantage that made Beijing less feared under dire

circumstances and rendered its influence in the region more acceptable. Since then China has employed its array of soft-power strategies to boost its image in the region. Observing the general pattern of China's statecraft, a prominent American scholar avers:

Burgeoning trade and growing Asian investment in China are the most concrete manifestations of greater Chinese prominence in Asia. China has become the largest trading partner of many Asian neighbors, and Chinese trade expands at almost twice the rate of China's fast-growing economy...Chinese wealth and economic importance support popular exchanges in tourism and education. Attentive Chinese diplomacy involves an often dizzying array of leadership meetings and agreements with Asian neighbors and increasing adroit Chinese interchange with the growing number of Asian regional organizations. As a result, China's positive image has grown, particularly in South Korea, much of Southeast Asia, and Australia.⁹²

As China reaches out with its soft power, Southeast Asian states have reciprocated and have recast their views of Beijing. Most, if not all, of them consider China as a good neighbor, a constructive partner, and a responsive status quo power bent on effecting a peaceful emergence in the region. It should be noted that in the past, these states entertained the prospect of China becoming a domineering naval military power that could threaten these states' maritime interests. Now, the same Southeast Asian states are taking China's views and sensitivities into account. And this, of course, has occurred at the expense of the U.S. and to a certain degree, Japan. In sharp contrast, the U.S. appears a unilateralist and interventionist non-Asian power asserting its military preponderance and pushing a totally different agenda that is not in sync with Asian values and interests. China, in turn, depicts itself as an emerging and responsible power that supports a multipolar and democratic order where states don't interfere in each other's affairs.

Through its soft power statecraft, China stresses mutuality of interests, the idea of democracy in the international order, and the peaceful resolution of international conflicts while significantly downplaying any desire to dominate Southeast Asia⁹³ that image of a non-threatening and benign state was made apparent during the First China-ASEAN workshop on regional security held in mid-July 2006 at Beijing. More than 30 senior defense officials from the PLA and Southeast Asian states met at the Chinese

capital and discussed issues of mutual concern, e.g. regional security, East Asian maritime cooperation, counter-terrorism exercises, and peacekeeping.⁹⁴

The successful projection of China's benign presence in the region could be attributed to the fact that it has resorted to soft-power diplomatic gambit. This statecraft does not undermine the ASEAN approach to security matters that is premised on non-interference, building consensus through consultation, and non-use of force or threat of force to settle international disputes.⁹⁵ China's NSC clearly promotes ASEAN efforts to formulate a set of ideas and rules of acceptable conduct, rather than an arms build-up or alliances, as the principal means of deterring aggressive behavior while preserving regional equilibrium and preventing a concert of power.⁹⁶ Furthermore, the NSC buttresses these states' attempts to develop an East Asian norm that may constrain the use of force in intra-regional conflicts. Clearly, China has advocated an international order and an attendant new security concept build on the norms also espoused by ASEAN.⁹⁷

In its regional dealings, Chinese leaders adhere to the doctrine of "win-win relations." Accordingly, China will not make demands on other nations' sovereignty, economic models, governance, and political culture. The bottom line is that these smaller Southeast Asian states can benefit from their relations with China even as China benefits from its relations with them. This policy direction, in a way, enhances a number of Southeast Asian states' core security values such as political survival, economic security, socio-cultural autonomy, and general reluctance to the use or threat of force to foster economic growth, and safeguard prosperity.⁹⁸

China's soft-power statecraft, in turn, could render American strategic preponderance and initiative anachronistic. This is because the country's foreign policy gambit of peaceful emergence improves its long-term security by enhancing its image as a responsive regional power. Moreover, this prudent diplomatic gambit constrains U.S. naval superiority and ability to use force in any East Asian security crisis involving China. Expressing his apprehension on the long-term implication of China's soft power statecraft in Southeast Asia, an American analyst foresees:

China may want to shift influence away from the United States to create its own sphere of influence, a kind of Chinese Monroe Doctrine for Southeast Asia. In this sphere, countries would subordinate their interest to

China's, and would think twice about supporting the United States should there be a conflict in the region.⁹⁹

Conclusion

To contend with U.S. strategic preponderance in Southeast Asia, China applies a sophisticated combination of moderate hard power (or Sun Tzu's tactic of direct approach) on Taiwan and the U.S. and soft power (or Sun Tzu's tactic of flanking or indirect approach) on the Southeast Asian states. The first approach constitutes the military build-up across the Taiwan Strait. This is primarily to sidetrack American attention and efforts. On the other hand, Beijing's policy of peaceful emergence involves the application of soft power against the Southeast Asian states. This is to reassure Southeast Asian states of China's long-term intention, and to isolate Washington in the region. China has succeeded in prompting many of these states frustrated by Washington's myopic focus on the war on terror and on Iraq to readjust their relations with Beijing. China's application of its soft-power statecraft in Southeast Asia has placed it at the center of almost all regional issues. Its growing clout in the economic and technological networks of production and supply chains cuts across all Southeast Asian economies and serves as a stabilizing factor in the regional political economy. It is worth noting that in a not-so-distant past, China has been seen a possible domineering hegemon and a viable military threat to all the Southeast Asian states. Now, all these countries see China as a good neighbor, a constructive partner, and a status quo power that will not rock the boat.

Though the U.S. remains the region's most powerful military actor, its power and influence are being gradually eroded by China's soft power diplomacy. Unless Washington develops a grand national strategy (not just a military strategy) to deal with the China challenge, America's overwhelming naval superiority in Southeast Asia will be rendered useless and outflanked by Beijing's soft power diplomatic gambit. The first step towards this direction is to revisit, reflect, and appreciate Sun Tzu's advice that "...just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there is no constant condition...He who can modify his tactic in relations to his opponent, and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain."¹⁰⁰

Notes

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China and ASEAN in Non-Traditional Security Cooperation

CAI PENGHONG

The paper touches on new developments in political and security relations between China and East Asia, particularly Southeast Asia, with respect to their cooperation, respective roles in and prospects for 'non-traditional security' issues. Non-traditional security is a term still in debate, but the ASEAN-China joint declaration has adopted the concept, generally defining it under the rubric of state sovereignty. This paper reviews the development of bilateral relations in the area of traditional security but it will emphasize the non-traditional security area, particularly in light of China signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. This paper reviews Chinese perspectives in the debates on non-traditional security. It is divided into these main sections: (1) a brief retrospect of bilateral security relations between China and ASEAN; (2) a conceptual discussion of non-traditional security and the impact of this new field cooperation on China's relations with its East Asian neighbors including the Southeast Asian countries; (3) an evaluation of cooperation on non-traditional issues for East Asian Security Community, with stress on energy security. The paper also looks at some issues in debates on the leadership of an East Asian community and the role of the US. The author supports the view that ASEAN should play a leading role, while bringing in an external actor like the US is somewhat complicated. What is sure is that the US should not be excluded from an East Asian community, nor regarded as an actor to be aimed at.

Introduction

AS WE ENTER the new century, the international trend is of peace, development and cooperation; nevertheless the cause of peace is still facing serious challenges. Traditional security issues have been threatening global peace and stability. Meanwhile, non-traditional security threats such as terrorism and natural disasters, Severe Acute respiratory Syndrome (SARs) and Indian Ocean tsunami, have emerged as new security challenges to our human community. Obviously, how to deal with the non-traditional security threats is a critical issue confronting East Asia as well as the whole world.

This paper will focus on the new development of political and security relations between China and ASEAN, especially with respect to their cooperation, roles and prospects in addressing 'non-traditional security' issues. Non-traditional security is a term still debated within China as well as in international academic circles, but in 2002 ASEAN and China adopted the concept in their Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Field on Non-Traditional Security Issues, generally defining it under state sovereignty¹. This paper will review the development of bilateral relations in the route of traditional security, but its emphasis is on non-traditional security. This paper has been divided into these sections: (1) a conceptual discussion of non-traditional security in China; (2) a brief retrospect of bilateral relations and the impact of the new cooperation in the field of nontraditional security; (3) an evaluation of the prospects of Sino-ASEAN cooperation in non-traditional security; and (4) a brief conclusion.

Chinese Perspectives of "Non-traditional Security"

Since the end of the Cold War, Chinese policy makers and academics have reviewed and discussed the concept of security, coincident with a worldwide lively debate over the meaning of security². The discussion and review have generated a range of academic perceptions in China on non-traditional security - from the state-centric view to a blend of the state-centric and neo-liberalist security concerns including not only the protection of the foundations of the state against external threats, but also other types of security values and other types of threats. In policy circles, however, there is still some ambiguity.

It seems that Chinese security studies have traditionally focused on external threats to state security and internal instability. As a revolutionary regime emerged in 1949, China's government made every effort to consolidate state power during its initial years. For those revolutionary leaders like Mao Zedong and others, what made sense in security were those military threats against the new state from external sources, mainly from the US-led Western bloc at first and then from the former Soviet Union (USSR)³. Domestically, factors contributing to instability, including the KMT remnant regime in Taiwan and purported revisionists inside the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were regarded as the main threats to the viability of the new government. Like the realist approach, those views emphasized that a nation's security entails ensuring the survival of a nation state from an external aggressor. This state-centric paradigm dominated the agendas of security policy study in both academic and policy-making circles for more than 30 years.

Immediately after the end of the devastating Cultural Revolution (1966-76), Deng Xiaoping re-emerged and China embarked on economic reform. In terms of Deng's new thinking in the early 1980s, neither a new world war nor mass military aggression directed against China would be likely in the foreseeable future. It is obvious that Deng Xiaoping did not accept Mao's policy assessment that a global war was drawing near. This indicated that traditional security threats to the state would be less stressed than before, against the backdrop of rapid economic growth. With the end of the Cold War, East Asian countries have all been shifting to a new wave of economic development. The phenomenon of the absence of a new big war among big powers further supported Deng's argument that economic development was irrefutable and had developed an irreversible momentum.

Chinese research on the conceptual debates on security can be separated into three stages as follows.

The first stage started from the end of the Cold War to the year of 1997. Although some arguments of the Club of Rome group⁴ had been introduced into China in the early 1980s, some non-military issues expressed as "world problematique" such as poverty, environmental degradation, uncontrolled urban spread, insecurity of employment, alienation of youth, rejection of traditional values, and inflation and other monetary and economic disruptions, had not drawn Chinese attention until the early 1990s, when the

former USSR imploded and the Cold War ended. With the end of the bipolar international pattern, President Jiang Zemin raised some concerns on non-traditional security issues such as conflicts among ethnic groups and religion, economic competition and North-South gaps. Ever since non-traditional security issues have been clearly stressed in Chinese government and academic circles. Policy analysts started reconsidering the meaning of security and suggested some new ideas, such as comprehensive security and common security with respect to common interests of all nations, and social progress. The scope of the new concept extended from traditional security to economics, science and technology, environment, culture and many other areas, all these which now have been called non-traditional security issues. The embodiment of this new thinking was the New Security Concept as an initiative forwarded by China in 1996 and embedded into the document “*Sino-Russian Joint Statement On the multipolarisation of the world and the establishment of a new international order*” signed on 23 April 1997.

The second stage was from 1997 to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, during which non-traditional security issues had increasingly become the source of growing concern in China as well as the world. The financial crises in 1997 which occurred in Southeast Asia, the 1998 Russian financial storm and the 2001 problems in Argentina’s economy alerted the Chinese to pay attention to financial issues. These issues are all attributed to the economic security and financial security⁶. Meanwhile, China’s New Security Concept was being implemented through diplomatic activities. The establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 and its further development may be regarded as building a new institution dealing with non-traditional as well as traditional security issues.

The third stage commenced with the September 11 attacks and continues on to the present. China has made it clear that its non-traditional security concerns include terrorism, illicit drugs, HIV/AIDS, piracy, illegal migration, environmental security, economic security, information security and others⁷. The most significant viewpoint is that that “the elements of traditional and non-traditional threats to security are intertwined,” in which the term “non-traditional threats” first appeared in a top official document, a report delivered by Jiang Zemin at the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on 8 November 2002⁸. Since then, China has jointly held

conferences with ASEAN and other international organizations on poverty reduction, combating Avian Influenza and SARs, and non-traditional security issues have obviously been emphasized in China.

It is clear that international scholars have influenced Chinese study on non-traditional security. A significant impact on Chinese academics came out of the theory of International Political Economy (IPE), particularly with the publication of “*The Political Economy of International Relations*” by American scholar Robert Gilpin⁹, which had its Chinese translation published in 1988. IPE theory widened the Chinese perspectives of the security research even though Gilpin’s book did not refer to the term non-traditional security. Gilpin’s explanations of international trade, international finance, activities of transnational companies, dependence and development became and his exploration of the international economic order were the classic statement of the new field and the theoretical foundations for the intellectual development of Chinese international politics. The discourses forwarded by Robert Gilpin on the issue of the North-South gap and his argument that poverty and underdeveloped countries would deeply affect the future of the world and human beings¹⁰ have also been reflected in Chinese studies of non-traditional security.

Besides, this Neo-liberalist theory and its complex interdependence approach have drawn the attention of Chinese academics. Some Chinese scholars advocated neo-liberalism and shifted their security concerns to new phenomena including economic and social issues, somewhat departing from traditional thinking. The influence of Liberal views is gaining ground, particularly with the SARs incident in 2003. Today’s security concerns cover almost all those ideas that the liberals espouse, including individual and community (public) health, sustainable economic development, environmental protection, human security and even individuals’ spiritual growth and human rights¹¹.

The Environmental degradation and resource decline, therefore, have become increasingly central to academic debates and governmental development agendas. The attention paid in China on international politics of environment or ecological politics has been going on for less than a decade only¹². These days the Chinese government emphasizes the “scientific development concept”, indicating that environmental issues and resource

scarcity have been linked to non-traditional security and could have an adverse effect on national grand strategy. Decision makers stress the need to balance the development of man and nature, which shows that harmonious development among human and natural relations has been raised as a key issue in national planning and strategy¹³. In addressing the issues of the relations between non-traditional security and environment, the questions about politics and environment raised by Lorraine Elliott are still awaiting responses from Chinese academic and policy circles: who or what is made secure; what core values are threatened; what are the types of threats and the nature of the problem, how should insecurity be managed and how should security be attained¹⁴.

To put it simply, non-traditional security is a concept related to but different from that of traditionally high politics such as military fighting and safeguarding of sovereignty. Non-traditional security issues include trafficking in illegal drugs, people-smuggling (including trafficking in women and children), sea piracy, terrorism, arms-smuggling, money-laundering, international economic crime and cyber crime, which have all become important factors of uncertainty affecting regional and international security and are posing new challenges to regional and international peace and stability. Non-traditional security threats are related to human security, which not only depends on governments safeguarding people against natural and societal threats, but on the participation and mandate of the people as well. With that additional meaning, the concept of non-traditional security should be built on the definition of “putting people first”, which is to develop a civil society based on democracy. In the process of building an East Asia Security Community, non-traditional security issues should not be treated separately from those of traditional security. The cooperation between China and ASEAN non-traditional security is a good start for building a new style of security community.

China And ASEAN Cooperation in Non-traditional Security

China has had a long history of good relations with the nations of Southeast Asia. After the 1949 Revolution, there appeared to be almost no connection among China and the archipelagic nations of Southeast Asia because of the Cold War. Beginning with the first half of the 1970s,

China has gradually normalized relations with ASEAN countries based on a common political strategy against then Soviet expansionism. By the year 1991, China had restored its diplomatic relations with all individual ASEAN nations and then Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen attended the opening session of the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur laying the foundation for further developing cooperation with ASEAN. Although some legacy from history or the Cold War could not fade away overnight, the new events as mentioned spurred China into further reconsidering the traditional security concept from preparing to fight a global war to keep focusing on economic development and trying to be a responsible stakeholder in building a peaceful world. ASEAN members have also adjusted themselves to a new international situation, attaching importance to internal economic construction to make up for what they had lost in the period of the Cold War.

This policy adjustment by China contributed to the establishment of good-neighborly relations. Obviously, the opening of the dialogue process between China and ASEAN turned a new page in relations between the two sides mutual misgivings were gradually removed and mutual trust in politics grew. China became the first ASEAN dialogue partner to join the *Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia* and to establish a strategic partnership for peace and prosperity with ASEAN. Moreover, the 1997 financial crisis pushed China and ASEAN closer together, contributing to their cooperation in non-traditional security.

As a matter of fact, there are several other non-traditional security issues aside from financial turmoil, especially if security is not defined narrowly within a state-centric concept. In Southeast Asia, we have several trans-boundary non-traditional security issues to deal with. The environmental security issue such as haze pollution erupted in 1996-7 and again in 2006, producing negative effects on sustainable development and human health across borders, and leading to the new terms “environmental insecurity”¹⁵. Transnational organized crimes, such as piracy have also been threatening the trade and sea lanes’ security along Malacca Straits and other areas. Moreover, resource disputed issues exist, including over waters and fishery grounds. For instance, there has been a dispute over water between Malaysia and Singapore, fishery dispute between Myanmar and Thailand, as well as

between Vietnam and China, and an oil issue between China and some ASEAN nations. To work out an appropriate approach in solving the issues will benefit both the individual countries and the whole region.

Terrorism, another serious issue, looms large although the concept and definition are still being debated. If one defines non-traditional security issues as issues transcending national borders in terms of its effects, and where the solution requires regional as well as international cooperation, then the terrorist issue is a significant non-traditional security challenge in Asia, seriously affecting civil society and economic development.

Separatism could be viewed not only as an issue of non-traditional security but traditional security as well. If it worsens to the extent that a separatist movement becomes an internal threat to the present authority, with a possibility of overthrowing the legal government, then it is a traditional security issue. When it becomes a factor that may cause social instability, this separatist movement could be regarded as a non-traditional security threat because it causes anxiety and panic in society, especially when there are perceived association or some secret connections with international terrorist groups. Some ASEAN member nations and China are now confronting such threats.

These non-traditional security issues have spillover effects from one country to the next. The Indian Ocean tsunami also is obviously not a matter for a single country. Thus those transnational non-traditional security issues require China and the ASEAN nations to cooperate to find solutions. Within the last four or five years, China and ASEAN have experienced cooperation in non-traditional security and yielded productive results.

First, both sides have jointly fought against the threats in the economic and financial fields. To overcome the negative result of the 1997 financial crisis and address economic security issues, China and some ASEAN nations took cooperative action in setting up the Chiang Mai Initiative, which has become a collective decision-making mechanism. At the fifth leaders' summit in Brunei in 2001, former Premier Zhu Rongji agreed to establish a free-trade area with ASEAN within a decade to erase any doubts and misgivings some ASEAN nations had over Chinese WTO access. After signing the *Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Between ASEAN and the People's Republic of China* in 2002 and a

special period of preparation, China and ASEAN started the formal process for establishing the FTA in 2005. It seems that regional cooperation on non-traditional security was initiated in the economic field.

Second, both sides jointly combat transnational organized crime. Starting from 2001, China with some ASEAN nations including Burma, Laos and Thailand intensified cross-border cooperation to raid heroin production. **The major document *Joint Declaration Of ASEAN And China On Cooperation In The Field Of NON-Traditional Security Issues***¹⁶ signed by heads of China and ASEAN nations at the 6th ASEAN-China Summit in Phnom Penh, 4 November 2002, was a milestone in the advancement of China-ASEAN cooperation. The leaders agreed that transnational crimes such as trafficking in illegal drugs, people-smuggling including trafficking in women and children, sea piracy, terrorism, arms-smuggling, money-laundering, international economic crime and cyber crime are all non-traditional security issues which have become important factors of uncertainty affecting regional and international security and pose new challenges to regional and international peace and stability. In April 2003, leaders of China and ASEAN held a special meeting in Bangkok, Thailand, on SARS and issued a joint declaration. In January 2004, the two sides signed the Memorandum of Understanding Between China and ASEAN on Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security Fields. China initiated and participated in the first ministerial meeting between ASEAN and China, Japan and the Republic of Korea on combating transnational crimes, held in Bangkok, in January 2004, and submitted a concept paper. The meeting agreed to set up a cooperation mechanism between the 13 countries, and adopted the first Joint Communiqué of the ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting on Combating Transnational Crimes¹⁷.

Third, both sides undertook joint cooperation in maritime public security. To rescue wrecked boats and combat pirates, the Chinese and Vietnamese navies were involved in joint search-and-rescue missions in 2001¹⁸ and conducted joint patrol of the Bac Bo (Tonkin) Gulf in 2006¹⁹. In 2004, Beijing and Manila conducted a Search and Rescue simulation exercise, which was conducted by the Philippine Coast Guard and its counterpart, the Chinese Maritime Safety Administration at the Philippine Coast Guard Headquarters in Manila²⁰. A seminar on maritime public security and law enforcement

was held in Dalian, China at the end of August 2006, and both China and ASEAN would establish a cooperation regime to jointly combat maritime transnational crimes for the purpose of maintaining regional maritime security and stability.²¹ China also hopes the joint measures will promote bilateral relations to a higher level and continue to a stable region ahead. To further enhance cooperation in fighting transnational organized crimes, the Chinese police and the ASEAN nations' police are jointly making a mid-and-long term plan to meet the new situation in the new century.

Prospects and Scenarios

With such cooperation and the improvement of relations with each other, China and ASEAN have now formed an encouraging pattern of mutual respect and trust in the area of security cooperation for non-traditional security. What are the next steps for further developing both sides' cooperation in non-traditional security?

As mentioned earlier, non-traditional security has still been regarded as under governmental jurisdiction. Given that both China and ASEAN agreed to broaden and deepen the cooperation in the field of security for East Asia Community²², China and ASEAN should sort things out within their respective governments themselves and then get together at the table to discuss how to implement short and medium- term plans. Recently, China proposed to deepen military ties at a summit marking the 15th anniversary of dialogue between China and ASEAN²³. This proposal is based on common security, and its contents basically cover non-traditional security issues such as energy security in the South China Sea, maritime security, search-and-rescue operations and disaster relief, as well as maintaining regional security and stability, and establishing a nuclear weapons-free zone in Southeast Asia. It is obvious that they are consistent with basic principle in the *Plan of Action*²⁴. It seems that the next four or five years will provide good opportunities for both sides to consider taking up concrete actions to implement their *Plan of Action* for common security, as an essential step towards a East Asia Security Community. The *Plan of Action* is an important process in shaping outcomes from informal security dialogues to more institutionalized regional security cooperation. Recognizing the basic principles of common security, fostering the identity of an East Asian region and

institutionalizing security cooperation, all are steps in the process of eliminating security dilemmas.

The non-traditional security challenges listed in the 2001 East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) Report are mainly of piracy, drug trafficking, human trafficking, illegal migration, smuggling of small arms, money laundering, cyber crime, international terrorism and other issues affecting human security. In 2002, the East Asia Study Group (EASG) not only recognized the task of combating non-traditional security threats but proposed 26 measures including institutional building, as a short term measure to fulfill the task²⁵. There were also some additional measures and activities agreed upon under the 2004 *Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues* and the *ASEAN-China Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues*. Some of them have been conducted and some remain untouched. Given the current situation, urgent demand and realistic feasibility, three contextual issues were found by some to be particularly important in influencing non-traditional security-related issues in East Asia: the war on terrorism, maritime security and energy security. Personally, enhancing energy co-operation, in particular, could ensure the other two issues to be covered and therefore the most urgent is how to maintain energy security for national and regional development.

Energy Security as a concept has acquired a rising importance in non-traditional security in East Asia since the end of the 1990s. It can be understood as the continuous availability of energy in varied forms, in sufficient quantities, and at reasonable prices²⁶. Energy security threats can be analyzed in several ways.

First, an emergent, temporary or longer disruption of energy supplies would cause disastrous damage to a nation and even the region as well as to the global economy. In East Asia, the concept can also be explained as the availability of local and imported resources due to the growing demand for energy associated with development. For instance, China's economic development entails rapid growth of energy consumption at a rate of more than 10% annually, with 48% dependence on oil imports in 2004²⁷. Oil trade and supply is also significant for other East Asian nations and therefore this is closely related with the issue trade security in the region.

Second, energy security is a potential environmental issue. Maintaining environmentally-sustainable energy consumption has been emphasized because of adverse influences on human health and normal living standards. Therefore, the potential environmental impact of production or transportation of such resources should be considered.

Third, we should keep in mind that secure transportation in the seas benefits regional stability as well as individual country's economic security. Maritime security, therefore, is related with this issue and if one likes, this kind of security can be broadened to more topics.

Fourth, among the issues affecting security are potential terrorist activities against refineries, pipelines, and others. Sea lane security issue has strengthened interest in this topic, especially against the context of global excessive dependence on major oil exporters.

Fifth, energy security could contribute to deeper reforms undertaken not only in the "Asian dragons" but in new comers of ASEAN like Vietnam and Laos. The reforms in ASEAN countries have been structurally conducted and updated particularly since the 1997 financial crisis. In terms of Ethier's approach²⁸, China is attributed to a sort of communist countries and the third world with efforts for fundamental reform. All these reforms, presumably with some special exception, have been carried out against the backdrop of East Asia cooperation. The reforms do have concrete impact not only on trade in commodities but also on social and political security. In the process of domestic reform, growing consciousness of the need to take energy-saving measures and to build an energy-saving society has begun to be reflected in important state policies.

With the above-mentioned, it is but natural as well as comfortable for East Asian countries to consider energy security as first priority in the upcoming ASEAN Plus Three and relevant meetings. The January 2007 Cebu conference will surely provide a greatly needed political impetus for ASEAN, China, Korea, and Japan to formulate common energy security strategies in response to the short term measures' indicated in the 2002 East Asia Study Group report.

Conclusion and Issues

Since the end of the Cold War, non-traditional security issues challenge China and ASEAN nations as well as world. With the possibility of world war reduced and the process of economic globalization speeding up, governments have designed economic plans towards becoming well-developed societies. These are people-based strategies that require a peaceful environment to be achieved.

To have secure and stable environments for economic development, China and ASEAN have joined together to address non-traditional security issues. This cooperation has been mainly conducted in the fields of illicit drugs, HIV/AIDS, piracy, illegal migration, environmental security, economic security, information security and others. As counter-terrorism has been regarded as a special global war, this combat has actually become part of traditional high politics.

Undoubtedly, non-traditional security and traditional security are inextricably linked. Traditional security is strictly to deal with the affairs among states, in the relationship of sovereign countries. The Non-traditional security is an extension of traditional security but not superior to traditional security. The non-traditional security copes not only with inter-country relations but with relations within a country or sovereignty nation as well. Either China or any Asian country should accommodate the interests of others while safeguarding their country's own interests, but common interests and a common vision have laid the foundation for both sides to pursue a new and specific field of cooperation.

At least two major issues remain for us to address — the leadership issue in the process of East Asia community, particularly the United States.

That ASEAN should play a leading role has been a policy which has been supported by China as well as others. This is not only due to the fact that ASEAN is the only regional institution, but also the one that promotes new innovative ideas, such as the concept of an ASEAN Community. The strength of ASEAN lies in reaching consensus in decision-making and the voluntary involvement of member-states. With that in mind, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) could be considered as evolving into a form of East Asia Security Community, possibly to be named as East Asian Security

Cooperation Organization-EASCO. This is not a military bloc like NATO with an exclusivist nature but a regional security cooperation to deal with traditional and non-traditional security issues at various levels among East Asian member countries.

An East Asia Security Community should be inclusive but the membership should be limited. Historically, the US has had its interests and military presence in East Asia. East Asia Security Community, therefore, should have some relationship with the US. An EASC could be an independent mechanism for the US but it will be inappropriate to exclude the US. In this sense, the US is not a natural or geographical member of the EAC but should have some special status.

China's has shifted its security policy emphasis to building a harmonious society and a harmonious Asia. China tries to make contributions to the wellbeing of the world, pledging to play a responsible role in its neighboring region as well as globally. From this angle, we can see that China would play an active role in the formation of an East Asia Security Council (EASC) as well as an East Asian Community (EAC). This is a constructive role in regional cooperation.

(written in November 2006)

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East Asia Community Building: Ideas, Prospects, and Opportunities for Traditional Security Cooperation

NOEL M. MORADA

East Asia Community building is still in its early stages of evolution. The EAC idea is supposed to complement many of the existing multilateral frameworks, regionalisms, and community building approaches in this part of the world. There are several areas of cooperation for EAC countries to pursue and build upon these existing frameworks, including cooperation in traditional security.

This paper examines some ideas, prospects, and opportunities for EAC cooperation in traditional security. The main argument of the paper is that the prospects for cooperation in traditional security may be good if, and only if, the ASEAN-based norms and principles, mechanisms, and frameworks of cooperation in this area remain at the core of building the EAC. However, a major challenge for EAC cooperation in traditional security is for countries in Northeast Asia to overcome their historical baggage. This necessitates a rethinking of existing regional order and re-shaping it in accordance with the changing contexts, strategic interests, and capabilities of major powers in the region.

East Asia Community Building: An Overview¹

SEVERAL frameworks for regionalism and community building in East Asia are already in place to deal with traditional and non-traditional issues in the region. These include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the ASEAN Community, and the East Asian Community.

The ASEAN Regional Forum

Since the end of the Cold War, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been at the forefront of constructing and promoting a regional order that is based on its norms, principles, and diplomatic strategies in dealing with peace and security issues beyond Southeast Asia with the formation in 1994 of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Much of the impetus for setting up the ARF was due to the “uncertainties” of the post-Cold War environment in the region that came in the aftermath of the closure of the American bases in the Philippines in 1992, the collapse of the former Soviet Union and its withdrawal from Vietnam, and the perceived growing military capabilities of China. To some extent, the creation of the ARF also opened opportunities for Northeast Asian countries to engage in security dialogue given that there is no counterpart of ASEAN in that region. Primarily, the ARF served not only as a vehicle for developing confidence building measures but also as a forum where participating countries could discuss their “hopes and fears.”

Until the tragic event of September 11, 2001, much of the preoccupation of the ARF as a regional security forum was on: 1) norms and principles that should guide relations of states in the region; 2) confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy; and 3) residual traditional security issues involving territorial disputes among participating states (e.g., South China Sea), internal conflicts (e.g., East Timor and Myanmar), non-proliferation issues (e.g., Korean peninsula), and major power rivalries. Discussions on these issues were carried out by participating states (which increased to 26 in July 2006 with the inclusion of Bangladesh) through the mechanism of inter-sessional support group (ISG) and inter-sessional meetings (ISM).

After September 11, 2001, transnational security issues, particularly those that are linked to terrorism, became a priority security concern for the ARF. For example, the ARF ministers issued a number of statements related to

cooperation among participating states in various areas in response to terrorism and transnational crime, such as: 1) strengthening of transport security against international terrorism (July 2004); 2) cooperative counter-terrorist actions on border security (June 2003); 3) cooperation against piracy and other threats to maritime security (June 2003); 4) measures against terrorist financing (July 2002); and 5) condemnation of terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and terrorist bombings in Bali in October 2002, in Madrid in March 2004, and in London and Sharm el-Sheik in July 2005. In May 2004, the ARF welcomed the establishment of the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter Terrorism (SEARCCI) and the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC).

The extent that the ARF is a useful venue for consultation, dialogue, and confidence building among participating states is not debated. Its effectiveness, however, is very much questioned by some scholars especially in dealing with security issues that involve territorial conflicts, nuclear proliferation, and remnants of the Cold War period (e.g., the Korean peninsula and cross-Straits relations between China and Taiwan) among others. For some, a major limitation of the ARF is that its agenda is very much controlled by ASEAN, which remains in the driver's seat of the Forum. There have been calls made by some non-ASEAN participants for ASEAN to share the chairmanship in the Forum. However, ASEAN is still unwilling to do so because it fears the possibility of some Western powers dominating the ARF. China shares this sentiment and certainly supports the continuation of the ASEAN-centered Forum. Even so, some think tanks in ASEAN are open to the idea of expanding the role of non-ASEAN participants in the ARF if only to make it a more relevant security framework in the Asia Pacific region. Likewise, it has to give more attention to security interests of Northeast Asian countries to ensure their continuing commitment to the ARF process.²

The ASEAN Plus Three Framework

Following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) framework was launched that enabled a more structured engagement between ASEAN members and its Northeast Asian neighbors – China, Japan, and South Korea. Through the APT, a more institutionalized

mechanism has evolved for bilateral and regional dialogue between ASEAN and the three Northeast Asian states, which also opened opportunities for tackling mutual security, economic, and social problems that need to be addressed in a comprehensive manner.

ASEAN-China Security Relations

For the most part, China has effectively used the APT mechanism in improving its relations with ASEAN countries, especially in the area of security. Two important areas of security dialogue and cooperation between ASEAN and China have developed under the APT: the South China Sea and non-traditional security issues.

In the sixth ASEAN-China Summit in November 2002 in Phnom Penh, ASEAN and China signed a joint declaration on “Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues, along with the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” and the “Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation (CEC) between ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China”. It is interesting to note, however, that while ASEAN highlighted the signing of the Declaration concerning the South China Sea as the most important achievement in the Phnom Penh Summit, China played up its CEC initiative and the declaration of cooperation in non-traditional security issues as equally important.

In the seventh ASEAN-China Summit held in Bali in October 2003, a joint declaration was signed by the heads of state/government of ASEAN members and China on strategic partnership for peace and prosperity. The document, among other things, defined the goals of security cooperation between ASEAN and China in three ways, namely: 1) to expedite the implementation of the Joint Statement on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues and actively expand and deepen cooperation in such areas; 2) to hold, when appropriate, ASEAN-China security-related dialogue to enhance mutual understanding and promote peace and security in the region; and 3) to implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, discuss and plan the way, areas and projects of follow-up actions.

In their eighth summit in Vientiane in November 2004, China and ASEAN agreed to a joint Plan of Action to implement the joint declaration on

strategic partnership. In the area of political and security cooperation, the Plan of Action emphasized the importance of: 1) regular high-level contacts, visits, and interactions; 2) mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation; 3) the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation; 4) the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone Treaty; 5) the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea; and 6) cooperation in the field of non-traditional security.³ In the ninth ASEAN-China Summit in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005, the heads of governments/states recognized significant progress in their political-security cooperation. Specifically, they acknowledged that progress has been made by ASEAN and China towards the full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) even as they also looked forward to the eventual conclusion of a regional code of conduct in the South China Sea. As well, the leaders noted that the ASEAN-China Senior Officials’ Meeting on the Implementation of the DoC in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in December 2004 had established the ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the DoC (ACJWG) and welcomed the convening of the First ACJWG in August 2005 in Manila, the Philippines and the convening of the Second ACJWG in Sanya, China in February 2006.⁴

In July 2006, Beijing played host to the first regional workshop of defense officials from ASEAN and China where mutual security concerns were discussed, including opportunities for maritime security cooperation and the role of the respective militaries in international humanitarian aid, anti-terrorism, and peacekeeping operations.⁵

The impetus for greater cooperation between ASEAN and China, especially in the area of maritime security, comes from the growing dependence of the latter on imported oil and gas that require security of the sea lines of communication. Specifically, oil from the Middle East and natural gas from the Persian Gulf and Oman pass through the narrow Straits of Malacca and Singapore, where an average of about 140 ships pass through everyday. It is expected that traffic in these Straits will increase further with China’s growing dependence on imported energy supplies, which are necessary to continue fueling its economic growth.⁶

In order to deal with these concerns, a number of areas for ASEAN-China maritime security cooperation may be pursued. In fact, one Chinese

scholar proposed some “flexible and diversified” forms of maritime security engagement between ASEAN and China, to wit: 1) maritime security dialogue through existing mechanisms like the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium; 2) consultation on navigation and shipping safety; 3) maritime anti-terrorism operation; 4) maritime search and rescue; 5) building up a maritime military communication channel; 6) marine environment protection; 7) joint law enforcement against transnational crime; 8) joint military exercises; and 9) regional peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance.

There is no doubt that China’s image in the region has improved significantly because of its willingness to pursue cooperation with ASEAN in the area of non-traditional security. This is more than just a matter of military diplomacy. By focusing on this particular area, many in Southeast Asia see it as very low key and one that would neither attract domestic controversy in ASEAN countries nor invite undue suspicion from sectors that value strong military alliance with traditional partners. More importantly, it may well be in the interest of China to pursue defense cooperation with ASEAN in this area where it could build its own “soft power” capabilities, thereby earning for it the trust and confidence of not just governments but also peoples and communities in the region in the long run.

ASEAN-Japan Security Relations

Security relations between ASEAN and Japan under the APT have not really built up quite as fast as that between ASEAN and China. To some extent, one could say that Japan is still catching up in this area compared with its much deeper economic relations with ASEAN. For one, Tokyo did not sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) until June 2004 and had opted to confine its political and security cooperation with ASEAN in the areas of maritime security, counter-terrorism, anti-money laundering, and anti-human trafficking. The focus on non-traditional security issues is a prudent one in that it attempts to avoid arousing suspicions, especially from China, about the motivations of Tokyo in pursuing enhanced security ties with ASEAN.

Just like China, Japan has been quite interested in pursuing maritime security cooperation with ASEAN. During the ASEAN Plus Three Summit

in Brunei in November 2001, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi proposed the creation of a Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Essentially a government-to-government agreement, it aims to enhance cooperation among 16 Asian countries composed of the ASEAN members, China, Japan, Korea, Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka. In November 2004, the ReCAAP agreement was finalized and parties agreed to set up an Information Sharing Center (ISC) in Singapore when the agreement comes into force. As of 29 June 2006, only 12 of the 16 Asian countries have signed the agreement, with 11 of these ratifying the agreement. The ReCAAP agreement entered into force on 4 September 2006 following India’s move to be the tenth signatory to the agreement.

The ISC was commissioned on the day that ReCAAP came into force, and became operational before the end of 2006. The primary tasks of the ISC are: 1) to collate information and intelligence obtained from participating countries, from affected vessels, or non-government agencies; 2) disseminate these information to alert ships of possible dangers in the Asian region; and 3) conduct research and make recommendations on best practices.⁸ The ISC also hopes to provide opportunities for signatory countries to build regional capacity and extend mutual assistance both at the technical and legal aspects.⁹

It is interesting to note that two littoral states in Southeast Asia – Indonesia and Malaysia – have so far not signed the ReCAAP agreement. During a meeting of foreign ministers from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore in Batam in August 2005, Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar reportedly expressed unhappiness with the way Japan and Singapore had pushed through with the agreement. Indonesia and Malaysia apparently believe that the ReCAAP is not in accord with the sovereignty of the three littoral states in the Malacca and Singapore Straits. Both countries are also unhappy with the idea of having the ISC based in Singapore. An Indonesian defense official was quoted as saying that Jakarta would only sign the agreement as long as the ReCAAP aims to secure only the Malacca Straits instead of the three littoral countries in the area.¹⁰

China has also not signed the ReCAAP and is apparently reluctant to join a Japanese-initiated maritime security cooperation framework that allows

Japanese coast guards extended range into the South China Sea and the Malacca and Singapore Straits. In February 2000, Beijing strongly protested Tokyo's announcement that it was considering deployment of vessels to the Malacca Straits to deal with increased piracy attacks, in joint cooperation with other patrol and navy vessels from other countries including China. This forced Japan to put the idea on hold.¹¹

What is clear from the foregoing discussion is that even in the supposedly less than controversial area of non-traditional security cooperation with ASEAN members, the rivalry between China and Japan inevitably emerges. Their mutual suspicions of each other's motivation somehow constrain the APT as a security framework from transforming itself beyond the essentially *de facto* bilateral ASEAN + 1 mechanism. Thus, the prospects for institutionalizing the APT as a complementary security framework for promoting a regional order that is based on ASEAN norms and principles is challenged by rivalry and balance of power realities between China and Japan.

ASEAN Community Building

The idea of an ASEAN Community was launched in October 2003 under the Bali Concord II, which attempts to promote greater political, economic, and social-cultural cooperation among the ten member states of ASEAN. It is essentially composed of three pillars, namely, the ASEAN Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Social-Cultural Community. More flesh was given to the ASEAN Community idea in the Vientiane Action Program of 2004, where specific norms, principles, and projects were put forward in order to promote deeper security, economic, and social-cultural interaction among its members. This section of the paper will focus only on the ASEAN Security Community and the ASEAN Charter as they relate to the building of a regional order in East Asia.

The ASEAN Security Community

The ASEAN Security Community (ASC) as envisaged in Bali Concord II aims "to bring ASEAN's political and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another

and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment." Among other things, the ASC contains a number of norms and principles that emphasize the importance of: 1) relying exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences; 2) subscribing to the principle of comprehensive security as having broad political, economic, social and cultural aspects in consonance with the ASEAN Vision 2020 rather than to a defense pact, military alliance or a joint foreign policy; and 3) promoting regional solidarity and cooperation; 4) abiding by the UN Charter and other principles of international law and upholding ASEAN's principles of non-interference, consensus-based decision-making, national and regional resilience, respect for national sovereignty, the renunciation of the threat or the use of force, and peaceful settlement of differences and disputes.¹²

With regard to approaches and instruments in dealing with specific regional security issues within and beyond Southeast Asia, the ASC stipulates that: 1) "maritime issues and concerns are trans-boundary in nature, and therefore shall be addressed regionally in holistic, integrated and comprehensive manner"; 2) "existing ASEAN political instruments such as the Declaration on ZOPFAN, the TAC, and the SEANWFZ Treaty shall continue to play a pivotal role in the area of confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy and the approaches to conflict resolution"; 3) "the High Council of the TAC shall be the important component in the ASEAN Security Community since it reflects ASEAN's commitment to resolve all differences, disputes and conflicts peacefully"; and 4) the ASC should "contribute to further promoting peace and security in the wider Asia Pacific region and reflect ASEAN's determination to move forward at a pace comfortable to all." The ASC also states: "the ARF shall remain the main forum for regional security dialogue, with ASEAN as the primary driving force."¹³

The operationalization of the ASC was spelled out in the Vientiane Action Program (VAP) in 2004, where the focus was in the following areas: 1) political development, where ASEAN members' leaders are expected to promote "shared vision and common values"; 2) shaping and sharing of norms that, among other things, "contribute to the building of a democratic, tolerant, participatory, and transparent Community in Southeast Asia"; 3)

conflict prevention through confidence building and preventive diplomacy; 4) conflict resolution through “the use of existing regional dispute settlement mechanisms and processes in the political and security areas”; and 5) post-conflict peace building that include the establishment of appropriate mechanisms and resource mobilization.¹⁴ Appendix 1 at the end of the paper enumerates the specific activities that have been identified under the ASC Plan of Action.

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the ASC is part of ASEAN’s strategy to bring to a higher level the process of security cooperation not only among its members but also other non-ASEAN states with which it has been interacting. To some extent, the ASC idea is also an important step towards strengthening and deepening security cooperation in the region not only based on traditional norms and principles of ASEAN but also through the introduction of new principles that were considered taboo in the past. Specifically, the ASC’s political development principles such as strengthening of democratic institutions, political participation, rule of law, good governance, and combating corruption are likely to pose a challenge to member states that do not fare well in these areas. Yet the importance of promoting political development based on these principles cannot be denied especially if ASEAN as a community has to move in the same direction and the desire for greater economic and social-cultural integration would have to be realized in the long term. Increased level of economic integration, for example, is not likely to take place unless there are mechanisms in place that ensure fair business practices, rule of law, and transparency in government policies across member states. As well, attendant problems related to labor migration in the region have to be dealt with, for example through the development of mechanisms for regional human rights protection. In short, ensuring uniform good governance standards will spill over into the economic and social community spheres. In a way, with the increasing and deepening level of political, security, economic, and social integration among ASEAN members, there is a greater need for developing a more institutionalized approach to managing issues and problems that affect relations not only among states but also among peoples in the region.

Apart from political development, the ASC Plan of Action also identified the importance of: 1) implementing agreements on the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, in particular working towards the adoption of a Code of Conduct; 2) resolving outstanding issues to ensure the early signing of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ); 3) strengthening the ARF process in support of the ASC; 4) enhancing cooperation in non-traditional security issues; and 5) strengthening confidence building measures through regional military exchanges, convening of the annual defense ministers meeting, and establishment of an ASEAN arms register, among others.¹⁵ These specific goals clearly indicate that the ASC is not only about promoting intra-ASEAN security cooperation but more importantly the need to push for institutionalization of mechanisms and principles that should govern ASEAN security relations with external actors. In a sense, the ASC casts a wide net over a range of security concerns beyond Southeast Asia.

The ASEAN Charter

Under the category of shaping and sharing of norms, the ASC Plan of Action acknowledges the importance of having an ASEAN Charter. It is not only supposed to reaffirm traditional norms and principles in ASEAN but also give substance to the “collective responsibilities” and obligations of members. More than just a collection of documents that contain previous agreements, declarations, norms, and principles since ASEAN’s creation in 1967, the ASEAN Charter is supposed to contain several provisions that govern inter-state relations among members, external relations, and the norms of behavior within states.¹⁶ As well, it should contain provisions for new structures and mechanisms that ought to enhance further the roles and functions of several ASEAN agents and units, even as it should also have provisions for strengthening the coordination of decision-making procedures and meetings.

For some sectors in Southeast Asia, the ASEAN Charter should not just be a document that gives juridical personality to ASEAN but must also institutionalize dispute settlement mechanisms, spell out obligations and expectations from members, and define sanctions and appropriate mechanisms for implementing these. Likewise, the Charter ought to recognize the

importance of several layers of consultative mechanisms across various sectors in the region, including legislators, epistemic communities, civil society organizations, and business groups, if ASEAN must be true to its stated goals of becoming relevant to the people and communities in the region.

After almost two years of negotiating the basic outline, principles, and provisions of the ASEAN Charter, many in the region considered the final output signed by ASEAN leaders in their 13th Summit in Singapore in November 2007 a major disappointment. Specifically, some of the important recommendations of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on the ASEAN Charter related to the creation of a regional human rights commission, as well as norms pertaining to sanctions and obligations of member states, were simply watered down in the final version of the Charter. The High Level Task Force (HLTF), which drafted the document was composed mainly of bureaucrats and/or retired diplomats who apparently did not accept the more forward-looking and innovative ideas of the EPG members. Although the HLTF consciously made sure to “consult” many non-government groups during the drafting of the Charter, the final version of the document highlighted more the traditional norms and values of a state-centered – more than people-oriented – ASEAN. No less than President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo categorically warned her counterparts in ASEAN that the ratification of the Charter would be quite difficult in the Philippine Senate in the absence of progress in Myanmar and amidst continuing crackdown by the junta against followers and sympathizers of monks who protested in September 2007.

East Asia Community Building

ASEAN has also projected the process of community building into the larger East Asian region through the idea of an East Asian Community (EAC). Much of the push for the EAC¹⁷ came primarily from Malaysia with support from Japan, although they differ on the composition of such community. While Kuala Lumpur would like to restrict the EAC geographically to ASEAN countries plus China, Japan, and South Korea, Tokyo wanted to include Australia and New Zealand as “new peers” in the region.¹⁸ Other ASEAN countries, notably Singapore and Indonesia wanted India to be in the EAC as a counterweight to China.¹⁹

In his speech at the Second East Asia Forum in Kuala Lumpur in 2004, Prime Minister Badawi stated that “the future East Asian Community should be an integral extension of the ASEAN Community” for which the East Asia Summit (EAS) would be “more than a political symbol of the East Asian Community”. More specifically, Badawi outlined the following as important milestones or markers of building an East Asian Community: 1) East Asia Summit; 2) East Asian Charter; 3) East Asia Free Trade Area; 4) Agreement on East Asian Monetary and Financial Cooperation; 5) East Asia Zone of Amity and Cooperation; 6) East Asia Transportation and Communication Network; and 7) East Asia Declaration on Human Rights and Obligations.²⁰

The first East Asia Summit that convened in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 saw sixteen (16) heads of governments/states meeting for the first time, including the ten ASEAN members, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand. Russia attended the EAS as observer and expressed its desire to join the Summit in the future. The leaders declared that EAS was created as “a forum for dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia” and that its efforts to promote community building in [the] region will be consistent with and reinforce the realization of the ASEAN Community, and will form an integral part of the evolving regional architecture.”²¹

Furthermore, the leaders declared that the EAS will be “an open, inclusive, transparent and outward-looking forum in which [members will] strive to strengthen global norms and universally recognized values with ASEAN as the driving force working in partnership with the other participants of the East Asia Summit.” In more specific terms, the EAS is expected, among other things, to focus on the following: 1) “fostering strategic dialogue and promoting cooperation in political and security issues to ensure that our countries can live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment”; 2) “promoting development, financial stability, energy security, economic integration and growth, eradicating poverty and narrowing the development gap in East Asia, through technology transfer and infrastructure development, capacity building, good governance and humanitarian assistance and promoting financial links, trade

and investment expansion and liberalization”; and 3) “promoting deeper cultural understanding, people-to-people contact and enhanced cooperation in uplifting the lives and well-being of [the region’s] peoples in order to foster mutual trust and solidarity as well as promoting fields such as environmental protection, prevention of infectious diseases and natural disaster mitigation.”²²

With regard to the principles and mechanics of participation in the EAS, the leaders agreed that: 1) “participation in the East Asia Summit will be based on the criteria for participation established by ASEAN”; 2) “the East Asia Summit will be convened regularly”; 3) “the East Asia Summit will be hosted and chaired by an ASEAN Member Country that assumes the ASEAN Chairmanship and held back-to-back with the annual ASEAN Summit”; and 4) “the modalities of the East Asia Summit will be reviewed by ASEAN and all other participating countries of the East Asia Summit.”²³

In the Second East Asia Summit in Cebu in January 2007, participating states highlighted a number of non-traditional security issues as priority areas for enhancing cooperation between ASEAN and the Plus Six countries. This includes poverty alleviation, energy security, finance, avian influenza, and natural disaster mitigation. At the same time, the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula was the most urgent traditional security concern, with EAS member states expressing support for the Six Party talks as an important diplomatic approach in dealing with the issue along with the implementation of pertinent United Nations resolutions. The East Asian leaders also reaffirmed their commitment to the EAS as an important component of the emerging regional architecture that complements other frameworks such as the ARF, ASEAN+3, and APEC in community building in the region.²⁴

In the Third East Asia Summit in Singapore in November 2007, leaders focused more on the non-traditional but complementary issues of energy security, environment, and climate change. Several initiatives to address these non-traditional security concerns were agreed upon by member countries. At the same time, the EAS leaders recognized some progress made in the Six-Party Talks in the pursuit of a comprehensive resolution to the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula. They also noted the role being played by the United Nations in Myanmar and reiterated the importance of national reconciliation in the country. As usual, the members also reiterated the

importance of the East Asia Summit as an important pillar of community building in the region.²⁵

East Asia Community Building and Traditional Security Cooperation: Ideas, Prospects, and Opportunities

Based on existing security frameworks and ideas that have been floated in the region, the EAC could very well be another framework for cooperation in the area of traditional security. There are important lessons that could be drawn from the experiences of ASEAN in dealing with major powers in the region and the incremental (or “step-by-step”) approach towards engaging them in the larger context of the East Asian Community presents a number of opportunities and challenges at the same time.

Confidence Building

An important starting point for any EAC cooperation in traditional security is confidence building. There is no doubt that, notwithstanding the existence of the ARF and ASEAN Plus Three, there is still much to be desired as far as trust and confidence among East Asian countries are concerned, especially in Northeast Asia. Historical animosities and mutual suspicions remain, which spill over and create tensions in bilateral relations.

What do ASEAN’s experiences in confidence building tell us with regard to improving the level of confidence among countries in the larger context of the EAC? First, confidence building is a multi-track effort that should involve not only government and defense officials but also the academe, think tanks, and even civil society groups. CBMs are not limited to the publication of defense white papers but also – and more importantly – the creation of networks of influential leaders or political elites in government, business, academe, think tanks, and non-government organizations who play crucial roles in building and promoting a communitarian approach to mutual security issues and problems. Second, government officials must be willing to engage in frank and open discussions with other sectors and stakeholders, with a view towards exploring new ideas and creative approaches or strategies in managing (if not resolving) conflicts, rather than simply defending respective national positions or interests. Third, confidence building is also about building and strengthening norms and principles that should serve as

important parameters for evaluating not only the conduct or behavior of states but also their obligations in a community.

Opportunities for Strategic Cooperation: China-Japan-US relations²⁶

The EAC idea should be anchored on the principle of inclusiveness and openness. In this regard, and in the context of building a community of states, nations, and societies, existing security alliances must be transformed into a strategic partnership that allow the re-creation of a regional order that recognizes the legitimate interests of emerging powers such as China. Clearly, as long as China remains outside of a strategic partnership between the US and Japan, the reality of the balance of power will continue to serve as an obstacle to institutionalizing regional order in East Asia. Mutual suspicions and policies of deterrence against China by both Japan and the United States will only undermine the development of multilateralism in the region. What is needed, therefore, is for both Japan and the US to begin engaging China in a strategic trilateral partnership that would encourage it to become a more “responsible stakeholder” in the region as well as in the international stage. As one Japanese scholar has put it:

[In] my view...a high-level trilateral meeting should be institutionalized between Japan, the United States, and China. The three countries should exchange views candidly about the respective strategies regarding key issues in the East Asian region. Included in the agenda should be ways of boosting cooperation on energy problems, confidence-building measures, and preventive diplomacy in the region, as well as common rules of conduct on the East China Sea.

Japan has benefited from the US-led regional order which has evolved in East Asia in the postwar era. But economic development in many East Asian countries and China's ascent as an economic powerhouse will transform this regional order.

To ensure the creation of a new order in the region, Japan should join hands not just with the United States but [also] with China and other East Asian nations. The key to addressing this challenge lies in achieving the proper mix of Japan's strategy of engagement and deterrence toward China.²⁷

It is clearly apparent from the foregoing statement that the post-war order in East Asia dominated by the US is no longer in tune with the changing regional context. China must be recognized as a rising regional power and at the same time be allowed as an important player and stakeholder to contribute in shaping the region's future, along with other East Asian states. It is inevitable that, with China's rise as an economic and military power, its influence in the region would also grow. At the same time, a key issue is whether China would behave as a responsible power and abide by international norms, or whether it would act more unilaterally. Certainly, the policy of deterrence against China either by Japan or the United States will not encourage it to be a responsible stakeholder.

China may be open to the idea of a trilateral strategic partnership with Japan and the United States²⁸ if only because it desires recognition as an important player in the region, which consequently allows it to have a much more stable external environment and enables it to concentrate on domestic priorities such as economic development and modernization. Through this trilateral partnership, China will also be given the opportunity to shape the regional order without having to be seen as undermining it in the long run due to its inevitable rise as a military power. At the same time, however, it cannot simply be assumed that with China's rise, there will be a parallel increase in the level of transparency on the part of China about its defense and security posture. Certainly, a lot would depend on whether China's political transformation in the near future moves in the direction of institutionalizing the rule of law, good governance, increased political participation, and greater accountability.

Terrorism

Dealing with the problem of terrorism in the region is one area of traditional security cooperation for the EAC. The ARF and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SOC) have already established mechanisms for some countries within and outside the East Asian region to develop regional approaches to this security problem. The EAC could build on these existing mechanisms and link them to non-traditional security issues (e.g., piracy and maritime security) where opportunities for cooperation are far greater. However, as discussed in the previous section above, the apparent lack of trust and confidence between China and Japan due to historical animosities has to

some extent constrained the prospects for joint cooperation in this area. Even so, some littoral states in the Malacca and Singapore Straits have raised issues of sovereignty and international law provisions under the UNCLOS on a number of anti terrorist maritime security initiatives by major powers.

Territorial Disputes

Another potential area for traditional security cooperation is in managing territorial disputes among EAC countries. Whereas some ASEAN claimant states and China appear to have been moving towards the general direction of having a code of conduct in managing territorial disputes in the South China Sea, this remains elusive in the case of China and Japan as far as their disputes in the East China Sea are concerned. What lessons could be learned from ASEAN-China relations in this area? What are the fundamental reasons behind the inability of China and Japan to follow the same direction as that taken by ASEAN and China? What particular norms and principles could the EAC adopt from existing ASEAN-centered frameworks in managing territorial disputes? How could Northeast Asian countries overcome their historical baggage that continues to impact negatively on bilateral relations and exacerbate territorial disputes? These are some of the hard questions that need to be addressed if cooperation in managing territorial disputes in the context of the EAC is to be explored, make progress, and become institutionalized. One is always tempted to remain doubtful of the prospects in this area given the strong tendency of states in the region – especially major powers like China and Japan – to put a premium on sovereignty and territorial integrity, which forces them to adopt a more realist or power-based approach in dealing with these issues. Yet one can take comfort in the idea that norm-promotion and confidence building precisely help mitigate and constrain states from adopting unilateral, power-based strategies in addressing territorial disputes.

Conclusion

The prospects for cooperation in traditional security within the context of East Asia Community may be good if, and only if, the ASEAN-based norms and principles, mechanisms, and frameworks of cooperation in this area remain at the core of building the EAC. It is quite difficult to imagine

a process of engagement between China and Japan, for example, in the area of traditional security without utilizing existing mechanisms or frameworks that are already in place, such as the ARF, ASEAN Plus Three, SCO, and even APEC. A major challenge for EAC cooperation in traditional security is for countries in Northeast Asia to overcome their historical baggage. This necessitates a rethinking of the existing regional order and re-shaping it in accordance with the changing contexts, strategic interests, and capabilities of major powers in the region. The transformation of existing security alliances into one that moves in the direction of a more open and inclusive strategic partnership between China, Japan, and the US may contribute to improving the prospects for traditional security cooperation.

Notes

1. A major portion of this section of the paper is adopted from the chapter written by the author titled “Institutionalization of Regional Order: Between Norms and Balance of Power”, in Jun Tsunekawa (ed), *Regional Order in East Asia: ASEAN and Japanese Perspectives*, National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) Joint Research Series No. 1, Tokyo: NIDS 2007.
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15. *Ibid.*
16. Framing an ASEAN Charter: An ISEAS Perspective (compiled by Rodolfo Severino). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005, pp. 15-18.
17. For some in ASEAN, it should be EAc with a small letter "c" to signify that the idea should not compete with the ASEAN Plus Three framework. Indonesia, for example, insists that the APT should be the core of the East Asian community.
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23. *Ibid.*
24. Chairman's Statement of the Second East Asia Summit, Cebu, the Philippines, 15 January 2007, from <http://www.aseansec.org/19302.htm>, accessed on 10 February 2008.
25. Chairman's Statement of the Third East Asia Summit, Singapore, 21 November 2007, from <http://www.aseansec.org/21127.htm>, accessed on 10 February 2008.
26. This section of the paper is adopted from the author's chapter on "Institutionalization of Regional Order: Between Norms and Balance of Power", *ibid.*
27. Takashi Shiraishi, "Questions over China's intentions," CEAC Commentary, 2 August 2006, pp. 3-4.
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The EAC & the Role of External Powers: Ensuring Asian Multilateralism is not Shanghaied

MOHAN MALIK**

This chapter examines the interests, roles and concerns of three major external powers (the United States, the European Union and Russia) that have vital stakes in the future evolution of Asian multilateralism. This study argues that it is not in the interests of any of these three external powers to see one or more countries in Asia dominating the EAC or covertly working to transform regional organizations into alliances or collective security pacts, as that would not only undermine regional stability but also give a bad name to multilateralism. Of the three external powers, the United States-by virtue of its power and presence -is the most important external power and the state of its relations with regional heavyweights would inevitably influence the EAC-building process. All three external powers share a vested interest in ensuring that Asian multilateralism is not shanghaied. The future of the EAC-building, in the ultimate analysis, will be determined by several key issues, including the role of external powers, membership criteria, ASEAN's will and capacity to remain in "the driver's seat," the EAC's distinctive character, utility and relationship with other existing multilateral forums (such as APEC, ARF-and last but not least, the state of China's relations with the United States, Japan and India, which would make or mar progress toward EAC-building."

Introduction

IN LESS THAN two decades, the Asia-Pacific region has moved from a situation where there was a significant gap in regional organizations to a point where new collaborative arrangements in both economic and security matters have proliferated. That is indeed the good news. However, the bad news is that there is too much hype and overblown rhetoric about the conditions being ripe for a new kind of Asian multilateral security architecture based on shared interests, if not shared values. Some Southeast Asian leaders suggest that East Asia eventually could become like the European Union, which has a common currency, market, and institutions to facilitate trade and even foreign policies. The reality of East Asia, in fact, is quite different. The multiplicity of organizations in the Asia-Pacific—the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum, (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three (APT: ASEAN plus China, Japan, South Korea), the East Asian Summit (ASEAN+3+3 [Australia, India, New Zealand]), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), the Mekong-Ganges Cooperation (MGC), and the Six-Party Talks in Northeast Asia—points to a very dynamic but complex and diverse region with diverse needs and competing interests which cannot be easily subsumed under one pan-Asian organization. While the creation of an East Asia Community (EAC) with an integrated politico-economic system modeled on the European Union is an admirable goal, it would require a degree of economic, political, socio-cultural and security cooperation that is unlikely to be achieved in the foreseeable future. In fact, the EAC building process is going to be a very long drawn-out affair as it involves the interests of both member-states and external powers. In the context of the East Asia Community building, there are three major external powers that have vital stakes and interests in the future evolution of Asian multilateralism. These external actors are the United States, the European Union and Russia.¹

This chapter begins by outlining the similarities and differences between the European Union (EU), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and EAC to understand the historical and political context of regional integration in three different regions. It then examines the interests, roles and concerns of three external powers. It argues that it is not in the interests of any of these three external powers to see one or more countries in Asia

dominating the EAC or covertly working to transform regional organizations into alliances or collective security pacts as that would not only undermine regional stability but also give a bad name to multilateralism. Of the three external powers, the United States—by virtue of its power and presence—is the most important external power and the state of its relations with regional heavyweights would inevitably influence the EAC building process. Since the US-China relationship will, to a large extent, shape regional integration processes, the interests and concerns of Washington and Beijing deserve close watch. The European Union's interests in Asian multilateralism, broadly speaking, dovetail with the US even though there are some differences in nuance, approach and emphasis. As for Russia, Moscow's attitude is driven by a combination of factors, the most important of which is to reassert Russia's role while integrating the Russian Far East with the booming economies of the Asia-Pacific.

The European Union and the East Asia Community: Similarities and Differences

The European Union (EU) offers a good template for building a closely-knit economic and political community, and in many respects it is seen by many as the role model for other regional organizations. However, a sound appreciation of the similarities and differences between East Asia and Europe is necessary to avoid unrealistic expectations. For instance, the centerpiece of an East Asian regional community based on the EU model would be a common currency and it is not surprising that many regional governments have called for a single Asian currency unit. But going by the example of Australia-New Zealand, one cannot but be pessimistic. If these two countries find it difficult to reach an agreement on one currency, then it may well be even more difficult for EAC to have a common currency. For the foreseeable future, the path to creating a common currency and a community faces numerous roadblocks, including Washington, which fears a weakened dollar as well as diminished power and influence in the region.²

As regards similarities between the EU and EAC, both Europe and East Asia are major engines of world economic growth. In both regions, economic integration laid the foundation for political cooperation. As in Europe, increasing economic integration has begun to foster a common

East Asian cultural identity. Both are home to several great powers with historic rivalries, jealousies and ambitions. After the end of the Second World War, however, war-torn European powers turned inwards and agreed to put their past behind them. They were in a “withdrawal mode” (in the sense that having been everywhere and done that—colonization, spheres of influence, and wars—all over the world), they were returning home to the continent to rebuild a new future. They might still be vying with each other in different parts of the world for influence but they were no longer engaged in a zero-sum rivalry for resources and markets as before.

More importantly, the European powers’ fear of a common threat—Soviet communism during the Cold War years—and the security umbrella provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the US forces in Western Europe created a “sink or swim” mentality conducive to reconciliation and reconstruction. In other words, Washington’s alliance network underpinned and facilitated Western Europe’s integration, allowing countries in the region to focus on socio-economic development. Significantly, the process of European economic and political integration was essentially led by powerful democratic states with shared political values and near-identical worldviews. Since its inception, the EU has sought to create a positive regional identity, promote economic growth via free trade and investment flows and create a spirit of cooperation and confidence-building among member-states.

Needless to say, many of these conditions are absent in the Asia-Pacific region. In sharp contrast, the Asia-Pacific of the early twenty-first century, home to several rising and contending powers, bears more resemblance to Europe of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than to Europe of the late twentieth century or early twenty-first century. Unlike Europe’s retiring powers, Asia is home to two rising powers—China and India, and a Japan that is increasingly becoming a “normal nation”. Asia’s rising powers—China, Japan and India—are today where Germany, France, Britain and Italy were at the beginning of the 20th century. They are increasingly looking outwards, beyond their immediate regions in search of access to markets, resources, capital and jockeying for power and influence and outmaneuvering and outbidding each other. This extra-regional competition amongst Asia’s 3 heavyweights is invariably reflected in their intra-regional interaction, in their perceptions of each other and their dealings at multilateral forums.

Furthermore, unresolved territorial and historical issues coupled with a wide variety of political systems and most countries’ preference for the US to balance regional great powers mean that it is unlikely an integrated East Asian Community along the lines of the European Union will emerge in the near future. Though most countries in Asia have historically been concerned about China—with the exception of a few—there is no common threat perception that would unite all.

Not only that, there is no sign that the countries of East Asia are willing to surrender part of their national sovereignty to a supra-national body as their European counterparts have done. Asia is simply too obsessed with sovereignty, despite all the talk of a borderless, inter-connected world. The long-standing principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs remains a sore point within ASEAN, not to speak of EAC. It continues to hinder the grouping’s conflict resolution and crisis management efforts. Burma is a case in point.

The proliferation of a large number of multilateral institutions and organizations speaks for itself. At best, the multiplicity of organizations is a sign of dynamism, and at worst, it shows the degree of residual or latent distrust, rivalry and a game of one-upmanship in the region. The fact that ASEAN spurned China’s offer to hold the second East Asia Summit in Beijing and instead decided to hold it in Southeast Asian capitals along with the annual ASEAN summits demonstrates the regional grouping’s desire to be in the driver’s seat and not to let Asian multilateralism fall victim to great power rivalries between China and Japan.

China and Japan are locked in a struggle for supremacy in Asia, with Beijing attempting to gain the leadership position in the planned EAC, and Tokyo trying to rein in its rival with the help of other “China-wary” nations in the Asia-Pacific region. The rivalry between China and Japan also has served as a catalyst for the proliferation of preferential agreements in East Asia. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s proposal for a 16-nation East Asian free trade bloc to match the European Union is an invitation to remove the blinkers of autarky and protectionism and a thicket of rules and regulations that still obstruct the free flow of trade, investment and expertise. However, the proposal is opposed by China which prefers a free trade bloc within the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) arrangement, and not the East Asian Community framework.³

There is a view that Beijing's new-found love for multilateralism is nothing but a smokescreen for its strategic expansion designs. Luo Yuan, chairman of the Strategy Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, believes that China will soon reach a stage where it will have the power to either mold or discard existing institutions and build a new political-economic international order that will ensure strategic balance and stability.⁴ Many suspect that this would be "a Sino-centric international order." Multilateralism is a multi-player game played in a spirit of give-and-take. Critics contend that authoritarian regimes like China's that do not share power at home, and accept no institutional constraints on the exercise of power in domestic politics are unlikely to respect the rights and interests of others in international politics. Others, however, counter by saying that China's attitude toward regional cooperation in Asia has considerably changed for the better in recent years. Still, in the absence of great power cooperation and common threat perception, there is little prospect of the EAC taking off any time soon.⁵ Nor do countries in East Asia share similar political values. The liberal impulse underlying a regional security community envisages a strengthening of democratic institutions set up to eradicate poverty and promote confidence and dialogue as a means to achieving regional integration. However, reconciling national interests with regional economic and security imperatives continues to pose a major challenge for all countries—big and small, democratic and non-democratic.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the only relatively successful regional organization, second to the European Union. ASEAN is a regional grouping of small and medium-sized nations that seeks to navigate through the choppy waters of great powers politics. It endorses no single country's foreign policy agenda. Traditionally, it may have been seen as a pro-West regional organization but it has become an inclusive organization and enjoys wider international support. Even as they seek to preserve traditional security ties with Washington, most ASEAN countries are wary of great power games, machinations and maneuverings. They are pursuing sophisticated diplomatic and hedging strategies designed to give them more freedom of action while avoiding overt alignment with major powers. Some ASEAN leaders have expressed strong support to push for complete ASEAN

integration by 2015, slashing five years off the 2020 deadline.⁶ Though no one expects ASEAN to move in the direction of the European Union, it appears that an ASEAN Community building is likely to take precedence over the East Asian Community building exercise.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the EAC: Similarities and Differences

The six-nation Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a Beijing-led regional multilateral forum. It is successor to the Shanghai Five grouping put together in 1996 to deal with China's border disputes with former Soviet Central Asian republics, which has slowly expanded its reach into counterterrorism, energy, economic cooperation, and defense. With the decline of Moscow's influence, Beijing has sought to rely primarily on the SCO as an instrument to project its power and gain allies in a region which is the source of much needed strategic energy resources as well as a launchpad for China's larger strategic aspirations in Central and Southwest Asia. Through the SCO, Beijing has also sought to secure its western frontier by creating a buffer for restive Xinjiang province, contain the forces of "separatism, terrorism and extremism," and most importantly, counter the US presence in the region and gain control of the region's energy supplies. Beijing's task is made somewhat easier by the fact that the SCO is devoid of any democratic and liberal values. More than anywhere else, "the successful Chinese model" of "development-minus-democracy" finds a captive audience in Central Asia. Other Central Asian countries are minor players and some are at best hedging their bets.

Thus, in a very short period of time, the SCO has been transformed into the most important regional alliance for China that helps it secure its borders, promote trade and provide access to valuable raw materials, and it serves as a vehicle to curb US influence in Central Asia in order to establish the Sino-Russian condominium there. The SCO summit meetings routinely endorse Chinese foreign policy agenda. In 2005, it became the first regional bloc to oppose the Group of Four's (Japan, Brazil, Germany, and India) proposal to expand the UN Security Council's permanent membership and called for an end to US military presence in Central Asia. If the military exercises in 2005 and 2007 conducted by the SCO member-states are any indication, then this

regional grouping is beginning to look more like “NATO of the East” than like the European Union or ASEAN or EAC.⁷ It is no exaggeration to say that the SCO is the power play of China and Russia. Given its exclusive membership and overtly anti-US character, it is hardly a model of regional community building that would win approval and universal support.

With an understanding of the similarities and differences between Europe (the EU) and Central Asia (SCO) on the one hand and East Asia (EAC) on the other, let us critically examine the roles and interests of 3 major external powers—the United States, the European Union and Russia—whose support, acquiescence or opposition could make or mar the Asian community building project.

The United States’ Perspectives on Asian Multilateralism

While supporting the establishment of regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific region, the US continues to assign great significance to its alliances in the region. Seen from Washington’s perspective, multilateral organizations in Asia ought to complement and reinforce the US alliance network and facilitate regional integration as in Europe. So a major US interest is to ensure that the evolving EAC does not call for an end to the US military presence in the future (as the SCO did in Central Asia in 2005 under the influence of Beijing and Moscow). Therefore, Washington would not like to see the EAC process becoming a tool of one country’s foreign policy or degenerating into a collective security pact along the lines of the SCO.

Washington’s second objective is to ensure that EAC building seeks to promote freedom and democracy along with free markets and free trade. In this context, Beijing’s efforts to promote the Chinese model of “authoritarian capitalist development” or “development without democracy” to the developing world as an alternative model for ending poverty causes unease in Washington and bodes ill for the United Nations’ efforts to promote transparency, accountability, good governance and democracy in conflict-prone, weak, or failing states. The US prefers to see the balance-of-power underpinning multilateral organizations remaining in favor of liberal democracies, not autocracies. Third, since East Asian economies are enmeshed in the global economy, and dependent on access to markets outside the region, “East Asian regionalism must necessarily

be ‘open’ regionalism...promoted [preferably] by global multilateral trade liberalization agreements.”⁸ If the above-mentioned three overarching conditions are met, then the United States can be expected to promote Asian integration.

As regards the US membership of the EAC, opinion remains divided. On the one hand are those who believe that exclusion equals loss of influence. They wonder if EAC would replace APEC as the main multilateral forum in Asia on trade and investment liberalization and economic integration. Many worry that China—a late convert to multilateralism—will use its growing involvement in the East Asian Summit (EAS) and other regional organizations that exclude Washington (ASEAN+3, SCO) to define limits to the US global power, marginalize Beijing’s regional rivals (e.g., Taiwan is not invited to the EAS but is a member of APEC), and mold multilateral institutions to have its foreign policy agenda endorsed. Given the central role that China plays in giving direction to the SCO, the manner in which the SCO has developed provides clues to the direction other regional organizations, such as ASEAN+3 and EAS, might take if China is allowed to assume a dominant position. It is worth recalling here that Beijing has long called for the dismantling the US alliances with its Asian-Pacific allies. The Chinese contend that that these alliances—“relics of the Cold War era”—hinder regional integration and ought to be replaced with the SCO-type multilateral institutions. There is obviously a disconnect or tension between the US and Chinese motives for multilateralism.⁹

Others, however, argue that Washington need not worry. It does not have to be part of every organization in the region. Just as the US exclusion from the EU did not see any erosion in US presence and influence in Europe, non-inclusion in EAC would not necessarily be detrimental to American interests in the Asia-Pacific region. With the exception of a few, most Asian countries have no desire to live in a China-led or China-dominated Asia. As Gerald Curtis points out: “There is no danger that East Asia is going to exclude the US: the entire region will continue to rely on the US as a major market for its products, as a major source of foreign capital and technology, and as the key provider of security...For one thing, the idea that China, Japan and South Korea will collude to pursue policies that threaten US interests is unrealistic.”¹⁰ It is noteworthy that Beijing’s perceived attempts in

2005 to steer East Asian multilateralism along the lines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to serve Beijing's broader strategic goals were successfully thwarted by Japan and Southeast Asian countries that campaigned hard to include India, Australia and New Zealand at the first inaugural East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005. The fear of becoming China's economic dependencies is also driving many Southeast Asian countries into courting Japan, India and Australia both to leverage their strategic clout, and to prevent an overly dominant China from skewing trade balances in its favor.¹¹ Presumably, the decision to expand the EAS membership was based on the belief that as long as China finds itself in the company of Japan and India at multilateral forums, Beijing will want to put its best foot forward and be on its best behavior. Otherwise, the Middle Kingdom syndrome may again manifest itself. It was against this backdrop that the very first East Asian Summit resolved that ASEAN must remain at the center of a future EAC. Since then, Beijing's enthusiasm for EAS has waned and it has retreated to the ASEAN Plus Three forum where China has a more domineering position.¹²

While being wary of becoming divided into Chinese and American blocs, most ASEAN member-states want the United States to stay engaged in the region. Despite US anxiety that China may use regional organizations to reduce US influence, the consensus is that this is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future. For one, most Asians do not want to replace American hegemony with Chinese domination over their countries. They view the US presence in the region as an insurance policy against any future bid by China to re-establish a tributary state system or a China-led "East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." So, the United States, being a distant hegemon, remains the balancer of choice for countries on China's periphery. Of the 16 EAS members, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and South Korea are military allies of the US, while New Zealand, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and India are hedgers that worry more about China than the US. Second, given China's own dependence on the US for its economic growth, investment, technology and market, Beijing's claims to regional economic leadership are hardly convincing. Third, regional organizations are essentially "talk shops" and ASEAN and the ARF work through consultations, dialogue and consensus. Therefore, the possibility of one or more powers hijacking the EAS agenda without opposition seems implausible. Interestingly, democracy and common international political norms

have begun to take root in East Asia. According to a study undertaken by the *East Asia Barometer*, a project examining public opinion across the region (excluding China and North Korea), majorities in nine Asian nations preferred democracy to authoritarianism.¹³ In addition, enmeshing China with US allies and partners in the broad framework of international organizations is part of engagement strategy to condition China's rise in such a way that it becomes a "responsible stakeholder" in regional stability and prosperity. Former US National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger, believes that "encouraging [Beijing] to pay attention to the interests of other countries is likely to outweigh the risk of China dominating such groupings and giving them an anti-US agenda."¹⁴

And finally, the general consensus is that the EAC building is going to be a very long, complicated process. It is unlikely to undercut the significance of US bilateral relationships with its friends and allies. Nonetheless, to safeguard against the uncertainties and vulnerabilities of the future, there are some who favor laying down the criteria for Washington's support for Asian multilateralism in the future. For one, Sandy Berger, National Security Adviser in the Clinton administration, identifies 4 major concerns which he believes should determine the future US policy toward Asian integration¹⁵ :

1. Will the new East Asia Community (EAC), as announced at the December 2005 East Asia Summit, interact in a positive way with other institutions in the Asia-Pacific that the U.S. actively supports?
2. Will the EAC take actions aimed at weakening U.S. bilateral alliances or the overall U.S. role in the region?
3. Will the EAC become a means for China, in particular, to dominate the regional security agenda?
4. Will the EAC reinforce the programs and policies of other regional organizations, especially the ARF and APEC?

Given the history of US support for multilateral cooperation, Washington would continue to support initiatives and forums that promote trust, transparency and trade in the Asia-Pacific region as all these go a long way in promoting peace and stability for all parties concerned. Washington has already stated its desire to have some role in the future of the EAS, perhaps as an observer. In the meantime, everyone hopes that enmeshing China in multilateral activities would moderate China's behavior in the military and

security spheres and “provide a mechanism for China to demonstrate that it is a good neighbor and not a threat to other countries.”¹⁶ In short, the ultimate driver of Washington’s concern over East Asian regional arrangements lies in US strategic relations with China.

The European Union’s Interests in EAC

The European Union has indicated its desire to have a role as an observer in the EAC. The EU’s interests in the EAC building are mostly similar to the US, albeit with differences in nuance, focus and attention. The European Union has identified “effective multilateralism” as the defining and determining feature of its external relations strategy. Much like the US, the EU member-states want to foster and benefit from closer economic ties with East Asia. The EU welcomes the emergence of an “open regionalism” in East Asia that promotes free trade and investment flows to and from the region, embedding the protectionist tendencies into an effective multilateralism.¹⁷ It is not in the interests of the EU to see Asia’s multilateral organizations being dominated by one or two regional powers. Unlike the US, the EU is better placed to contribute to the development of conflict resolution mechanisms and maritime security measures for the safety of sea lanes of communication. For its part, East Asia has a lot to learn from the EU in institution building, preventive diplomacy and crisis management. The EU can provide a good template for creating a positive regional identity conducive to creating a spirit of cooperation and confidence-building among member-states. The European experience of coming to terms with the past (especially in Germany) may be of relevance to Northeast Asia. Much like the US, promotion of liberal values of democracy, human rights and free market economics remain on the agenda of many European countries. And as in the case of Burma, it can complicate their interaction with East Asia because the EU wants to see regional cooperation in East Asia based upon universally recognized political values and global rules. The EU would also like to see democratic states with shared political values taking the lead in bringing about Asian economic and political integration. However, two areas where American and European interests diverge are the EU’s support for multipolarity in the world and the priority assigned to economic, as opposed to security, issues in the EU-China relations.

Russia’s Interests in EAC

Russia, increasingly assertive in its foreign policy after years of stable economic growth, is looking for a new role in the world and sees itself as a balancing force between the old trans-Atlantic world and new power centers such as China.¹⁸ Under President Putin, Moscow has moved to forge closer ties with major Asian economies and to stake a claim in an emerging East Asian regionalism in order to re-establish a resurgent Russia on the world stage. Unlike the US and the EU, Russia has expressed its desire to become a member of the East Asia Summit. Its stance enjoys China’s support.¹⁹ However, ASEAN has decided to freeze new membership of EAS for at least two years. Their concern is that by bringing in outsiders, such as Russia, the United States, and Canada, the East Asian nature would be lost, and EAC would become a duplication of APEC. This development would, however, be welcomed by those who want to see ASEAN+3 as the principal focus for East Asian Community building or those who want to replace APEC with EAC.

Moscow seeks economic integration with Asia to help stop the decay of resource-rich but depressed areas east of the Urals and the government has unveiled an ambitious plan of diverting part of Russia’s new wealth to upgrade infrastructure in Siberia and the Far East to attract investment.²⁰ Closer ties with ASEAN, the ARF, APEC and the EAC are part of Russia’s strategy to balance the US and Chinese involvement in regional affairs. The gigantic project to construct oil pipelines from Eastern Siberia to the Pacific coast, with branches into China, will definitely serve to reinforce economic ties between these countries. To achieve its objectives in East Asian multilateral processes, Russia has “six cards” to play:

1. The “geopolitical card”: Russia is the only Eurasian power;
2. The “global power card”: As a UNSC veto - holding permanent member, Moscow’s cooperation is required on all global security issues;
3. The “nuclear card”: Russia is still a nuclear superpower;
4. The “arms supplier card”: Russia is a major arms producer arming China, India & ASEAN countries;
5. The “energy card”: Russia is a growing energy supplier to booming Asian economies;

6. Last but not least, being a “swing state” or “pivotal state” in Eurasia, Russia hopes to benefit by making itself the object of courtship by both China on the one hand and the US/ Japan on the other.

Though Russia shares Beijing’s interest in limiting US influence via multilateral institutions, it also has many interests in common with the West.

Conclusion

Though leaders of sixteen nations (ASEAN+3+3) have vowed to work toward building a an Asian equivalent of the 25-member European Union (EU), the shape of the East Asia Community remains undefined. Most seasoned observers see this project as very ambitious and perhaps overly optimistic. Pessimists warn that unresolved historical issues, different political systems and values, and countries with different stages of socio-economic development mean that attempts at forming an Asian Union *a-la* Europe will be slow and ineffectual, with the outcomes characterized by shallow integration. Most regional organizations are essentially “talk shops” that work through consultations, dialogue and consensus and this will remain so for the foreseeable future. Regional community building is a long-term project. It is worth remembering that the European Union has taken decades to reach its current form and shape.

While a Sino-centric Asian international order might be a long-term Chinese goal, concerns that China will use its growing involvement in the EAC and other regional organizations to diminish the US role in Asia are somewhat unfounded. Just as the US’ exclusion from the European Union did not result in a reduced role and influence in Europe, the US’ exclusion from the East Asian Community would not be detrimental to its interests. The US enjoys enormous advantages vis-à-vis China. The regional and global economic and military balance of power remains in favor of democracies within regional groupings (SCO is an exception). Wherever China finds itself in the company of Japan, India and Australia, it has to be at its best behavior. Additionally, ASEAN does not want to be upstaged by EAS/EAC. Integrating and socializing China in multilateral institutions and thereby encouraging Beijing to accommodate the interests and concerns

of other countries outweighs the risk of China dominating multilateral institutions.

The future of the EAC building will be determined by several key issues involving membership, the role of external powers, ASEAN’s will and capacity to remain in “the driver’s seat”, the EAC’s distinctive character, utility and relationship with other existing multilateral organizations and forums (such as APEC, ARF), and last but not least, the state of China’s relations with the United States, Japan and India which could make or mar progress toward EAC building.

Notes

* The views expressed here my own and do not reflect the policy or position of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies or the U.S. Department of Defense.

1. Canada is arguably the fourth external actor but Canada has long been a fervent advocate of multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific. Unlike the United States, the European Union and Russia, Canada—a middle power—lacks both the will and the capability hinder regional integration.

2. Eric Johnston, “East Asian Community: a Tough Prospect,” *Japan Times*, October 30, 2006.

3. Goh Sui Noi, “Green Light for Study on 16-nation Trading Bloc,” *Straits Times*, January 16, 2007.

4. See Tao Deyan and Zhang Binyang, “Zhuanjia zonglun Zhongguo heping jueqi jinglue” [“Experts Discuss China’s Peaceful Rise Concept”], *Zhongguo Zhengzhi Xue*, May 18, 2004 (originally published in *Guoji Xianqu Daobao*, at www.cpd.org.cn)

5. Mohan Malik, “The East Asia Summit: More Discord than Accord,” *YaleGlobal online*, December 20, 2005 <<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6645>>

6. Kavi Chongkittavorn, “The politics of speed: An Asean Community by 2015?” *Nation* (Bangkok), November 27, 2006.

7. Fred Weir, “Russia, China looking to form ‘NATO of the East’?: A six-member group, seeking to balance US power, meets in Moscow,” *Christian Science Monitor*, October 26, 2005, p. 4.

8. Gerald Curtis, “The US in East Asia: Not Architecture, Action,” *Global Asia*, Vol. 2, No. 2, Fall 2007, pp. 43-51.

9. Mohan Malik, “Multilateralism Shanghaied,” *International Assessment & Strategy Center*, July 14, 2006 <http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.115/pub_detail.asp>; Chen Xiangyang, “Draw up new ‘Greater Periphery Strategy’ as soon as possible,” *Liaowang [Outlook]*, No. 29, July 17, 2006, p. 64.

10. Curtis, “The US in East Asia: Not Architecture, Action,” p. 47.

11. David Lague, “Coming to terms with China’s ascent,” *International Herald Tribune*, November 7, 2005.

12. Mohan Malik, "The East Asia Summit," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 60, No. 2, June 2006, pp. 207-211.
13. Cited from Joshua Kurlantzick, "Pax Asia-Pacific? East Asian Integration and Its Implications for the United States," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 3, p. 72.
14. Samuel R Berger, "The US stake in greater Asian integration," *Global Asia*, Vol. 1, No. 1, September 2006, p. 26.
15. Berger, "The US stake in greater Asian integration," p. 26.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
17. Willem van der Geest, "The East Asian Summit—towards ever closer cooperation?—an EU perspective," European Institute for Asian Studies, Brussels, 2005 <<http://www.eias.org/conferences/2005/fukuoka010905/abstract.pdf>>
18. Oleg Shchedrov, "Putin uses Asia-Pacific summit to look East," *Reuters*, September 7, 2007 <<http://uk.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUKSYD17221620070907>>
19. By pushing for Russia and other countries' participation in the EAS to make it "open and inclusive", China may well be trying to subvert the EAS just as the US diluted APEC's focus by bringing in Russia, Mexico and Chile. However, a former Japanese prime minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone, too has supported Russia's participation in the East Asia economic cooperation, given the importance of its vast oil resources which are required by non-oil producing countries in the region.
20. Vladimir Putin, "Russia's Role In Asia: A chance for cooperation on economic, political goals," *Washington Times*, November 17, 2006, p. 19.



A Role for External Actors in an East Asian Security Community: Indian Perspectives

SWARAN SINGH

Given India's shift to its Look East policy from the early 1990s, and its changing power profile during these last two decades, 21st century India has shown ample interest in being not only an interested onlooker but a partner in ASEAN's efforts to promote its security formulations. The evolution of a security community in East Asia remains one critical component of India's strategic interests in ASEAN's evolving security architecture. It is in this new context that this chapter tries to highlight India's predilections on some of these persistent themes and examine India's interests that will determine the future focus of New Delhi's engagement with this larger East Asian region.

Introduction

THE IDEA of evolving a Security Community amongst the Southeast Asian nations as well as its linkages with external powers have remained at the core of all conceptions about the evolution of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The reason why the theme of 'Security Community' appears as a new phenomenon – as if invented at ASEAN's Ninth Summit in Bali during 7-8 October 2003 – is precisely because the original Bangkok Declaration of 1967 had not been able to go beyond very generic expressions of 'regional peace and stability' as the aim and objective of their nascent organization.

This decision to underplay security concerns in the original ASEAN charter was primarily goaded by Cold War dynamics and by their direct and common fears about external powers – especially the Soviet Union and China – viewing ASEAN as extension of the US-sponsored South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) of 1954. It is against this backdrop that one has to appreciate the fast changing external realities of the post-9/11 era that seem to have influenced Indonesia and other members of ASEAN into ‘reviving’ this focus on security which is believed to have been the core of ASEAN vision right from its inception.

As regards India, in the first phase of ASEAN’s obfuscated security formulations during the 1960s, New Delhi stayed away from being either an influence or an object of ASEAN’s original motivations. In addition to India’s domestic preoccupations flowing from its violent partition in 1947 and complicated political consolidation during much of 1950s, four inter-state wars with China and Pakistan during its first 24 years had kept India too busy to even contemplate walking into avoidable Cold War power projections. Things, however, were completely different in the second round of ASEAN attempts to prioritize its security formulations. Both the end of the Cold War bipolarism followed by India’s own transformation from the early 1990s have created new incentives for India-ASEAN rapprochement.

As regards India’s approach to East Asia, given India’s shift to Look East from the early 1990s, and its changing power profile during these last two decades, 21st century India has shown ample interest in being not only an interested onlooker but a partner in this second phase of ASEAN’s efforts to promote its security formulations. The evolution of a Security Community in East Asia remains one critical component of India’s strategic interests in ASEAN’s evolving security architecture. It is in this new context that this chapter tries to highlight India’s predilections on some of these persistent themes and examine India’s interests that will determine the future focus of New Delhi’s engagement with this larger East Asian region.

The Strategic Continuum

To put it at the very outset, the segregation of South and Southeast Asia is a rather recent phenomenon. Historically, the entire area of the Indian Ocean extending from the eastern coastline of Africa to India and then stretching

beyond to the peninsular and archipelagic Southeast Asia had been viewed as one strategic continuum. In early modern times as well, the European colonial powers, on the force of their ever-expanding colonialism, had facilitated the rise of this ‘regional’ consciousness in this part of the world. Accordingly, the initial conceptions of this larger region had ‘continued to regard security of South and Southeast Asia as integral to each other’.¹

The Japanese, during World War II, had tried to conquer India from its occupied territories of Burma, Malaya, and Singapore which made independent India equally conscious of its security linkages to these Southeast Asian countries even though New Delhi was to remain preoccupied with its more immediate internal affairs and successive invasions from its western and northern frontiers. In the evolution of their security discourse, it is important to note that Admiral Mountbatten’s command in Kandy (Ceylon) during World War II was also known as the Southeast Asia Command. It is from this British formulation that the expression Southeast Asia was to become accepted parlance. Nevertheless, at least initially, till the Colombo Conference of Southeast Asian Countries in 1954, the expression South East Asia had included India, Pakistan and Ceylon as part of this region. It was further reinforced by the Cold War military alliances like the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) that had Pakistan as its integral member.

Later, Cold War semantics were to impose critical divisions not only between South and Southeast Asian nations but, while Southeast Asia was to become synonymous with the original six members of the ASEAN, it was to leave other nations of the continental South East Asia as part of other clusters known as Indo-China, Greater Mekong region, and South Asia. Much of these psychological divisions were to continue for several decades and these could not be overlooked until the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Several events since then have once again revived the mutual consciousness amongst South and Southeast Asia about their inherent linkages and raised the focus on several issues that project these two regions as integral to the same security matrix.

India’s political loss from the collapse of the former Soviet Union was followed by an economic crisis of early 1990s, then followed by the World Bank - induced economic reforms. This was to greatly facilitate India’s Look East policy that was to be centered around India’s economic

engagement with Southeast Asia, especially the ASEAN. More recently, the expansion of ASEAN in the 1990s to include Indo-China also triggered expansion of India's agenda, this process of their mutual engagement resulting in revival of their mutual consciousness of India's strategic continuum with Southeast Asia. At the most visible level, the expansion of ASEAN has also physically connected ASEAN to India's land and maritime boundaries.

In particular, India's historically close relations with the CLMV countries (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam) make New Delhi view itself as an important ally for promoting the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI).² While the ASEAN today seeks access to India's professional and technical strengths, New Delhi highlights emerging convergence in their security and development perspectives: in ensuring peace and stability in their respective regions, especially security of sea lanes of the Indian Ocean for smooth transfer of raw materials, merchandise and energy supplies. As a result, in addition to being part of ARF dialogue from 1995, and BIMSTEC from its very inception in 1997, India has initiated the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation in 2001, it involving five members of the ASEAN.³

Mutual Images and Perceptions

The elite in India had always been conscious of its enduring as well as strategic linkages with Southeast Asian peoples. Apart from their cultural, commercial and civilizational interface since ancient times, India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, had outlined India's vision about this region in his world-famous *The Discovery of India* in 1944:

The Pacific is likely to take the place of the Atlantic in the future as the nerve center of the world. Though not directly a Pacific state, India will inevitably exercise an important influence there. India will also develop as the centre of economic and political activity in the Indian Ocean area, in Southeast Asia, right up to the Middle East. Her position gives an economic and strategic importance in a part of the world which is going to develop in the future.

However, the Chinese attack on India in 1962, the Pakistan-China nexus, and India's own post-Nehru domestic preoccupations were to deflect India's attention and shrink its role in this extended neighborhood of Southeast Asia.⁴ As a result, India remained, more or less, neutral to the formation of

ASEAN. From the ASEAN side as well, while Sri Lanka was invited to join the ASEAN, India was completely ignored by its founding members. No doubt, India had also been, in principle, skeptical of the whole idea of such regional organizations. Given New Delhi's Non-aligned orientation, it carried a strong belief that all such organizations favored a particular security environment and that such organizations seemed aimed against states not sharing the grouping's ideological orientation.⁵

Some of their mutual perceptions about their inherent links and ground realities of interdependence were to be revived following changes in their domestic, intra- and inter-regional as well as global contexts since the early 1990s. As part of its Look East policy initiatives, India was to become ASEAN's Sectoral Dialogue Partner in 1992, then Full Dialogue Partner since 1996, and India has been an important member of Asean Regional Forum since 1995. In 2006, the two sides set up an Indo-ASEAN Science and Technology Fund to undertake collaborative work in research and development, and technology development in areas including food security, the Tsumani Early Warning Systems of India and Malaysia were expected to be networked to provide information on such environmental threats in a matter of seconds.⁶ This is in continuation of India's joint efforts since a tsunami hit this entire region in December 2004.

Mutual perceptions also get reinforced by the fact that India today shares a 1,600-km long land boundary with Myanmar, and maritime boundaries with Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia. It is separated from Indonesia by a very short distance. Also, by virtue of its civilizational contacts in terms of religion, culture, language and trade as well as because of the presence of a large number of Indian people, emerging India once again feels integral to the dynamism of this larger East Asian region.

Nevertheless, given their historical and Cold War legacies, there also remain several hiccups. For instance, in spite of being the second largest country in terms of population and fourth largest economy in purchasing power parity, India is not a member of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). But, at the same time, India being invited to the December 2005 Inaugural East Asia Summit (EAS) has opened a whole new dimension to India-Southeast Asian ties. Similarly, India was an integral part of the second EAS that was held at Cebu, the Philippines during January 2007. The 12th ASEAN

Summit held at Manila with the Philippines as Chair chose to have ten ASEAN members plus six others including India in their deliberations.

The Perennial China Factor

The perennial influence of China is one factor that can not be overemphasized in examining India-ASEAN mutual consciousness and why their overlapping security formulations remain integral to the overall picture. Concerns about China have always been a critical factor in India's vision of Southeast Asia and vice versa. In the mid-1950s, increasing Chinese activism in the Afro-Asian movement had resulted in Jawaharlal Nehru's winding down India's foreign policy overdrive in this region. This was also further complicated by the restive and substantial overseas ethnic Chinese populations in several Southeast Asian countries. Given the history of anti-Chinese riots in some of these countries, engaging or encouraging Indian diaspora was not seen as a favoured option in New Delhi.

The 1990s once again were to witness Chinese-ASEAN and China-India *rapprochement* triggering India's increasing focus on engagement with this region. The fundamental difference in this new phase was that unlike its focus on ideology as the sole locomotive of foreign policy in the 1950s, China, India and ASEAN are all using economic instruments to achieve their political and security objectives. It was during the East Asian financial crisis of late 1990s that China was able to turn the tables on the United States, which had been a traditional friend and ally of ASEAN. In these financial crises, Beijing was able to muster innovative proposals and organize aid and assistance much before all other major players – including ASEAN friends like the United States and Japan. This seems to have greatly facilitated China's projection of itself as a friend and responsible partner of ASEAN.⁷

More recently, the rise of China and its engagement of Southeast Asia as well as the rise of ASEAN as the main driving force in the integration of Asia can be counted as triggers to India's Look East policy initiatives since the early 1990s. At a cursory glance, China has moved very far in its last decade-and-a-half engagement with ASEAN. In security cooperation as well, it has agreed to the establishment of a code of conduct in the South China Sea; acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and has attached significance to ASEAN regional norms on peaceful conflict resolution.

Similarly, in economic cooperation, starting from their Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation of 2002, the two sides have been working on setting up a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) to be realized not later than 2011.⁸

Meanwhile, both China and ASEAN have also been promoting ideas about launching an East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) which can be seen as a precursor to building an Economic Community in East Asia. In financial cooperation, starting from its financial aid during the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, Beijing has signed bilateral swap arrangements (BSA) with all ASEAN members. So much so that commentators are beginning to prescribe caution to ASEAN and suspect China as emerging as a hegemonic power in the region.⁹ All this has triggered several of India's new interests and initiatives in becoming part of these larger East Asian trends.

According to Amitav Acharya, while US hegemony remains a well-known factor and ASEAN has been working towards 'reducing their sense of dependence' on the US security umbrella, it is the rise of China – especially its economic links – which are today 'challenging Southeast Asian identity'. This becomes critical as the expansion of ASEAN strengthens China's leverages as against ASEAN's ability to reinforce its identity while incorporating new members.¹⁰ This is where the role of evolving a Security Community as a bulwark or a mediator between major powers – e.g. Australia, China, Japan, India – becomes critical. Some scholars see the initiation of East Asian Summit process as precursor for an East Asian Security Community.¹¹

Indeed, senior ASEAN diplomats have long talked of an ASEAN Security Community being only a precursor for building an East Asian Security Community followed by a still larger Asian Security Community at large and how, in this process of evolution, India is seen an integral part of this process or evolution.¹² Of course, they remain aware of many constraints that include the complete normalization of relations between China and Japan; acceptance by the US, open or tacit; and the question of continued cohesion and credibility of the ASEAN. India in some ways seem to have its own advantage of having had historical ties with Southeast Asia and having remained far more acceptable to several of these member states of ASEAN.

New Strategic Convergence

From once being seen as on the opposite sides of the Cold War ideological divide, most countries of Southeast Asia and India have since moved towards more centrist ideological frameworks seeking rapid development through economic reforms and opening up to foreign investments from all possible directions.¹³ This is also the period which has witnessed growing convergence in Indian and ASEAN approaches to new and old security paradigms, from traditional balance of power to more recent formulations like building flexible and innovative security communities for dealing with emerging new challenges from terrorism, transnational crime, sea-lanes security to energy security issues and so on.

Indeed, both ASEAN countries and India today have the distinction of having good relations with all major powers which makes it possible for them to think long-term and to debate new formulations that can play a critical role in transforming inter-state equations through systemic changes in the international system. Amongst these, building a Security Community in East Asia remains one most potent and feasible alternative to their conventional focus on organizing military alliances as instruments for ensuring international peace and development. As a result, 'engagement' has come to be the essential first step and the buzzword aimed at avoiding military confrontation, promoting dialogue and maximizing areas of agreement so that peace and socioeconomic progress can be assured.¹⁴

Theoretically, evolving transparency, communications and functional cooperation remain the core of Security Community approach to international relation. Here, in addition to working together in multilateral forums such as Asean Regional Forum (ARF) or East Asia Summit (EAS), and in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process, India has been equally effective in strengthening its ties with individual nation-states of this region. India and Thailand, for instance, set up a joint working group on security in May 2003, and while India and the Philippines started a security dialogue from March 2003, also signing an extradition treaty. Similarly, recent years have witnessed India evolve a strategic partnership with both China and Japan. All this has since transformed the nature of India's engagement with East Asia.

Prospective Role for India

India prospective role in coming years is surely going to continue to be centered around New Delhi's trade-led economic engagement with East Asia, both at multilateral and bilateral levels. This is precisely because India's trajectory of economic growth – hovering around 9 per cent increase in GDP and about 25 per cent growth in its foreign trade – will require India to expand its interactions with existing partners and explore new avenues for cooperation. To appreciate the tenor of India-ASEAN ties, one can cite a speech by the Indian Prime Minister where he talks of India-ASEAN trade having reached \$ 15 billion for 2005 and their target being \$ 30 billion by the end of 2007.¹⁵ This seems to perfectly fit into rapidly growing East Asian nations who also have similar requirements. In particular, given China's and India's expanding bonhomie in the East Asian region their future policies should only accelerate their overall engagement with the rest of East Asia.

All this economic engagement - led transformation is bound to have politico-security implications. Starting from India's turmoil-ridden northeastern region, and India's historical and expanding linkages with the Greater Mekong Region, India's economic engagement continues to intertwine with its security perceptions. As has already been outlined in several expositions of New Delhi's Look East policy, India has already expanded its horizons and now treats the larger Asia-Pacific region (rather than the original six of ASEAN) as its strategic space to build engagements. Integration of CLMV countries into ASEAN has clearly facilitated this process whereby this reinforced strategic continuum allows India to treat this larger ASEAN region as a bridge to catapult India's interactions with the larger Asia-Pacific region.

The fact that all major external powers –the United States, Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, and Japan – share close and warm relations with India will only facilitate India's engagement and cooperation with East Asian region. The transformational economic growth and opportunities in China-India relations and Beijing being increasingly forthcoming in welcoming Indian initiatives in Asian affairs virtually removes the only possible concern that experts have had about India's interactions with the dynamic East Asian region. In some ways this cross-fertilization

promises to be equally beneficial to India's own evolution as the emerging new major player on the horizon.

This increasingly mutual appreciation and interdependence between India and expanded ASEAN clearly promises increasing interactions in coming times. The fact that India has always favoured a soft-security approach makes it one sincere proponent of evolving a Security Community in East Asia. Indeed, India has critical stakes in ensuring the evolution of Security Community in East Asia and in exploring possibilities to replicate and expand that example to the wider Asian region for ensuring peace and stability. This remains an essential imperative for India's continued and peaceful development.

Conclusion

To conclude, in examining India's strategic interests in evolving an East Asia Security Community, we see that its continued engagement with this region and its contributions to these evolving security discourses amongst these nations have never been a matter of choosing between options. The global and regional contexts today seem to be far more favorable and New Delhi today seems to be far more aware as well as capable in pursuing its national objectives of participating in the evolution of security community in East Asia. Moreover, compared to the conventional wisdom of building military alliances, India feels far more at home with this emerging focus on Security Community as it remains much closer to India's strategic culture and ethos. The prospects of India's prospective role in refining and promoting its own security cooperation with East Asia and facilitating intra-regional security cooperation among these countries in this new soft-security framework surely augurs well for all sides.

Notes

1. Devare, Sudhir, *India & Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p. 14. Pakistan, for instance, had been part of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) during 1950s.

2. Yahya, Faizal, "India and Southeast Asia: Revisited", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 25, (2003), Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi at <http://meaindia.nic.in/onmouse/ASEN%20-India.pdf>, p.1. This initiative seeks to ensure smooth integration of CLMV into much developed original six of ASEAN.

3. For details see Swaran Singh, *Mekong-Ganga Cooperation Initiative: Analysis and Assessment of India's Engagement with Greater Mekong Sub-region*, IRASEC Occasional Paper 2007, No. 3 (August 2007), available at http://www.irasec.com/docs/GangaMekong_finalweb.pdf, pp. 47-48.

4. Devare, Sudhir, *India & Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p. 2.

5. Sridharan, Kripa, "India-ASEAN Relations: Evolution, Growth, and Prospects", in Jeshurun, Chandran (ed.), *China, India, Japan and the Security of Southeast Asia*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), p. 118.

6. "India, ASEAN to have partnership in science and technology", *The Hindu* (New Delhi), 8 November 2006, at <http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/001200611080312.htm>

7. Baviera, Aileen S.P., *China's Relations with Southeast Asia: Political, Security and Economic Interests*, PASCN Discussion Paper No. 99-17, (Manila: Philippine APEC Study Center Network, 1999), p. 32.

8. "Interview: Closer ASEAN-China ties important to int'l economic integration", *The People's Daily Online*, 26 October 2006, http://english.people.com.cn/200610/26/eng20061-26_315379.htm

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10. Amitav Acharya, "Constructing Security and Identity in Southeast Asia", [An Interview with Jillian Moo-Young], *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Winter/Spring 2006, Vol.xii, Issue 2, (2006), pp. 158-159.

11. Begi Hersutanto, *Prospects for East Asian Community: Security Perspectives*, CSIS Working Paper Series, WPI 063, October 2005, pp. 24, 27.

12. Wanandi, Jusuf, "Towards an Asian security-community", *Asia Europe Journal* (Heidelberg), Vol. 3, No. 3 (October 2005), p. 323.

13. Traditionally pro-Soviet India and Vietnam have since built strategic partnership with the United States which has been ASEAN's ally from the very beginning.

14. Devare, Sudhir, *India & Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p. 46; for an opposite view see T.J. Pempel (ed.), *Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region*, (London: Cornell University, 2005).

15. "Third India-ASEAN Business Summit: Inaugural Address by Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India" [19 October 2004, New Delhi], Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry website, available at <http://www.ficci.com/media-room/speeches-presentations/2004/oct/asean04/oct19-asean-pmspeech.htm>

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Regional Security in EAST ASIA:

Challenges to Cooperation and Community Building

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editor

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Regional Security in **EAST ASIA:** CHALLENGES TO COOPERATION AND COMMUNITY BUILDING

There is no sign that the countries of East Asia are willing to surrender part of their national sovereignty to a supra-national body as their European counterparts have done. Asia is simply too obsessed with sovereignty, despite all the talk of a borderless, inter-connected world. The long-standing principle of non-interference in other countries' internal affairs remains a sore point within ASEAN, not to speak of the East Asia Community. It continues to hinder the grouping's conflict resolution and crisis management efforts.

- MOHAN MALIK

The promotion of East Asian regionalism is concurrent with an increasing anxiety on the part of many countries about the possibility of China's re-emergence as the hegemon in the region. Great and medium powers of the region ... have begun to fear that China would have too much say in shaping the regional norms and would exert overwhelming influence in the regional cooperative institutions.

- PAN YI-NING

Democracies share a set of liberal cultural norms that promote peaceful conflict resolution on the basis of mutual tolerance and respect. Democratic powers tend to resolve their mutual disputes in a manner short of war. Democracies tend to perceive each other as peaceful because of the democratic norms governing their domestic decision-making processes. What, then, are the democratic norms most conducive to the process of trust building? Some of the most important are peaceful dispute settlement (non-recourse to war, negotiation, and compromise) and legal equality (voting equality and certain egalitarian rights to human dignity).

- SORPONG PEOU



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