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Perpetuating Loyalty: Parental Influence on Early Radicalization in Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

Scholars have debated as to how direct the influence of the parents is in the terrorist recruitment process. While parents may create a favorable disposition towards terrorist activities among their children, do they urge them to join terrorist groups? This paper examines the parents' role in creating conditions for children to become jihadists by drawing on a case study of nine families who have a background in jihadism. It argues that parents involved in terrorism in the past and have remained in terrorist activity and organizations create conditions for early radicalization through values inculcation in the form of fidelity or "ready loyalty" toward a jihad-based ideology, leader, or organization. Families with a background in terrorism and extreme values of Islam tend to nurture and raise their children based on values, ideologies, and beliefs compatible with their commitment to the terrorist network and activism to preserve the ideology. As a result, children commit themselves to an identity at an early age before exploring other options or ideas from different social environments.

Keywords: family, jihadism, loyalty, early-radicalization

Introduction

In May 2018, three families in Surabaya, East Java, were involved in suicide bombings and explosions. All three were members of Jema'ah Ansharud Daulah (JAD), the main pro-ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) organization in Indonesia. The first set of suicide bombings was operated by Dita Oeprianto and members of his family, including his two daughters and his two teenage sons. It happened on 7 May and involved attacks on three churches: Immaculate Saint Mary Catholic Church, Indonesia Christian Church, and Surabaya Central Pentecost Church (Cahya and Boediwardhana 2018). Later that evening, the police raided the apartment of another JAD family in the nearby city of Sidoarjo, resulting in the accidental detonation of bombs that had been assembled in the area in preparation for future operations. The explosion killed both parents and three of their six children. The next day, the third JAD family attacked the Surabaya police headquarters with two motorcycle bombs, igniting both at the front gate and causing the deaths of the parents and two of their three children and serious injuries to the third. The total death toll from the attacks were 18 people, including six adults and ten children from the JAD families (BBC 2018).

Although family-related jihadism is not a new phenomenon in Indonesian history, the Surabaya bombings sparked intense discussion about radicalization within families and the role of parents in transmitting values that lead to extreme violence to their children. Particular families in Indonesia have produced successive generations of jihadists with some even spanning almost seven decades. One example is the family of Fathurrahman Al Ghazi and Ahmad Rofiq Ridha whose father, Zainuri, was a member of Darul Islam, Indonesia's oldest terrorist organization whose origins can be traced back to the late 1940's (Alamsyah and Hadiz 2017). During the Suharto era in the 1980's, Zainuri was jailed for nine years. Imam Samudra, also a Darul Islam member is another example. He was the field commander of Jema'ah Islamiyah's (JI) Bali bombing team in 2002, for which he was later executed by the Indonesian state. Imam

had a son, Umar Jundul Haq, who joined the ISIS and died in a Syrian battlefield in 2015 (Sundaryani 2015). Through kinship and familial ties, Darul Islam has been active throughout most of the Indonesia's post-independence and remains to be a major source of terrorist recruits, not only for its own network but also for the more recently established terrorist groups, such as JAD, JI, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), and Jamaat Anshorut Tauhid (JAT). For instance, leaders and members who were involved in JI operations in the early 2000s or those of JAD since 2016 are also descendants of or have kinship ties to earlier-generation Darul Islam families. For this reason, researchers have long argued that understanding family dynamics and networks are critical to understanding the persistence of terrorism in Indonesia (IPAC 2015).

Despite the importance of families to terrorist movements and operations in Indonesia, surprisingly, only a few specialized studies have been done on the subject. Generally, families have been a neglected topic in terrorism studies, with many scholars who tend to view families as victims of, rather than as important elements in radicalization processes (Milla, Faturochman, and Ancok 2013). The chief purpose of many of these studies is to examine terrorists' motivations, their behavior before the attack, and their personalities (Merari 2010). While they do offer important insights, these studies are unable to illuminate what happens within jihadists' families that might shape emerging terrorist behavior. When jihadists' families are studied, attention has been largely directed to sibling relations and the use of marriage for strategic purposes, rather than the role of parents in influencing their children's attitudes towards violent jihad. In this regard, this paper seeks to examine intergenerational ideological transmission within a family whose members are associated with violent extremism and are convicted of committing acts of terror, focusing on the relationship between the parents and the children.

Based on a case study of nine families, this paper argues that parents whose families have a historical affiliation with terrorist-based ideologies and organizations and have remained engaged in terrorist activities create

conditions for early radicalization of their offspring. These conditions are constructed through inculcation of values such as fidelity or "ready loyalty" toward a violent jihad-based ideology, leader, or organization. The objective of this paper is to explore how values are transmitted within families through the use of Erikson's (1968) concept of fidelity and the socialization model. The focus on the family and their involvement emerges from the following reasons: families have been used by jihadist organizations to recruit their family members to ensure the long-term sustainability of these groups due to their ability to transmit particular ideological convictions across multiple generations and throughout social networks. This paper attempts to look deep into these relationships and to examine the role of the family in values and ideological transmission. It also seeks to describe and analyze the process of an individual's pathway into extremism from the perspective of the family members.

The paper is divided into four parts. It starts by introducing the framework and methodology of the study, and then provides a background on the cases. The second part provides a glance of the intergenerational aspect in terrorism. The next part explains how the family context, its existing relationships and environment can facilitate members to be involved in jihadist activities and organization ending with a summary and conclusion.

Jihadist or Terrorist?

Before delving into the extensive literature on terrorism or jihadism, it is important to address the issues of terminology. Scholars debate whether acts of extreme violence committed by Muslims should be called jihadism or terrorism (Abdulla 2007; Bakker 2006; Silverman 2002). While most literature employs the term, terrorism was first introduced by the Bush administration in response to the 9/11 attacks (Bunzel 2017). However, some scholars and Islamic leaders find the term controversial and problematic as it lacks an objective definition, prone to be politicized, fails to capture the true nature of the phenomenon, and stigmatizes Islam and the Muslim

community. Certain scholars argue that terrorism is inherently subjective and cannot be defined objectively (Schmid 2011). Hence, in academic discourse and government statutes, multiple definitions of terrorism exist.

During the Obama administration, the discourse shifted focus from a tactic to an ideology by arguing that the struggle is against violent extremism. Promoting Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) emphasized the preventive action to terrorism. The administration defined violent extremists as "individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political goals" (Kleinmann 2018, 288). In other words, the term implied that violent extremism are terrorist activities that are ideologically motivated (Bunzel 2017). Nonetheless, the term was also deemed problematic as it remained connected with the war on terror (Schmid 2014).

The term jihadism, on the other hand, is aligned with the Islamic concept upon which most Muslims engaging in extreme violence base and justify their actions. *Jihad*, meaning "to struggle" or "to strive," encompass various meanings, including personal fulfillment, peaceful activism, and holy war. Meanwhile, "jihadism" or "jihadist" (a practitioner of jihad) are the terms used to describe the purpose and the movement. Scholars held the view that the use of this term indicated that the movement possessed a rational and consistent set of beliefs upheld by mentally sound individuals (Bunzel 2017; Sedgwick 2015). After 9/11, the tendency of using the term "jihadis" connoted terrorists and violent extremists. Although some jihadists admitted the term as a badge of honor and explicitly state that Islam encourages terrorism, as it aims to terrorize the enemy of Islam, the term has been perceived differently. Cook (2009) argues that terrorism should be understood as a tactic used by the jihadist. Therefore, calling the jihadist as terrorist is out of place (Cook 2009).

Based on the above, this paper will use "jihadism" and "jihadist" to describe those who perceive themselves as carrying out or supporting violence in the name of Islam without having been convicted of terrorism. Most jihadists studied in this paper adhere to an orthodox definition of

jihad, as originally outlined by Abdallah Azzam during the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s where he advocated for Muslims to defend their territories against non-Muslim occupation (Hegghammer 2020). I use this term without passing judgment on the legitimacy of their actions but rather to acknowledge that the perpetrators consider their acts informed and justified by their understanding of jihad's concept and legal principles. For instance, Darul Islam members who received training and engaged in battles in Afghanistan in the late 1980s or early 1990s are referred to as jihadists since they did not commit any crime under Indonesian law at that time. Similarly, those involved in the Muslim-Christian conflicts in Ambon and Poso in the early 2000s can also be described as jihadists. According to Indonesian statutes, none of these fighters could be legally categorized as terrorists. However, nowadays, the term is sometimes used to also refer to them.

On the other hand, those who have already been convicted of terrorism are referred to as "terrorism" and "terrorist" as used in this paper. This definition is in reference to Indonesia's 2003 and 2018 counterterrorism laws which defines terrorists as those who "use violence or threat of violence to create a widespread atmosphere of terror or fear, resulting in mass casualties and/or causing destruction or damage to vital strategic objects, the environment, public facilities, or an international facility."[1] These will also be employed when referring to extreme organizations and academic discussions related to terrorism.

Family Radicalization and Involvement in Jihadism

In Indonesia, most studies focused on the family as victims of terrorism including how the acts of some members of the family stigmatized other family members. This circumstance is particularly felt by the wives and the extended families of convicted terrorists, who are often left to support themselves financially and live with a sense of insecurity and isolation from their community (Noor 2009; White 2009; Rufaedah and Putra 2018; Akbar and Fujiati 2021; Hidayat and Husna 2021). Meanwhile, the family's role as a radicalization factor are seldom studied.

Scholars believe that family plays a significant role in enabling the radicalization process, as it stimulates an individual's sensitivities by triggering feelings of significance and belonging. Studies by Taylor and Horgan (2006) include family as a key to the context of an individual's development, while Doosje et al. (2016) emphasize the family as driving factors at the *meso* level or social environment level. Families can lead to a stronger sense of group identification and a greater likelihood of experiencing intergroup emotions, such as the feeling of injustice towards one's own group.

Other studies have recognized the importance of family in the involvement of individuals with extremist groups. Some highlighted the family's influence that come in the form of normative support where families grant their consent for involvement in terrorist activities (Orbach 2004), as seen in Pakistan (Asal, Fair, and Shellman 2008), Palestine (Moghadam 2003) and Middle Eastern countries (Post, Sprinzak, and Denny 2003). Others emphasize that generational dynamics also play a role, where the family grooms similar feelings of hatred or a sense of mission, leading young people to act on these beliefs which can be observed in other cases like the anti-zionist movement in Palestine, Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA) in Spain, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, or the Irish Republican Army in Ireland (Post 2007).

Lee and Knott (2017) have identified three conditions that strengthen the ideological connection between parents and children. First, frequent discussions on religious or political matters in regular and open settings provides opportunities for the exchange of ideas, perspectives, and information. It facilitates a deeper understanding of each other's beliefs and can foster a sense of ideological cohesion within the family. Second, a general ideological agreement creates a foundation of mutual understanding and alignment. Finally, when a high religious or ideological salience exists within the family, religion or ideology become an important and relevant part of their daily interaction. This will increase the likelihood of parents

and children to actively engaging with and prioritizing their beliefs (Lee and Knott 2017). All these conditions provide an environment that supports ideological socialization through ongoing, intensive every day interactions (Milla, Faturochman, and Ancok 2013) and thus, motivate individuals to be martyrs (Speckhard and Ahkmedova 2006).

The transmission of these ideological messages are underscored by the parents' decisions on education (Asal, Fair, and Shellman 2008). By making choices related to their children's education such as when they send them to educational institutions compatible to their ideology, parents actively shape the values and beliefs that are instilled in them. The case of the al-Shabbab terrorist organization in Kenya illustrates how an individual's loyalty toward their parents contributes to the embeddedness of these feelings and beliefs toward their parents' mission (Botha 2014).

In the recruitment and retention of jihadists, Harris-Hogan (2014) and Hafez (2015) also highlight the crucial role of family. Jihadist group members share similar ideologies, grievances, and bonds, referred to as "kinship radicalization" (Hafez 2015, 15). Because most of the members of the group are also family relatives, the cohesiveness of the relationship among the family strongly inflluence whether or not individuals will follow their relatives who are already involved in jihadist activities. A study of terrorist groups in Indonesia undertaken by the Institute of Policy and Conflict (IPAC) in Jakarta (2015), Ismail (2006), Hwang and Schulze (2018), and Osman (2010) share similar findings. They conclude that families are an important channel for recruitment into terrorist organizations and are crucial to ensuring the long-term sustainability of terrorist groups due to their ability to foster and transmit particular ideological convictions across multiple generations and throughout social networks. The Southeast Asian terrorist organization Jema'ah Islamiyah is a good example. JI has repeatedly used father-children and siblings' relationships as well as in-law networks to maintain a supply of recruits and community support (Ismail 2007). Parents in JI families routinely choose to send their children (including daughters) to JI-affiliated Islamic schools and mosque-based study groups, and encourage their

children to participate in military training. Moreover, fathers or JI spiritual leaders played matchmaker for young family members, arranging marriages from within the JI community or its offshoots to strengthen and expand the network (Hwang and Schulze 2018). Commonly in Indonesia, families lie at the center of militant communities, along with the *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school), alumni networks, and relations between the extremist *ulama* (Islamic scholars) and their students (IPAC 2015; Osman 2010).

Studying families and their internal dynamics is important to determine how they influence an individual's decision to engage in radical activities. Therefore, the current study focuses on investigating the mechanisms by which engagement and loyalty are perpetuated within the families of terrorists. In doing this, I will focus on the families of jihadists and terrorists (whether parents or their children) in Indonesia. The primary research question can be stated as follows: What is the role of parents who have a historical background in terrorism and who remain active in terrorist activity and organization in creating conditions for early radicalization among their children?

Socialization and Fidelity: A Theoretical Framework

The intergenerational ideological transmission within the family can be analyzed through the concept of fidelity from Erikson (1962, 5) and the collective representation of Durkheim's socialization theory (1956). In his theory, Durkheim emphasized that individuals undergo socialization by adopting the behaviors of their group. He argued that collective representation influences an individual's thoughts and actions, which refers to the shared body of experiences, ideas, behavioral patterns, attitudes, and values held by a group of people. Socialization, then, is a unidirectional process, as he primarily examined how society shapes and molds individuals to conform to the group. Durkheim's primary focus was on the control exerted by the group over the individual in the context of the individual-group relationship (van de Walle 2008). However, this perspective overlooks the role of the agency and freedom of the individual in the socialization

process, representing a significant weakness in Durkheim's theory. He also failed to adequately explain how these collective representations are internalized by individuals or how they exert pressure on the individual.

Despite the limitation of this theory, Durkheim's argument on the importance of the group in socialization is compatible with how family play the role in providing individuals to adopt certain ideas, attitudes, and values. Scholars agreed that family is the first and primary agent of socialization (Grusec and Davidov 2014; Harro 2018; Whitbeck 1999). Through familial interactions, children acquire social norms, cultural practices, and moral frameworks integral to their social development and integration. The family unit serves as a microcosm of the larger social group, wherein individuals learn how to navigate interpersonal relationships, internalize societal expectations, and shape their identities based on the collective representation of the family. In this sense, Durkheim's emphasis on the group's influence in socialization finds resonance in families' pivotal role in shaping individuals' beliefs, values, and behaviors.

Erikson defined fidelity as "the ability to sustain loyalties freely pledged despite the inevitable contradictions of value systems" (Erikson 1962; 1964, 125). Fidelity is the specific quality that emerges from negotiating identity challenges during adolescence. The emergence of fidelity in the fifth stage strongly relates to commitment and loyalty. It is thus closely linked to an individual's exploration of group or family dynamics and his or her commitment to the members of that group or family (Hunsberger, Pratt, and Pancer 2001; Marcia 1993).

The willingness of individuals to be loyal and committed to role choices, jobs or ideologies is at the core of fidelity (Erikson 1968), which indicates a sense of purpose in life and feelings of belongingness to a social setting (Erikson 1988). This includes feelings of loyalty to a particular faith or religious leaders. During the exploration process, individuals usually ask questions about whether or not they should follow a "religion," and if so, do they adhere to the same faith and ritual practices as their family. Individuals may be conscientious in attending religious services at their mosque or church, but only because their parents strongly encourage them

to do so, or they might attend because they have arrived at a personal position that observance of such practices is the correct and fitting thing to do. In this regard, those who identify with their parents may become as pious as their parents. When they accept their parents' or society's roles and values without questioning them or exploring alternatives, they establish an identity achievement by applying the goals and values set by the parents and rejecting others (Erikson 1988).

Parents with their primary role in the socialization process is strongly related to identity formation, particularly on fidelity. Many scholars have noted that fidelity is featured strongly among terrorists worldwide. Crenshaw (1986), Taylor (1988) and Knutson (1981), recognized the occurrence of "fidelity" as a key psychological factor in terrorist motivation. They relate this factor to the identification or identity development process when an individual seeks meaning and a sense of wholeness or completeness (Crenshaw 1986; Taylor 1988; Knutson 1981). Becoming a terrorist is one of the ways to pursue this. Post (1984) links terrorist motivation to a need to belong to a group and the group becomes important for the person's identity formation. The above scholars used the psychosocial theory developed by Erik Erikson (1968).

Overall, using Durkheim's socialization theory provides a framework to comprehend how individuals, including family members, adopt radical beliefs and engage in terrorist activities. By examining family socialization processes, researchers can explore how radical ideologies are transmitted, internalized, and reinforced through familial interactions, shaping individuals' attitudes and behaviors. Moreover, in the context of family radicalization, the concept of fidelity proposed by Erikson can further contribute to understanding the findings. Fidelity refers to integrating personal identity and societal expectations, emphasizing the importance of maintaining a sense of continuity with one's cultural and social heritage. In the context of radicalization, examining fidelity can help unpack how individuals negotiate their identity within the framework of terrorist ideologies and how these ideologies may resonate with their perceived societal expectations or notions of social justice.

Methodology

This study employed a qualitative approach that involved semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and document analysis. Field research was conducted over seven months divided into two periods: six months from January to June 2016, and one month from December 2016 to January 2017. The primary sources consulted include documents from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), including police depositions, statements, and documents written by convicted jihadists from online sources, which provided valuable information on biographies, charges, family links, and organizational data.

The interviews focused primarily on the nuclear family, including the jihadists and their parents (father and mother). To validate the information obtained from blood relatives, the wives and in-laws were also interviewed. During the interview, particular focus was given to the parents who have involvement in violent jihadist activities and organizations. They were affiliated to one or more of the following: Darul Islam (DI) (1949–1962), Jema'ah Islamiyah (JI) (1993–now), Jema'ah Ansharud Tauhid (JAT) (2008–2014), Jema'ah Anshorus Syariah (JAS) (2014–unknown), Jema'ah Ansharud Daulah (JAD) (2015–now), and ISIS.

The selection of case studies across Java was guided by the snowball sampling method. Additionally, various strategies were employed to identify and reach out to potential respondents, including maintaining contact with previous respondents from my master's research, collaborating with colleagues and activists working on terrorism-related issues, and engaging with government institutions. The interviews were conducted over multiple visits, allowing the researcher to observe family interactions and occasionally participate in daily activities such as cooking, meals, and prayers together. It also allowed the observation of family dynamics in a more relaxed and natural setting, facilitating the collection of unselfconscious narratives. Informal conversations played a crucial role in encouraging respondents to openly share their stories.

Profiles of the Families

A total of nine families consisting of 24 respondents were interviewed for the study. Four of the families resided in Central Java, three families in West Java, one family in East Java, and one family in Jakarta. The participants' education ranged from Senior High School or Islamic boarding school (equal to Year 12) to having master's degrees. Seven of the eleven parents were currently self-employed as small business owners, two were clerics, one was a truck driver and the last, a lecturer. Most of the mothers were housewives. With regard to organization, of the 24 respondents, nine were DI members, eight were JI, four were JAS and two (husband and wife) were members of JAT. Two of the eight members of JI were also ISIS supporters. The identities of all interviewees written in this study were kept anonymous through the use of pseudonyms. The table below summarizes the demographics of the families.

Table 1: Families' Demographic Information

Family	Position in the Family	Occupation	Affiliation
Family 1	Son (the jihadist)	Small Business owner	DI to JI (father was also DI)
Family 2	Father (the jihadist)	Small business owner	DI to JI
	Mother	School canteen	JI
	Son (the jihadist)	Small business owner	JI
	Son's wife	Kindergarten teacher	
Family 3	Son (the jihadist)	Truck driver	DI to JI (grandfather was DI)
	Son's wife	Housewife	JI
Family 4	Father (the jihadist)	Preacher	DI, JI to JAS
	Son no. 1	Small business owner	JAS
	Son no. 2	Small business owner	JAS
	Son no. 3	Small business owner	JAS
	The wife of son no. 2	Housewife	JAS
Family 5	Mother	Small business owner	DI, JI to ISIS (husband is in jail for violent activities, and son died in Syria)

Table 1: (*continued*)

Family 6	Father (the jihadist)	Lecturer	DI, JI to ISIS (son died in Syria fighting for ISIS)
	Mother	Housewife	
Family 7	Son no 1 (the jihadist)	Small business owner	DI to JI (father was DI)
	The wife of son no 1	Small business owner, housewife	DI to JI (father was DI)
	Daughter of son no. 1	Unemployed	-
	Son 2 (the jihadist)	Small business owner	JI
	Son 3 (the jihadist)	Small business owner	JI
Family 8	Son (the jihadist)	Preacher	DI, JI to JAT (father was DI)
	Son's wife	A cleric, housewife	JI to JAT
Family 9	Father (the jihadist)	Small business owner	DI
	Mother	Housewife	-

Socialization from Above

Family Relationships

Families with active memberships to violent extremism ideologies and organizations consider violent jihadism not only as an Islamic teaching but also as an obligation. Therefore, they teach about jihad as part of their essential religious instruction and affirm that violence such as in the form of bombings or fighting in conflict areas are legitimate ways to defend Islam. They believe that God (Allah) will grant a reward to those who carry these out sincerely. As with religiosity, engagement in jihadism does not occur naturally. People becoming jihadists is primarily the result of the transmission process of beliefs and practices of violent jihad in a specific environment.

Socialization within the family, whether intended or not, results in the transmission of norms, attitudes, and behavior across generations. It also involves the acceptance of values, standards, and customs from family members. Two components play a role in the process, namely the relationships within the family, and their resources. The family relationships

include the interactions between and among individuals in the family. As will be illustrated by the participants of this research, the family relationship among families with a historical involvement in terrorism is characterized by a top-down relationship—like father-to-mother or parents-to-children. This top-down relationship influences and affects the values transmission during socialization.

Religious Upbringing and Climate

As a significant part of life for Muslim families, religion demonstrates this top-down relationship. Vermeer (2014) suggested that involving children in daily routine activities significantly influence their religious upbringing. This method of upbringing make children follow their parents' religious path, for instance, by wearing long *hijab* and *niqab*, attending Salafi schools, or maintaining a long beard. Another way is through performing religious practices at home, like reading the Quran, praying five times a day, and fasting during Ramadhan. This also includes religious attendance (e.g., participating in *halaqah* or a religious meeting, or *pengajian* (religious study gathering), discussions on religion and politics at home—engaging children in religious discussions letting them hear political discussions between parents and friends. The family's religious upbringing affects children's religious commitment that is compatible with the parents' piety because they perceive their parents as the "architects" of the family. One of the jihadists narrated

> When I was a kid, I was already listening to them. Maybe this is a natural process—if there were friends over, they always talked about politics and the movement, the condition of politics in Indonesia, how Suharto is repressive towards Muslims, the traps set up for Komji (Komando Jihad), so that there were friends, now dead, who were executed by the government or by their own friends. I heard all of that. But the context of what I heard was always that Indonesia needs to be saved from the despots. My father's friends were from Aceh, Sulawesi, Tasik, [and] Garut.

> My father always asked me to go with him when he went out, and of course every time he met someone, they talked about politics. My grandfather was one of the founding fathers of Indonesia. He liked to use Dutch so that I couldn't understand. I found it strange once when my grandfather rebuked Muhammad Natsir, the PM of Indonesia. My grandfather was arrested three times. My father was also arrested.[2]

Another confession from a jihadist:

> The basic principle of our father's teaching is to uphold the Islamic law as the sole principle of Indonesia. My father was very emotional. When the government was on TV, he called them, *toghut* (tyrant), *dajjal* (the deceiver), *fir'aun* (The Pharaoh of Egypt), and the like.

Religious upbringing also influences the climate within the family which includes family relationships and emotional bonding. In the process of socialization, families implement a combination of parental control and support. This combination can also be perceived as authoritative parenting style where parents establish rules which children are obliged to follow. The implementation of this parenting style places the family as the first learning point for children. Because of this, parents' friends and colleagues also become influential factors in their children's education. Meanwhile, outside education only become secondary to education by the family.

> Because the education we are hoping for is family education, that's what lasts. In the past, people thought that the only qualified education is that from the family. But it's not only that, it's also the environment. The environment contributes only half to character building, it's a side effect of knowledge. But one more thing, because of that, the mother or father have the responsibility, in this regard, to direct towards what is good, in the sense that we are not giving them the chance to have worldly desires because our principles, my own personal principle, is that we live in this world, so we should not be a slave to this world, but [we should

> think about] how we can give something good to the world, manage this world. Something we should understand is that the whole family has a duty to religion, to *sharia* (Islamic law). So, for example, it's not only me who has this duty, but my wife, my kids, we all have a duty to *sharia*.

Uniformity of Islamic Teaching and Method

In addition to religious upbringing and family climate, families maintained their ideological socialization through the uniformity of parent's teaching methods which refer to the consistency and similarity in the way parents educate and guide their children. It also implies that both parents employ similar approaches, techniques, and expectations when it comes to teaching and imparting knowledge and values to their children. This uniformity is manifested in various aspects, including discipline, communication styles, rules and regulations, and overall parenting style. Each parent understands their role in parenting—the father at the center of the ideological teaching while the mother as the field coordinator. In this context, the father is responsible for teaching the mother about Islam, and the mother, the children. She acts as a bridge to communicate the children's needs and problems to the father. As a result, children understand that everything that happens in daily life should be communicated first to the mother. However, this direction of transmission does not mean there is no communication between the father and children. Children admire and honor their father as a jihadist. Through spending time with them, engaging in storytelling, and sharing experiences, the father provides guidance and imparts values such as bravery, discipline, and perseverance. This helps children envision their own future, inspired by their father's example. The mother only acts as the primary communicator and the translator of the father's messages and teachings.

One good example of children receiving direct ideological transmission from the father happened during one respondent family's visit to jail. I accompanied them to the Nusakambangan prison in Cilacap along with

the jihadist's children and parent. At that time, I met and talked to the jihadist, who was wearing an Afghan-style dress with a turban on his head. We talked about the importance of Islamic values education for children, jihadism, and Islam in Indonesia. I observed that the way they interacted with each other seemed close and warm. His younger daughter was sitting on his lap, the three sons sitting next to him, and his wife sitting in front of him. They were watching a video together from his wife's mobile phone, sometimes laughing as they listened to their father's explanation about the video. He used the time for hearing and answering his children's inquiries about anything that might not be satisfied yet by their mother. He also asked his two sons to memorize their Quran recitation and corrected the false parts from their recitation. It was clear from the visit that the father tried to contribute to the parental role by catching up on what he had been missing during his absence.

In this regard, mothers are likely to focus on the teaching on the importance of being a good jihadist family. They teach their daughter to be a good jihadist wife through their devotion to the parental roles in the absence of the father. They also teach their son to be a good jihadist husband through the example of the father's involvement in jihad activities.

The uniformity of thought or ideology between the father and the mother is also significant to the success of ideological transmission. Families share the ideology of *manhaj Salaf* (methodology of receiving) and it refers to following the way of *salafusshalih* (the pious predecessors) in the *aqidah* (belief), in worship and in interacting with others—wearing the *niqab* (face cover), lengthening the beard, not making friends with the *kafir* (infidel), a woman needing her husband's permission before leaving home, a man not needing his wife's permission to leave home are examples. To illustrate, in Solo, Central Java, one conversation between one of the respondent mother and her daughter talked about how the daughter judged other women's wearing of the *hijab*. For her, women who wore *niqab* like her mother was the most pious. Those who wore the *hijab* differently did not properly understand their obligation as Muslim women.

Family Resources

Family resources also contribute to the socialization process. These come in two forms: economic, referring to material assets, such as income, wealth, housing, and other physical resources; and social capital referring to non-physical assets such as ties to kin, friends, and social or organizational affiliation. Knowledge and emotional support and others can also be part of family social capital (Uhlenberg and Mueller 2003, 126–7). This research shall focus on social capital.

Family Engagement in Jihadism and Organization: A Source of Loyalty and Commitment

Engagement in jihadism is not a natural occurrence but rather the result of beliefs and practices being passed down in a specific environment as supported by the family also known as the social capital. In Indonesia, an individual's loyalty is not only indicated by the frequency of their involvement in jihadist activities; it can also be determined by their family background. For some jihadists, being born into a family that has a long historical and genealogical background in jihadism automatically considers them as being already committed to the organization and its ideologies. For instance, having a father who is a member of Darul Islam will bring a level of prestige to the "aspiring" jihadist in the movement. As Darul Islam is considered a pioneering and substantive jihadist organization, being part of it reflected well on family members. Even though the organization is now fragmented, second and third generation members of the movement are still influenced by their image, and feel pride in the fact that their family predecessors were part of the cause. One of the respondents in Jakarta said:

> Being part of the Darul Islam movement for us may [already] be in our blood, but at first, we didn't realize it. At the beginning, we thought we just had to study the Quran, but then in high school, our father directed us to become part of the *usroh* (religious study group) belonging to the movement. At that time, we still

> weren't aware, our parents only directed us there. Everything was arranged by our parents and we just had to follow. In fact, we were "bad boys" but when they ordered us to [join the usroh] we just did what we were told. I went to Afghanistan, also because that's what my parents wanted. But in fact, we also lived in an environment where the people were in the movement, the Gerakan Pemuda Islam (GPI-Islamic Youth Movement). My father was also involved in the Cikini riots in 1957,[3] 1962,[4] and 1965,[5] Komando Jihad (Jihad Command) in 1979, and the riots against the government's regulation to make Pancasila the sole ideology of Indonesia in 1982, and he was also involved in the Priok riots in 1984.[6] I understood that our movement [GPI] was to correct the government but we still supported the Indonesian state (NKRI: Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia), the state that the heroes fought for. That was our struggle.

Having family members historically involved in the movement is an enabling factor for attitudinal commitment. Individuals are more likely to develop their commitment as well as affective attachment to the organization knowing that his or her family was involved. Incarceration is not regarded as a crime because for them, their father or grandfather was defending Islam. The spirit of jihad seemed to be passed on to the next generation having thought of their actions as having the same motivation and spirit as their predecessors. As a respondent from Subang said:

> My father was in jail during the Old and New Order era. Both times were because he wanted to uphold Islamic law in Indonesia. But that doesn't mean that I am following his path in and out of jail, but I am following his spirit to defend Islam.

This statement also shows that individuals can have allegiances to organizations different from their parents—for example, from JI to ISIS or from other network like Noordin's network to ISIS. Noordin's network is a group that clearly stated that they would follow al-Qaeda's goals

and target of action which is different to ISIS (ICG 2007). Meanwhile, JI itself is anti-ISIS, but quite a few JI people have aligned with ISIS (IPAC 2015). Another example is Imam Samudra who was a member of Noordin's network, while his son, Umar Jundul Haq, went to Syria to fight for the Islamic State. The family of Imam Samudra are likely to consider Umar's fighting as jihad because he kept that spirit of defending Islam whatever his affiliation was. These individuals nevertheless consider their actions as consistent with and a continuation of their father's struggle.

Jihadist fathers also serve as models of masculinity that their descendants can emulate through their own involvement in activism (Duriesmith and Ismail 2022). Premised on the belief that being a good Muslim man is different from being a good Muslim woman, a good Muslim man should balance his life between being an activist of Islam and being a leader of the family. Once he becomes engaged in an organization, he should give not only his energy and loyalty to the organization, but also his money and time, including family time. As a Muslim man, he does not belong solely to his family but to the Muslim community in general. Therefore, defending Islam through engaging in Muslim associations or *Jema'ah* is one of their responsibilities that sometimes takes priority over responsibilities to the family (Ismail 2019).

In return, Jihadist organizations also provide support to religious transmission within the family. For instance, Jema'ah Islamiyah (JI) conducts routine *tarbiyah* (religious training), held simultaneously for men and women members but with different topics and venues. IPAC (2017) reported that women who did not go to JI schools but married into JI families were expected to receive similar *tarbiyah* (religious training) from their husbands (IPAC 2017, 5). The training held for women prepared the wife to support and encourage her husband to do jihad and discussed the main roles of women in the family emphasizing obedience—being a wife who must obey her husband. Loyalty to their husbands is then formed among the wives of jihadists.

> Honestly, I didn't want to know because then I would think about it, especially when I was still staying with my mother, she would know if I was worried, but it's even more uncomfortable if I don't know anything because it's unclear. So, for example, if my husband asks me to wait for three months, I just wait. If he tells me, I'm prepared. My husband taught me, if he went away for three days, I should be prepared for three days, even though often he came back earlier than three days.

Another told her story,

> My husband said I should stay home, and I agreed with that. There's no benefit to leaving the house, there's just gossiping, and we women like to chat and talk about other people. There's a lot of housework to do, and I can study the Quran with other women at home. My child is studying at LIPIA (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab-Islamic and Arabic College of Indonesia) in Jakarta. I've never been to Jakarta to visit him. My husband says I don't need to.

Therefore, the first loyalty embedded in the family is the loyalty of the wife toward the husband. Although they believe that they have different responsibilities, wives support their husbands in teaching the same ideologies and dedicate herself to her children's well-being and education daily. Moreover, she is obliged to obey and protect her husband and the family's dignity. When other people, or even their family, are curious about the husband's absence, wives sometimes hide or lie about the reasons for him being away.

Overall, being born into a family that has a historical background in jihadism can lead individuals to have a similar level of loyalty and commitment, and develop their attitudinal attachment toward the organization. With their family having been part of the struggle, they also gain a sense of belonging. These individuals do not need to go through typologies[7] set out by Taylor and Horgan (2006) because they were born into

a *mujahid* family that exposed them to the world of jihad earlier than others. Their involvement in jihadism did not start as a clean slate but skipped ahead by the "ready loyalty" that led them into the early stages of radicalization. Moreover, the picture of the mother's obedience toward her husband, their father was a model of loyalty and commitment for the children. They learned about loyalty and commitment by seeing and examining how their mother submitted herself to God. Therefore, as moral gatekeepers, the mother's attitude and behavior determines their children's role in maintaining the family ideology.

Family Revenge: Feelings of Anger and Hatred

Many jihadist family members have powerful feelings of anger and hatred towards perceived foes, giving them a disposition for revenge. Many terrorism scholars agree that revenge is one of the most important motivations found in terrorist attacks. McIntyre (2016) stated that vengeance may be the most common emotion that drives people to become terrorists. This revenge can be done on behalf of their comrades and in the form of committing acts that are against the social norms (McIntyre 2016, 5). These feelings of anger and hate about Islam's plight are motivated by the experiences of family members and are passed on to the children. Post (2010, 18) describes this phenomenon as "bred in the bone"—when a mother nurses her child on the mother's milk of hatred and bitterness, the need for vengeance is reproduced. The mother is therefore essential in transmitting values, thoughts, and ideas to her children, enabled by the trust built upon their relationship as mother and child.

Iqbal and His Father

The life story of Iqbal, a jihadist from Subang, West Java who fought in Afghanistan for six years from 1987 to 1993, illustrates this as well. He shared that his father, an extremist since the 1970s, was absent from his life for five years beginning when he was in the fourth year of primary

school. His father was among those who dissented against the Indonesian government's 1985 ruling to implement the state philosophy of Pancasila as the sole principle for all mass organizations, including Islamic organizations, and thus, was implemented by Suharto's security services.[8] When he was in his third year of Junior High School (SMP-Sekolah Menengah Pertama), Iqbal eventually saw his father again, during which his father asked him to transfer to the Islamic Boarding School Al-Mukmin at Ngruki, a school well-known for having educated many jihadists (IPAC 2015). He followed his advice. His father went on the run again from authorities and it would be another two years before they meet again. He was in his final year of Senior High School (SMA-Sekolah Menengah Atas) when his father urged him to undertake military training in Afghanistan after he graduates from boarding school. Once again, Iqbal followed his father's instructions without question.

While in Afghanistan, Iqbal realized that his training was preparing him to become a fighter, something he had not previously considered. At first, he thought that he was being trained to become a good Muslim—to have Islamic knowledge as well as physical strength. As it turns out, the core atttributes of a Muslim fighter were being knowleadgable in Islam and being physically strong. Since the time he was in school, the experiences of his father and Muslims around the world had taken root in his mind. His father also told him that their separation was the fault of the Suharto regime and its anti-Islamic policies. Iqbal admitted that he wanted to kill Suharto, whom he regarded as having treated his father badly. Therefore, his motivation for training in Afghanistan was to fight back against the Indonesian government and to avenge his father.

According to Iqbal, every *amaliyah* (jihad operation) has a motivation and purpose. Most people who went to Afghanistan had the intention of bringing jihad back to Indonesia. They shared similar feelings of hatred towards the state and the government and wanted to take revenge. They commonly referred to the New Order regime's persecution of Muslims, including arresting and interrogating without warrant those opposing

the implementation of Pancasila, and those who protested at the Tanjung Priok riots in 1984 when the armed military troops fired at demonstrators, killing more than 100 people. Survivors of the Tanjung Priok incident gave talks about their experiences and the brutality (e.g., beatings and torture) of state officials. Many were tried and sentenced with one to three years imprisonment, on charges ranging from subversion to resisting arrest.[9] In Iqbal's case, he saw the Indonesian government as an enemy of Islam and he used photos of Suharto and his Catholic Defense Minister, LB Moerdani, for target practice when he was in Afghanistan. Even when he was learning the jurisprudence of jihad while in training and how it should not be conducted with negative feelings, he nonetheless despised the New Order regime and considered them the enemy.

Imam Samudra and the Community

Another example was the story of revenge of Imam Samudra as analyzed by Angus Mcintyre (2016) in the work, *Imam Samudra's Revenge*. McIntyre examines the terrorist activities of Samudra, which included a series of church bombings in 2000 and the first Bali bombing in 2002, for which he was executed by firing squad in 2009. He argued that Samudra justified the 25 bombs that was detonated in churches across Indonesia on Christmas Eve if year 2000, as his revenge for the 250 Muslims who were killed in the communal violence between Christians and Muslims in Ambon and Poso from 1999 to 2000. Meanwhile, the first Bali bombing in 2002, for which Samudra was the field commander of the bombing team, was inspired by the 9/11 attack on the United States and was justified as revenge for the harm done to Muslims worldwide by the "infidel" Western powers (McIntyre 2016).

A similar story came from Hasan, an Afghan veteran who was in the same cohort in Afghanistan as Imam Samudra. He admitted that his motivation for having military training in Afghanistan came from his grandfather's stories about being part of the Darul Islam movement and

their armed struggle. Even though his parents never urged him to undertake jihad training, he felt jihadist blood surging through his veins and wanted to follow in his grandfather's footsteps. Learning about his grandfather's life, he was convinced that the government was primarily responsible for the injustices against the Muslim community, in the past and at present.

Hatf and Traumatic Experiences

Hatred and anger can also arise from children and family members witnessing unpleasant and tragic events. As the police raid homes and make arrests of family members especially if conducted with excessive force or in a humiliating way, as it frequently happens, result to traumatic experiences. Children, on occasion, witness violent arrests of relatives and the police searching their homes, damaging their possessions, and leaving the household in a mess. Thus, it is not just the arrest of loved ones that cause children to feel distress and anger toward the law enforcement agencies but also the way in which this is done. This can include seeing physical violence against family members, most often their father, explosions, gunfire, and large crowds of onlookers and sometimes the media around their homes during and after police raids. The trauma creates fear and distrust toward security officials, particularly if the children believe their father is innocent.

The life of Hatf Saifurrasul, the son of Saiful Anam, the convicted terrorist, illustrates the above point. Hatf joined Islamic State when he was 12 and died in Syria when he was just 13 years old. According to an account published in IS media on 20 March 2007, he witnessed the police violently abusing his father during a seige at his house in Temanggung, Central Java. When the seige ended, the police arrested his father and saw in horror how they shouted at, punched, kicked, and stomped on his father and interrogated him about a gun that his father owned and had hidden. Before the incident, his father expressed that their time in Temanggung was the best time he had with his son because they enjoyed an extended period living together. In the aftermath of his father's arrest, Hatf was often sad and confined himself in his room. He believed that the police had taken

his happiness away from him and his family when they arrested his father. Then, at the age of 10, his mother took him to study in a *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) run by his father's colleague. In this *pesantren*, Hatf studied Salafi-Jihadist principles such as the meaning of *kufr* (infidel) with regard to non-Islamic government, and a book on *Al Wala' Wal Bara'* regarding loyalty to Islam and disavowal of all that is not Islamic, and devotion toward the belief in the oneness of God. He loved to watch videos about the Islamic State's extremism and to sing the Islamic State's *nasheed* (Islamic chants). At the age of 12, he told his parents that he wanted to *hijra* (migrate) to Syria and do jihad there. He was motivated to go because some of his teachers and friends in the *pesantren* had been to Syria to fight for and defend the Islamic State. The initiative to go to Syria came from Hatf himself, but his parents were fully supportive and gave him money and their blessings.

Overall, families mentioned above made no secret of their hostility and animosity toward the government, as well as toward other religions and Western countries. The desire for revenge motivates their involvement in extremist actions. This motivation is inherited intergenerationally in the family through socialization such as political discussion, *halaqah* participation and jihad activities. Socialization practices allow parents to influence their children's point of views.

Bi'ah: Living in an Islamic Environment

Finally, another way jihadists create a family environment conducive to the transmission of values is by living in a manner favourable to Islamic values or *Bi'ah*. Families always take the characteristic of *bi'ah* (Islamic environment)[10] into consideration when nurturing children to manage and protect them from "undesirable" influences and "inappropriate" values. They are careful in choosing a pious neighborhood, a well-regarded *madrasah* (Islamic school), a suitable job, and maintain having only Muslim friends. All of these decisions relate to the *manhaj* (system) or values of the parents. One of the respondents said, "I should obey my parents because it is obligatory in Islam. Therefore, when I wanted to apply for non-Islamic

studies at a university and dreamed about being a public servant, my parents refused my request and asked me to apply to study in Afghanistan."[11] *Bi'ah* is also important so that people in the neighborhood share similar values and beliefs. In this regard, children tend to accept and view the teaching as something common to everyone influencing their dreams for the future.

The life of Hatf Saifurrasul reveals how family background and living environment led to his radicalization. When he was a baby, his father was a police fugitive wanted for the 2005 Tentena market bombing in Sulawesi. To escape the police, he moved the family from one place to another. In picking where to stay, his father chose a neighborhood with values similar to the family, such as near friends and jihadist colleagues' houses. His family had moved to Poso during the conflict so that his father could participate in the jihad against Christians and the state. Living in a village with many other jihadists, the people surrounding the family supported the value transmission. Even as a small child, Hatf was familiar with the calls to "*takbir*" (the Arabic term for the phrase *Allahu Akbar*—Allah is the greater), "shoot the *kafir*" (infidel) and the sound of bombings. At four years old, his father began taking him to activities such as jihadist gatherings, *ta'lim* (a religious study circle) or socializing with the other jihadists in the village. This created a family environment that supported the intense ideological socialization of the children. The parents realized that without these factors, the religious family climate would not be successfully established. Therefore, when the 12-year-old boy was able to join ISIS in Syria, own a gun, and fight in battles against infidels, his parents were proud. As his father, Saiful Anam, wrote in his account:

> *Subhanallah* (glory to God) [...] *rohimakallah* (may God have mercy on you) O my little martyr. We are so proud of you, with your small body and young age. You have proven that you have a lot of guts and bravery, that you left us to pursue God's order, and may God accept your martyrdom, O, my child.

> *Junud daulah khilafah* (the soldier of the Islamic State) who is aged 13 years old from *nusantara* (the archipelago) is ready with this AK-47 and its variants in his right hand, a handgun of 9 mm in his waist, and two grenades in his front pocket and a compass. His small body covered with grey stripes pant and gamis (a robe) like a typical uniform of the Islamic State's soldier made him looks manly. A turban that wrapped around his head looks untidy which shows that he was just a kid. An unexpected statement came from him to his uncle: "Uncle, if I am martyred, please give my savings to my younger siblings." His uncle was shocked and stunned for a while and replied "*InsyaAllah* (if God wills) *Mas*."

The case of Hatf Saifurrasul highlights how family background and environment can play a significant role in the radicalization of a young individual (Zuhdi and Syauqillah 2020). Being exposed to a family environment where jihadist ideologies are supported, and living in a community where such values are common, can profoundly impact the development of a child's beliefs and attitudes. As part of the socialization process, constant exposure to certain Islamic beliefs, values, and customs through interacting with family members, friends, neighbors, and community members who share similar beliefs and practices reinforce among children similar religious ideologies. Done and continued to be done within the social fabric of the Islamic environment contributes to the process, shaping children's loyalty and attitude toward what they perceive as the enemy of Islam.

Conclusion

The process of socialization within families plays a significant role in transmitting norms, attitudes, and behavior across generations. The process is conducted in an environment where the family, particularly the parents, agree to apply religious upbringing to not only influence children's religious commitment but also to shape the overall family climate. Positive family relationships and emotional bonding are also crucial components of

socialization. Parental support and control establish rules that children are expected to follow. The family serves as the primary learning environment, with external education playing a secondary role. Furthermore, parents' friends and colleagues also exert influence on children's education.

As discussed above, parents socialize their children during daily family conversation and interactions. Both parents are aware and are involved in the process of understanding each role and function and within this framework, although the father holds the central role in teaching the ideology, the mother acts as not only the field coordinator but also the keeper of the ideology whenever the father is away. The mother becomes responsible for all family matters particularly when the father is absent—attending jihad activities or imprisoned—running the home, the business, earning the family income in addition to all duties that her husband left behind. In this situation, the role of the mother is not only to keep the family together but also to maintain the ideology of the family.

This paper discussed the role of parents in creating an environment enabling the early radicalization process through values inculcation of fidelity or loyalty toward jihad-based ideology, leaders or organizations. Based on the interviews with the nine families, it shows that the family relationship and resources perpetuate and support fidelity to jihadism by continuing the engagement to a jihadist organization. Parents remained loyal to the ideology and the leaders of jihad, by preserving the feelings of anger and hatred toward people or institutions that they considered as enemies of the family. Parents socialize religious practices, beliefs, political discussion and jihadist activities to their children.

This paper examines the factors that make ideological transmission successful in this type of family. From the families' narratives, it shows that several factors are central to the success of ideological transmission within the family. The first is the uniformity of the transmission's direction from father to mother to children. These families believe that the father is responsible for teaching the mother, and the mother is responsible for educating the children. The second factor is the uniformity of thinking or ideology that is agreed upon and shared in the family. The last factor is the uniformity

of method in the ideological transmission to raise the children religiously within the frame of the family ideology that they have shared and believed. Based on these factors, I conclude that the father is ideologically dominant, and the mother conveys those ideologies by acting as the communicator and translator of those ideologies.

This paper has important implications for counter-terrorism initiatives. First is that by studying jihadist's family circumstances, clues can be found regarding how best to turn the person away from violence. Involving families in the disengagement process is important to bring back parents' role as the first socialization agent. However, including family in counter-extremism initiatives should also consider the background of each family as they influence individual jihadists differently. For the families in this paper, where parents have radical values and high loyalty toward jihadist figures or ideology, there is little prospect of engaging them in any kind of disengagement or de-radicalization processes. Nevertheless, working with this type of family is also important because they may be persuaded to disengage, and this might in turn affect the outlook of their jihadist family member. One way that might be useful is to involve them in a dialogue which discusses and reflects on their past and current life and into the future, particularly their children's life. The objective of this dialogue is to show the family and the jihadist that they have other options for their lives without involving violence and extremism. Further research is needed to investigate what type of family environment is effective to support counter-extremism initiatives.

About the Author

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Endnotes

[1] See Law Number 15, 2003; Law Number 5, 2018.

[2] All quotes are direct quotes from the interviews. Interviews were done in Bahasa and translated into English by the author.

[3] The Cikini Riots were the assassination attempts on then President Sukarno which took place while he was going to his son's school in the Cikini quarter of Jakarta in 1957. Several grenades were thrown in his direction, and although the president escaped the attempts, several people were killed, including children. Lieutenant-Colonel Sukendro who was in-charge of the investigation reported that members of Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia) party and GPII (Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia) had taken part in the attack, but they were not directly involved in the assassination. See Madinier (2015, 254).

[4] In January 1962, another assassination attempt on then President Sukarno happened while he was visiting South Sulawesi. Some senior leaders of Masyumi and PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia) were imprisoned due to the allegation of their involvement. See Ricklefs (2001, 326).

[5] During 1965, many Acehnese rebels, Darul Islam fighters in West Java and followers of Kahar Muzakkar also laid down their arms. In the same year, Kahar Muzakkar, the leader of the Darul Islam movement, was killed in his hideout in the hills of South Sulawesi.

[6] The Tanjung Priok riots was an incident that occurred in the port area of Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta on 12 September 1984. Four members of the As-Saadah mosque were detained after a riot erupted on 8 September 1984 in response to a soldier who flushed a pamphlet of a sermon on a mosque wall using gutter water, and without taking off his shoes. On the night of 12 September incident, some members of the congregation of the mosque went to the Military District Operations Command (Kodim) of Jakarta to demand the release of the four members of the mosque. The Indonesian military opened fire upon thousands of people who came to Kodim causing the victims to run in all directions. Some victims who escaped were detained and tortured by the military. Some sources said that the incident started with the community's refusal to accept Pancasila as the sole ideology of the country. See Pusat Studi dan Pengembangan Informasi (PSPI) 1998; Fatwa 2005; and Wasis 2003.

[7] Taylor and Horgan (2006) categorized jihadists into three typologies to show the commitment and willingness of jihadists to carry out violence: first are those who have direct engagement with violence; second are those who have less direct involvement but are still central to creating the potential for violence, such as through recruitment of suicide bombers, construction of bombs or transport of munitions; and third are those who are involved in activities which may be legal, but are still vital for enabling terrorism, such as political activism, preaching, and community mobilization.

[8] In August 1982, the New Order implemented Pancasila as a sole ideology (*azas tunggal*). At that time, then President Suharto declared that all socio-political forces, particularly the political parties, should accept the state ideology as their principle. As a result, when MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat – People's Consultative Assembly) declared that social organizations (*organisasi masyarakat*) should also implement Pancasila as a sole ideology, major debates on the issues started. See Prawiranegara 1984; and Morfit 1981.

[9] See the KontraS 2011.

[10] *Al-bi'ah* literally means environment in Arabic. It employs different meaning in the Qur'anic context. In the context of Islam and environment, it argues that God created nature as pure, beautiful, and in a total harmony. Therefore, humans are responsible for its care, including protecting it from any kinds of pollution. There are two kinds of pollution: physical and spiritual. Physical pollution includes the pollution of water, air, seas, and so on. Religious or ethical pollution includes murdering, stealing, violence and other types of attitudes that damage *tawhid* or unity of God. See Haneef 2002.

[11] Direct quotation from interview, Jakarta, 5 April 2016.

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